Security in Peace Research and Security Studies

1 Introduction

In the Covenant of the League of Nations (1919) and in the United Nations Charter (1945), ‘international peace and security’ are used as key goals of both to be achieved by global & regional systems of collective security.

International relations relies on knowledge in political philosophy, history and international law, and it was influenced by the three ideal type traditions that were identified with realism, pragmatism, and idealism. Peace research and security studies are two research programmes within international relations. Both research programmes are identified with one of the two common goals and purposes of the United Nations.

This talk addresses two questions: How have the concepts of security evolved in both schools during the 20th century? Did a) the global contextual change in 1990, b) globalization, and c) the emerging ‘anthropocene’ trigger a reconceptualization of security?

2 The Two Schools and Three Traditions

International relations emerged at the Peace Conference in Versailles (1929) when policy advisers agreed to establish scientific institutes for the study of international relations to focus on causes, conditions, and forms of war and peace, and on approaches of international conflict resolution. Between 1919 and 1939, an idealist approach focusing on international organizations and institutions prevailed.

During the Cold War (1947-1989) international relations was dominated by theoretical approaches developed primarily by American scholars. Between 1917 and 1991, the theoretical debate in the East was influenced by Marxist-Leninist ideology and Maoist thinking. In Asia,

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Africa, and Latin America different traditions prevailed that were often inspired by third world intellectuals. Since 1990 the US intellectual dominance in IR has declined, and the Soviet influence disappeared. Since then an increasing theoretical and conceptual diversity has emerged and many new centres of conceptual innovation are emerging in all parts of the world.

2.1 Scientific Traditions of International Relations

Three intellectual traditions on IR co-exist:

- the *Hobbesian* or *Machiavellian realist* with a primary focus on power politics and on military strategy;
- the *Kantian idealist* focusing on international law;
- the *Grotian rationalist* pursuing cooperation irrespective of power difference and the democratic deficit.

While in the early years of IR legal perspectives in the Wilsonian tradition prevailed in the UK and US, since 1945 scholars working in the US have dominated the thinking and writing on IR. These three ideal type traditions and at least five fundamental debates have affected the research in the two schools of peace and conflict research as well as in security, strategic, and war studies.

X.2.2 School of Peace and Conflict Research

Peace research as an independent research programme was established in the inter-war period by Quincy Wright and Lewis Frye Richardson. In response to the realist paradigm in International Relations (IR) during the Cold War, peace research centres were established starting in the USA in many other countries.

During the Cold War, peace research focused both on the militarized East-West conflict and on the issues of underdevelopment and North-South relations that was aimed both at the scientific community and as alternative expertise for social movements. Since 1990, peace and conflict research has been confronted with many new challenges, with new wars, problems of nationalism and ethnicity, and a rethinking on security. While during the Cold War the major focus were critiques of the security and armament policies, since the 1990’s many peace researchers have shifted to a widened and deepened security concept, especially to societal, environmental, and human security issues.

Since 1964, many peace researchers and peace and conflict research institutes have cooperated in the framework of the *International Peace Research Association* (IPRA). For those who have focused on ‘negative peace’ (Galtung 1969), security issues, and conceptual approaches have been a major concern.

Since the late 1960’s, many peace researchers critiqued the approaches of security studies from theory-guided as well as policy perspectives. During the 1980’s, critical peace researchers focusing on ‘alternative’ security advised as alternative experts political parties, social movements and the media, thus contributed to a conceptual debate that mobilized millions of people in Europe against the deployment of new nuclear weapons and missiles, but also for the disarmament and human rights. During the Cold War period a narrow security concept prevailed that focused on the political and military dimension in most peace research studies.

2.2 School of Security, Strategic, and War Studies

International and national security, strategic, and war studies are research programmes in the realist or Hobbesian tradition. From the 1940’s to the 1980’s strategic studies dealt with military affairs. Security or strategic studies emerged in the US after 1945 when the new US global military role created a need of the national security, military, and intelligence commu-
nity for policy advice, but also a political interest in an intensive national debate to sustain high military expenditures. In 1948, RAND was set up to improve policy-making. During the 1950’s and 1960’s, security studies applied systems analysis and contributed to the development of doctrines and to the debate on theories of nuclear deterrence, focused on arms control, strategic decision-making, alliance policy, counter-insurgency, and economics of defence. In the 1970’s area studies, arms race theory, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and advanced technology, and intelligence were added. Since the 1960’s security studies became an academic undertaking distinct from the approach of think tanks. Research programmes were set up at leading US universities, and in the 1970’s sections on international security studies were formed in ISA and APSA.

According to Wæver and Buzan, security studies “emerged in the US and was exported to Europe where they were conducted in foreign policy institutes, military academies, and military staff colleges training military officers. Leading military strategic thinkers were Blackett, Liddle Hart, Howard and Freedman (UK), Aron and Hassner (France), and Bertram and Rühl in Germany. In the Soviet Union the two policy think tanks: IMEMO and the Institute of US and Canada Studies, became centres of policy innovation during the Gorbachev era, and their concepts contributed to many Soviet foreign policy initiatives in the late 1980’s. The main global security studies institution is the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) that was founded in 1958 in London. The IISS tries to facilitate contacts between government, business, and analysts on international security.

Since 1990, ‘critical security studies’ emerged in the US, Canada, and UK. Between both research programmes of peace research and security studies, many scientific disputes existed on theoretical assumptions, methodological approaches, and on policy issues where their concepts of security were mostly ignored.

X.3 Evolution of Security Concepts in Security Studies

Since 1945 two new concepts of ‘international peace and security’ in the UN Charter (1945) and ‘national security’ in the US National Security Act (1947) entered the vocabulary of international politics and relations.

During the Cold War period (1947-1989), for the realist mainstream in IR, the ‘national security’ concept focused on the state as the referent object that prevailed both in the political debate and in the research on ‘security studies’. But what did the key goal of this analysis, the concept of ‘security’, mean for this programme?

In the Cold War, Arnold Wolfers noted a shift from a welfare to a national security interpretation of the ‘national interest’ that become synonymous with national security. He cautioned that “‘security’ covers a range of goals so wide that highly divergent policies can be interpreted as policies of security.” As a core value of a nation, he defined “security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked”. He acknowledged that security dangers cannot be measured objectively but are always the result of subjective evaluation and speculation.

For Frei and Gaupp (1978) security is both a “value symbol” but often it is used as an empty formula. But which values are to be protected against which dangers? Among them are a minimal economic welfare, a certain political and social autonomy, and status as a group, or the survival of the system. The more the intended values are above the desired level, the higher the degree of security will be. State security as the realization of state values at a desired level is being endangered at three levels of conflict and uncertainty: a) within society; b) within political and non-political relations of the state and society towards its context and to international organizations; c) within the context in other states and societies and in international organizations. This pointed to four functional levels of state security of reproduction,
production, steering, and integration. Both interpreted insecurity as a consequence of conflict and uncertainty where values are being threatened by scarcity and or inconsistency, and by an uncertainty whether they can be reached in the future. Achieving security depends on whether, a) both value scarcity (conflict on distribution) and value inconsistency (due to ideological conflict) may endanger values; and b) incomplete information and a missing coordination of action lead to uncertainty. The degree of security depends on the externally determined uncertainty of conflict and on the self-determined strategies for reducing insecurity. These studies remained unnoticed in the English security studies literature.

Buzan (1983: 1) argued that “one needs to understand the concept of security in order to have a proper understanding of the national security problem, and secondly, that in its prevailing usage the concept is so weakly developed as to be inadequate to the task.” For him security is an underdeveloped concept that has been ‘ambiguous’ and ‘contested’ due to its partial overlap with the concept of power and to the interest of policy-makers to maintain its ‘symbolic ambiguity’. Buzan’s objective is “to develop a holistic concept of security which can serve as a framework for those wishing to apply the concept to particular cases”.

Buzan analysed as referent objects individuals, states, and the international system. Individual security is seen as a social problem (‘social security’) with the state as a protector and as a source of threat. National security is analysed as an object of the interrelationship between the idea of the state, its physical base, and its institutional expression. The nation state is confronted with manifold threats and vulnerabilities. In the international system the state is confronted with international anarchy, a specific system structure, and security complexes that pose a defence as well as a power-security dilemma for the state. He concluded with a plea for a holistic view of security that discusses national security in relation to the individual, the state, and the international system.

In the US the renaissance of security studies as an academic field started in the mid 1970’s when the Ford Foundation sponsored several strategic centres in security studies, and when the International Security (1976) journal was founded. For security studies theory creation, testing are preconditions for theory applications.

In 1992, Lynn-Jones conducted a review of international security studies (ISS) where he defined as its object: “international violence and threats to the security of states” with two key themes: “1) the causes and prevention of war, and 2) strategy – how military forces are used for political purposes” while “the effects of wars” received less attention. He defined ‘national security’ as “defending a particular state against external threats”, for ‘international security’ as “security interdependence renders the unilateral pursuit of security impossible”, while ‘global security’ refers to “institutions to deal with ecological, economic, military and other threats to the global community or even the survival of the planet”. Within ISS, its scope of analysis from a narrow focus of ‘national security’ on violence and war to a wide focus of ‘global security’ remained controversial, but a consensus emerged that the traditional war and peace issues remained important but that the nature of threats should be broadened when they became a cause of conflict, and economic threats should be included. He added to the agenda for future security studies: regional security issues in the developing world, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, US defence policy, US grand strategy, problems of nationalism, causes of peace and cooperation and economics and security, but not environmental security issues that were then suggested by Ullman, Myers and Mathews.

Stephen Walt (1991), a leading American neo-realist, observed a “Renaissance of Security Studies” since the mid 1970’s when they started to become “more rigorous, methodologically sophisticated, and theoretically inclined”. In his view, the main focus of security studies is “the phenomenon of war”. They may be defined as “the study of the threat, use, and control of military force” by exploring the conditions “that make the use of force more likely, the way the use of force affects individuals, states, and societies, and the specific policies that states
adopt in order to prepare for, prevent, or engage in war’. He argued against a widened security agenda because this would destroy its intellectual coherence. Walt added to the agenda of security studies: domestic politics, causes of peace and cooperation, power of ideas, end of the Cold War, questions of economics and security, refining of theories, and a protection of the database.

Edward A. Kolodziej (1992) called for a richer conceptual, broader, interdisciplinary, theoretically more inclusive, and … a more policy-relevant understanding of security studies. Instead of an exclusive focus on ‘American national security’ based on a narrow notion of realism, he proposed to analyse “international security or security per se” including the “threats posed by states to groups and individuals” and those posed by “non-state actors” such as guerrilla, terrorism, and low-intensity warfare, and the dual nature of the state as an object of these movements and as a “major source of international insecurity”. This reflected a call of a deepening of the security actors, away from the narrow state-centred focus, for both security by whom and for whom. He proposed a set of guidelines, including 1) a broader scope of ‘reality’; 2) the behavioural and normative assumptions on which the research is based should be states; 3) the disciplinary and interdisciplinary scope should be widened; 4) the historical and empirical bases for generalizations should be widened; 5) the problem to be solved should determine the scope and parameters of normative theory; and 6) “resist the temptation to consign security studies to a ghetto in the academy”.

The dispute between Walt (1991) and Kolodziej (1992) reflects for Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde (1998) the debate between state-centred traditionalists and a wider concept of security with different referent objects and sectors or dimensions of analysis. Buzan and the Copenhagen school opted for the wideners and combined five levels of analysis (international system, international subsystem, units, subunits, individuals) with five security sectors (military, environmental, economic, societal, political). Their key innovation has been Wæver’s theory of securitization that is defined as an intersubjective process that is socially constructed. While the traditional referent object of security has been the state, the primary referent object of security are the people who may be threatened by another or their state.

Terrif, Croft, James, and Morgan (1999) noted “that there is no agreement what constitutes security”, because its core “contain normative elements that mean that analysts and policymakers cannot agree upon a definition through an examination of empirical data”. Many national policy-makers and IR officials have redefined security concepts and agendas since 1990. They noted a disagreement on the referent point and on the nature of the threat. For Ken Booth (19954) “the enemy is us, Western consumerist democracy … is the problem.” In their perspective “security and security studies at the end of the twentieth century seem disaggregated and bewildering.” This is due both to the end of the Cold War, but also due to the “intellectual vibrancy of the subfield of security studies”.

Steve Smith reviewed the changing conceptualization of security between 1980 and 2000 when “the concept of security was both widened and deepened”. International relations and security studies have changed, “neo-realism is no longer dominant,” and “the state is no longer the only actor, and less privileged than before.”

Within security studies, he distinguished between traditional security studies that adhered to the state as the key referent object, while the non-traditional literature discussed a) alternative defence and common security; b) the Third World security school, c) Copenhagen school, d) constructivist, e) critical, f) feminist, and g) poststructural security studies. In light of 11 September 2001, Smith (2005) interpreted all concepts of security as theory-dependent what makes a neutral definition of the concept impossible. He concludes that “the events of September 11 support those who wish to widen and deepen the concept of security,” although this event has been used to strengthen the state and military security.
Based on the critical theory and stimulated by Booth, and Smith Richard Wyn Jones (1999) developed an emancipation paradigm for security theory and practice and argued that with the end of the Cold War the old concepts and theories “lost whatever limited relevance they once enjoyed”. He distinguishes between deepening, broadening and extending security suggesting that security analysts should concentrate “making individual human beings the ultimate referents” of analysis what must be understood as “a prerequisite for bringing about comprehensive security”. He argues that “theories of security must be for those who are made insecure by the prevailing order, and their purpose must be to aid their emancipation.” and “critical security studies [should] be capable not only of mapping out the contours of the present but of plotting a course for the future”.

Ken Booth (2005), a conceptual leader of critical security studies called for a bottom-up critique of the orthodoxy in security studies and for a rethinking of the security debate, after the US response to 11 September 2001. In his view the ideas that shaped the mainstream realism during the Cold War: “derived from a combination of Anglo-American, statist, militarized, masculinized, top-down, methodologically positivist, and philosophically realist thinking, all shaped by the experiences and memories of the inter-war years and World War II and the perceived necessities of the Cold War (Booth 2005). He argues that this worldview: “continues to survive and flourish because the approach is congenial for those who prosper from [its] intellectual hegemony”. According to Booth (2005), CSS should be “more self-conscious and sophisticated,…self-reflective … and open to change”, that “seeks to expose the problems of contemporary social and political life” from a distance. It should avoid “static interest”, should be “ethically progressive”, aim at “emancipation” based on a “broader agenda”, and offer a “better understanding of the relationship between theory and practice”. He called for a deepening of the analysis by including other referents than the state, from individuals to humankind and he supported a broadening of the security agenda.

Michael Sheehan (2005) observed that the reference to security as an “essentially contested concept” was often used as an excuse for not even trying to define what the key concept of strategic and security studies means. While the security problems, agendas, policies, and the focus of the competing schools addressing security studies have significantly changed since 1990, the question remained unanswered how this has affected the meaning of the key concept of security, and how such a reconceptualization of security has occurred.

The security concept in strategic and security studies has hardly been defined in the literature. For Sheehan (2005: 178) how security is defined is vital “because it is a crucial factor in determining how societies choose to allocate their scarce resources, and what is deemed to be a legitimate political discourse.”

Ole Wæver (2004) noted an increasing split in the debates on security studies in the US between offensive, defensive, neo- and post-classical realism, as well as constructivists, and neoliberal institutionalists and the emergence of distinct theories on security in Europe he associated with Aberystwyth (Booth, Wyn Jones), Paris (Bigo) and Copenhagen (securitization theory).

The intellectual leader of the Paris school is Didier Bigo who is inspired by Bourdieu, Foucault, and other French sociologists, and Cultures & Conflicts is a major platform. His empirical work has shown: “how internal and external security merge as agencies compete for the gradually deterritorialized tasks of traditional police, military and customs that jointly produce a new threat image by connecting immigration, organized crime and terror. Insecurity is largely a product of security discourses and security policy.”

The contextual change of 1990 has triggered manifold changes in the thinking on security in strategic, security, and war studies. But this debate on reconceptualization of security has remained self-centred, often due to the lack of knowledge on theoretical debates in other parts of the world and a lacking participation of their representatives in global debates. For the pol-
icy elites the annual and regional conferences of the IISS offer a platform to discuss security policy issues. Except ISA, the World Conferences on IR, UNESCO, no platform exists for a global debate on reconceptualizing security.

While most authors agree that a widening and a deepening of security have occurred the changes in the security concept were hardly defined. But on the basic changes in the theoretical approaches, the security problems, agendas and policies since 1990, a consensus emerged. The reviewed literature did not refer to the sectorialization of security such as energy, food, water, health or livelihood security, nor to the human security conceptualization and to the human security debate in the peace and development community. The debates outside the Western world were in most cases ignored. This self-centred Western security dialogue has remained unchanged. This has been a continuity that has remained unchanged by the end of the Cold War.

X.4 Security Concepts in Peace Research

The key goal of the peace research community has focused on the ‘peace’ concept. Galtung distinguished between ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ peace defining positive peace as the absence of ‘structural violence’, and negative peace as the absence of ‘physical violence’. While ‘positive peace’ is closely connected with social justice, overcoming exploitation and granting of social, economic, and individual human rights, ‘negative peace’ focused on research on wars, conflicts, armaments, arms control and disarmament policies and strategies.

While the concept of ‘security’ affects both positive and negative peace, it was discussed by those researchers who worked on military and state-centred security issues during the Cold War. Schwerdtfeger (2001) discussed security as an opposite term like violence, power, aggression, war, enmity and conflict. With the development of the modern nation state the original understanding of peace was replaced by the security concerns of the state, which was reflected in both the state sciences and in political science. In peace research, traditional peace researchers understood peace within the security realm while critical peace researchers saw peace as a potential for development. How have they conceptualized security during and after the Cold War?

This review on the security concept will be selective, based on IPRA Proceedings and assessments of peace research results. At the seventh IPRA conference in 1977, two contributions focused on security dealing with “The Doctrine of National Security” in Brazil (Cavalla 1979) and “Security policy options for the 1980’s – new perspectives for a policy of détente and arms reduction in Central Europe” (Brauch 1979). Both reflect different policy concerns and research agendas.

Cavalla, a former minister from Chile, critiqued the concepts of national security as the ideologies of the nation state, many of them were then ruled by military dictatorships “which implement new types of states of exception, constituting the expression of the bourgeois counterrevolution in dependent countries”. In his view this “doctrine [is] for the military who execute centralized government functions” and it is “related to other bourgeois counterrevolutionary theories” that were used to legitimize “national security states” and their actions.

Brauch (1979) dealt with arms control theory and practice pertaining to Europe and argued that “security should not be seen only in terms of a military balance of power. Other elements: economic potential and ideological attractiveness and stability should be included in any power equation”. Both contributions were symptomatic for the security-related discussions within IPRA: a fundamental critique of a concept that was used by the military elites to legitimate their rule and repression, and a reformist attempt to look for ways out of the doctrines of mutual assured destruction. But both did not conceptualize what they meant with security.

At the eighth IPRA conference in 1979, Gert Krell (1981) offered a first analysis of “the development of the concept of security”. For him, the security concept has been “one of the
most important terms of everyday political speech, and one of the most significant values in political culture”. In his definition “security means first absence of danger and protection against danger, or … the presence of desired values.” He pointed to the object of protection (territorial inviolability of the state, citizen, physical survival and autonomy) and referred to a threefold dilemma “of securing peace with military means in the Nuclear Age”. He also noted an extension of the concept to ‘economic’, individual non-military dimensions of security: globalization and interdependence, and he observed new developments for security policy, such as resource scarcity, interdependence among actors and issues, new patterns of military, political and economic conflict; a reduced utility of the military instrument in the pursuit of security goals, an increase in complexity of decision-making, and unprecedented problems of adjustment and global responsibility.

Since 1990, many of these reflections on security were applied by governments in their broadened or extended security concepts, e.g. in two German defense white papers of 1994, 2006.

These conceptual considerations were developed further by Jahn, Lemaître and Wæver (1987) and later by the Copenhagen school.

The 13th International Conference of IPRA in 1990 focused on “Reconceptualizing Security” with contributions by Randall Forsberg, Lothar Brock, Patricia Mische and Úrsula Oswald. In here introduction, Elise Boulding referred to a narrow and wider concept.

Forsberg (US) and Brock (Germany) adhered to a narrow military security concept, while Mische (US) and Oswald (Mexico) included environmental security dangers. Forsberg (1992: 67-78) argued for an alternative security system based on non-offensive defence and peacekeeping, she pointed to positive conditions for demilitarization but referred also to dangers on how a new arms race could emerge due to inertia, vested interests of military officers and defence industries. Brock argued that the fear of a nuclear war was replaced by a widespread fear that the natural basis of human civilization may be destroyed through the dynamic of this very civilization; that the biosphere may be thrown out of balance, with unforeseeable consequences for all existing social systems; that … environmental destruction will darken the expectations of future generations.

Mische (1992: 103-119) saw in past military activities an obstacle to new systems of security and argued that the advancement of world peace is essential to ecological security. She suggested an increased focus on the linkages between the environment, peace, and security.

From a third world perspective, Oswald (1992) outlined strategies to overcome the development myth and enter peaceful post-development ecotopia by critiquing three strategies of, a) the integration of liberal and neoliberal economies and the formation of huge economic blocs with their respective backyards; b) a new economic order, and c) an “autonomous development with some temporary, sectoral, or regional delinking from the world economy” based on forces “from below and based on ecological and non-violent criteria”. She argued that the third alternative “point the way to a peaceful, sustainable green alternative path that could change the nature-society relationship, and produce an ecologically viable, non-violent beginning of the next century.”

These four conceptual assessments of July 1990 pre-empted the debate between the adherents of a narrow security concept and the proponents of a widened, deepened, and extended security concept that has been in the centre of the debate in international security studies and peace research since the early 1990’s.

Brock (2004) remained sceptical of an extension of the security concept. While a widened security concept would overcome the territorial fixation of security by a functional approach, a widened concept would extend the categories of military thinking to non-military issue areas...
and thus potentially contribute to their militarization. He suggested as an alternative … a return to a comprehensive discourse on peace arguing that a transformation of security policy towards demilitarization could better be achieved with a narrow rather than with a widened security concept. He pointed to the ambivalence of the extended security concept that can be used both to emphasize the need of a civil conflict transformation and to legitimize a limitation of civil rights and freedoms domestically.

**Johan Galtung** in his early writings (1951-1980) avoided a conceptualization of security, but in 1982 he suggested alternative security doctrines. Twenty years later, in the mission statement of Transcend security was mentioned once as: *Non-military Approaches to Security and War Abolition*. While Galtung repeatedly criticized the security concept he did not offer any systematic analysis of security similar to his definition of peace.

The SIPRI director **Alyson Bailes** (2006), noted three processes of change for the conceptions of danger and security in the post Cold War era: “a) diversification of the security agenda, b) diversity of actors, and c) the preference for solutions involving action rather than restraint”. The forms of violence have broadened from intra-state conflicts to transnational opponents (terrorists, lawlessness, and criminality) and interpersonal violence. Thus, the security goal of governments has widened to the “protection of people and their rights against the whole range of such disorders” with an increasing focus on internal security. In addition non-military risks of climate change, desertification and disasters to the state and people have increased. While the Westphalian system of nation states dominated the security analysis during the Cold War, since 1990 new actors both below and above the nation state and transnational actors are objects of security analysis.

Paul Rogers, a former director of the Bradford School of Peace Studies, saw at the heart of a new security paradigm three drivers: “the widening wealth-poverty divide, environmental constraints on development, and the vulnerability of elite societies to paramilitary action. The paradigm … has been evolving largely unnoticed for at least a couple of decades, and there have already been numerous indicators” (Rogers/Dando 2000; Rogers 2002). He argued that this socio-economic divide, environmental constraints, and the spread of military technologies are most likely leading to conflicts what requires “to develop a new paradigm around the policies likely to enhance peace and limit conflict”. That should focus on a) arms control, b) closing the wealth-poverty divide, and c) responding to environmental constraints.

In a German project on the future of peace (Sahm/Sapper/Weichsel 2002, 2006; Jahn/Fischer/Sahm 2005) two contributions by Brauch and Zangl discussed security issues. Brauch (2002) argued that disarmament should not be addressed any longer within a narrow concept of national security, but should use a broader security concept. Zangl (2005) discussed to which extent the post-national constellation of international security policy has differed from the national constellation that has evolved since the 1990’s, a shift that has occurred in international economic, environment, and communication policy since the 1970’s. Since the 1990’s in international security policy there has been a shift in security dangers from national (other states) to transnational (terrorists, crime networks) actors. He argued that the supranationalization of governance gradually set in since the 1990’s with the significant increase in UN peacekeeping operations, most of them dealing with civil war situations where the participation and the use of force was accompanied by an increasing ‘international’ legitimization through international security concerns and not solely of national security interests. This implies that international security policy must be analysed as a multi-level policy that differs from the security policy of the national constellation. He did not discuss whether this shift implied a reconceptualization of prevailing security concepts.

Due to this widening of the security agenda, the strategies and means needed to cope with new dangers have also changed. This was a concern of the UN SG’s High Level Panel on Threats (UN 2004). Accordingly the scope of security concerns and the security agenda of
international organizations have widened significantly since 1990 “towards fields where economic, social and other functional processes (and competences) prevail”. However, this review of the changes in the security agenda and actors during and after the Cold War has avoided a discussion of the security concept and to which extent a reconceptualization has taken place.

From this review of selected writings on security by peace researchers in the Western world, it may be concluded that the analysis of conceptual issues of security was no major preoccupation within peace research. While peace researchers have already referred to the need for a widening of the security concept since the late 1970’s, and discussed the need for a widening and deepening of the concept, no systematic assessment exists that traces the manifold changes of its use.

While a reconceptualization of security could be observed, this was rarely linked to the fundamental contextual change of 1989, only partially to globalization, and not to the shift towards a new phase in earth history.

**X.5 New Post Cold War Conceptual Disputes and Efforts for an Integration of Critical Approaches**

A lively debate on the reconceptualization of security was triggered by the end of the Cold War. The major turning point has been 9 November 1989 and not 11 September 2001. Several innovations were evolving prior to the global turn of 1989-1991 suggesting:

- A peace and security policy ‘beyond deterrence’;
- a **widening** of the agenda (of what and for whom?) of US national security during the 1980’s;
- a **broadening** of the scope from ‘national’ to ‘common’, ‘mutual’, and ‘comprehensive’ security;
- a **deepening** of the concept of security from ‘national’ to ‘international’, ‘global’ and ‘world’ security;
- a **sectorialization** of security from national and international to ‘ecological’, environmental security and
- an **alternative focus and goal** from an offensive towards ‘alternative security’ since the late 1970’s;

Since 1990, the contextual change has triggered several additional conceptual innovations suggesting:

- a **widening** of the scope (**of what**) to at least five ‘sectors’ or ‘dimensions’;
- a **deepening** of the actors, referent objects (**for whom and by whom**) and levels of analysis from the nation **‘state’ upward** to ‘international’ actors and **downward** to sub-state actors, such as micro regions, communities, ethnic groups, clans, families, and individuals;
- a **reorientation** from a ‘state-centred’ to a ‘people’s-centred’ approach suggested by UNDP, UNESCO, the Commission on Human Security and by the Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities;
- and a **further development** of people-centred human security concepts from human to gender security and to a combined concept of human, gender, and environmental security;
- a **sectorialization** of security as reflected in energy, food, water, health, and other sectoral concepts as climate security;
- a **shift** from a ‘national constellation’ to a ‘post-national constellation’;
a *diversification* of the theoretical approaches within international relations and security studies from positivism to constructivism, and postmodern, postpositivist, post structuralist, feminist, critical security studies;

a renewed *shrinking* towards a narrow national military security concept within the policy-oriented strategic community primarily in the US that are involved in consultancies for the military and defence firms;

an *integration* of the manifold critical approaches with the emergence of a ‘New European Security Theory’.

The controversies between security studies and peace research that have been very heated from the late 1960’s to the late 1980’s have mostly disappeared after the end of the Cold War. Rather, the debates on the widening and deepening of the security concept have occurred primarily within the two research programmes:

- primarily within the *security studies* community between the neo-realist proponents of a narrow security agenda and those that have proposed a widening and deepening of the security concept both from realist, critical realist, or Grotian realist and many other postmodernist and poststructuralist approaches;

- and to a much lesser extent within the *peace research* community where some of the founding fathers have cautioned against a militarization of widened security concepts, while others have pointed to a shift in the urgency of non-military human security dangers and concerns that require utmost efforts (climate change) where the military tools and logic are irrelevant.

The three schools that have developed in European security studies have stimulated the emergence of a ‘New European Security Theory’ which reflects the divergent critical theoretical approaches to security in Europe, prefers qualitative interpretative methods, and which have partly integrated themes previously addressed in peace research (Bürger/Stritzel 200545).

According to Booth (1997), the end of the Cold War “provoked an intellectual crisis for strategists adopting an orthodox approach to security”, while this rupture was less severe for those who had previously challenged this orthodoxy.

The CASE manifesto brought together a team of young, theoretically minded, and promising scholars that try to overcome the dichotomies of US debates in IR and security studies. This effort to integrate the critical approaches in peace research of the 1970’s and 1980’s with the critical approaches in security studies and by bringing different disciplines together into an emerging new integrated European theoretical approach that is fundamentally distinct from the American versions of structural, classical, or neo-classical realism, or neo-realism, is also a signal of a scientific emancipation of a new generation of European scholars working on security issues that have returned to the creative roots of the diverse European intellectual traditions. This vibrant intellectual debate challenges the often self-centred American scientific debates.

However, this new European centred security discourse and theory development must broaden its scope to include the critical conceptual security debates outside Europe and North America. This is both a challenge and an opportunity of a theoretically trained new generation of security scholars to engage in scientific discussions with young scholars from Asia, Africa, the Arab World, as well as from Latin America and the Caribbean.

While the dispute between representatives of traditional, neo-realist, and narrowly focused security studies on the one hand, and policy-oriented peace researchers of the older generation has re-emerged especially since 2000 especially due to the policies legitimized by the events of 11 September 2001, there seems to have been no debate between peace researchers and
critical security studies. In this literature, human security concepts were not discussed and sectoral security concepts were ignored.

Much of the vitality of the vibrant theoretical and conceptual debate on security seems to have taken place since 1990 within security studies in Europe, and especially as a result of the new approach of the Copenhagen school and the critiques of the school of CSS. However, in nearly all contributions to the Western or North American and European debates, the contributions of scholars in Asia, Africa, in the Arab World, and in Latin America were mostly ignored. The reconceptualization of security should not remain a purely inter Western effort; the work of scientists representing the other 5 billion people should be analysed more closely.

These conclusions are drawn from the above debates:

- The security agenda has horizontally widened from a narrow military political security perspective to a more comprehensive one that includes the economic, the societal, and the environmental sectors or dimensions.
- The actors of security policy have also widened and are no longer (except for some realists) limited to the state, increasingly sub-national, supranational, and transnational non-state actors must be included.
- So far the human and gender security debate and the sectoral security concepts have not been systematically integrated by both approaches.

In summer 2009, 20 years after the end of the East-West conflict, both the security concept and security policies remain highly contested, but the debate has been less polarized between two opposing scientific poles of peace research and security studies. Both schools have focused primarily on their in-group debates, and there have been fewer controversies between both schools that have dominated the 1970’s and 1980’s during the the first (1969-1974/1979) and second détente (1987-1989) and the second Cold War (1979-1987).

Based on the achievements of these debates, the author suggests with regard to the future:

- a critical reflection and deeper understanding on the concept of security, its etymological and historical evolution, and contemporary use in different cultures and religions in all parts of the world and not only in Europe, North America, and in the OECD world;
- a progressive integration of the components of a new critical theory of security, including a deepening of the actor and referent objects, a widening of the sectors, dimensions, and fields;
- an internationalization of the new thinking on security by overcoming its Northern (European, North American) focus and Western theoretical resource base.

According to the Human Security Doctrine for Europe (2004), “… ‘civilians should play a significant role in a new EU force designed to combat global insecurity and protect citizens in conflict zones.’” This report “argues for a fundamental rethink of Europe’s approach to security – not only within its borders, but beyond. In the 21st century, when no country or region is immune from terrorism, regional wars, organized crime, failing states or the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, Europe cannot ignore the growing insecurity around the globe”.

Security has been and will remain a ‘contested concept’ in international relations, in strategic studies, and in peace research in the decades to come due to both contextual political challenges (transition to the anthropocene), diverse cultural impacts, and scientific innovations.