

A South Asian Debate on Peace and Security: An Alternative Formulation in the Post-Cold War Era

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Security is a contested concept. It has a different meaning and value for scholars, policy makers and analysts from all over the world. The fundamental questions such as: Who is being secured? From what threats?; and How, that is, by what means?, therefore elicit diverse responses. Furthermore, in the post-Cold War context, the debate on the nature and meaning of security has been enlarged to include attempts to *broaden* the meaning of security, as well as to *deepen* the agenda of security studies. The efforts to *broaden* the field seek to include a wide range of potential threats to security that range from economic and environmental issues to issues of human rights and migration.¹ Those attempting to *deepen* the meaning of security seek to move the debate either down to the level of individual or human security or up to the level of international or global security, with regional and societal security as possible intermediate points.² Most others have remained, by and large, within a state-centric approach, but have developed diverse terms (common, co-operative, collective, comprehensive) as “modifiers” to security to advocate different multilateral forms of inter-state security co-operation that could ameliorate, if not transcend the security dilemma.³ This, too, has raised fundamental theoretical, practical and normative questions about conceptions of security. This article explores issues such as: What does this debate signify? What is at stake? How have the South Asians contributed and responded, to this debate?

It presents a framework for understanding and analysing this discourse on security within the parameters of their location/agency and structure. The term “location” refers to the *context* in which the security discourse has emerged; “who,” in an institutional sense, that is, states, institutions of learning, international financing institutions and the like, has initiated the discourse which, in turn, shapes the “structure and content” of the field of security studies. The two are integrally linked. In other words, without understanding “where it is coming from” we cannot explain “why the field of security studies, and more broadly, international relations, is the way it is.” “Who” is asking the questions that the literature on security studies is trying to answer, provides the key because it is these “questions” that will determine the direction, shape and substance of the discipline.

Security is an empowering word. It both sets political priorities and justifies the use of force. The way security is understood and used profoundly affects the way political life is conducted. Therefore, the question “whose security” is, indeed, very critical. This requires uncovering the ethno-centric bias of the discipline and exposing the power relations involved, in both the practical operation of policy and the metaphysical underpinning of modernist ontology. It involves “challenging the use of security as ideology by asking “security specifically for whom?” in the face of assurances of security for everyone.”⁴

The basic contention of this paper is that a large proportion of the South Asian security discourse is not produced by South Asians themselves, but is “borrowed” or “adapted” from the West. This is as much due to the predominance of the structures of

Western philosophy⁵ backed by powerful institutions as it is due to the “intellectual dependency” of South Asians on the West.⁶ This paper poses a new set of questions and attempts to set a different agenda for security studies, that is more strongly rooted in the ground realities—political, military, social and economic—of the South Asian region. More specifically, in the following five sections, it will attempt to map some of the multiple discourses—generated both by the West as well in South Asia. This exercise is not exhaustive but illustrative. Each section seeks to analyse the context and expose the hidden assumptions therein; the agency, i.e., the institutional sources of its evolution; and the content and structure of its inquiries. It also seeks to outline some areas for future research agendas for the field of security studies especially from a South Asian standpoint.

The State – A Pivotal Player?

Who (or what) is the referent object of security? In the conventional security discourse, especially for the neorealists, the state is the only referent object of security. This discourse sees states as the given, eternal referent and anarchy as the permanent condition of International Relations (I.R). The security dilemma of states must be examined within these given parameters. The question of peoples’ security as an independent subject of inquiry does not arise because the security of “citizens” is identified with, (and guaranteed by), that of the state. A key assumption here is that most threats to a state’s security arise from outside its borders. This conception, and the process by which it was reached reflect “a particular trajectory of historical development that could be traced back at least to the Peace of Westphalia, if not earlier.”⁷ Mohammed Ayoob puts it succinctly:

In the three hundred years between 1648 when, to quote Martin Wight, the modern system of states “came of age,” and 1945, the evolution of the European system of states and its interaction with the domestic political processes of national consolidation within the major European powers led to the legitimation of both the system and the individual participants. These two trends—of interaction among sovereign states and greater identification of individuals with their respective states—strengthened each other. In doing so, they firmly laid the foundations for the dominant tradition in the literature on International Relations, in which security became synonymous with the protection from external threats of a state’s vital interests and core values.⁸

The key characteristics of the essentially European context and of its “nation-states” included more or less homogeneous populations; unquestioned loyalty and/ or the habitual obedience of its “citizens”; the consolidation and legitimacy of state institutions and, fixed and legitimised territorial boundaries. These, then, led to the evolution of a set of “givens” in the tradition of International Relations whereby the states were treated as “unitary actors.” Since the European states had already resolved their internal security predicament, domestic sources of threat were not a subject of conceptual or political inquiry. This explains the “external orientation” of the neorealist concept of security.

The strategic community during the Cold War was preoccupied with understanding and managing the East-West confrontation. The concept of security was used in a way that conflated a number of meanings of security with powerful ideological effects. Robert Luckham argues that security legitimised a number of crucial trends in Cold War politics.⁹ “The deliberate conflation of national (US) security with international (the West and capitalist countries) security and with collective (all states) security, rendered US imperial interests justifiable, to make it the normal and desirable state of affairs.”¹⁰ Coupled with this was the conflict between the East and West, much of which was played out in the South, where poor and underdeveloped countries were seen as a security threat as soon as questions of unrestricted US access to their resources were raised.¹¹ Moreover, the utility and importance of Third World states in the East-West confrontation was limited to their role as an alliance partners. Their internal political character—military dictatorships or democratic regimes—was of little political consequence. Hence, the Huntington thesis on the modernising role of the military, which legitimised dictatorships that suited US national security interests.

Let me revert to the theoretical contention of the neorealist conception of security studies that claims to be founded on an objective representation of reality. This claim to objectivity means that the discipline must treat the phenomena under consideration i.e. states as given, unproblematic objects and that the rules governing the behaviour of states are rigorously applicable across time and historical circumstance. Stephen Walt argues that the field of security studies has gradually evolved into an objective, scientific discipline in which the “laws” governing the realm of security are discovered or, at least, the correct method for their discovery has been identified.¹²

Such claims to scientific knowledge are, moreover, supported by a series of foundational claims presented as “facts” about the world. The most important of these is the centrality of the state as the subject of security. Paradoxically, this vision “emerges neither from a theory of the state nor of the international “structure” but from an implicit theory of the “subject” seen in terms of an individual person.”¹³ The subject is presented as an autonomous, rational actor confronted by an environment filled with similar actors. These other actors are the source of insecurity—hence, the classic security dilemma and the popularity of “state of nature” analogies supposedly drawn from Hobbes or Rousseau.¹⁴ As Krause and Williams point out:

the “fact” of anarchy is based on a priori claim about autonomous individual human subjects and the kind of contractarian political order that these subjects necessarily require. At the international level the essence of this conceptualisation is not simply a world of self-regarding states operating under the “security dilemma,” but the assumption that there is a particular form of individual rationality in state action as both the source and outcome of that anarchy . . . [Thus] grounded in a series of assumptions deeply ingrained in the culture from which it emerges, “neorealist security studies can confidently declare what is and is not a “security issue”, or what threats are, and to whom they refer.”¹⁵

These claims to objectivity and science, however, rely on a prior definition of the political subject and the conditions of its (in)security. Critics like Barry Buzan and the “Copenhagen School,”¹⁶ have pointed to the inadequacy of the state-centric approach by underlining the “duality” of security: that it combines *state security*, which is concerned with *sovereignty*; and *societal security* that is concerned with *identity*.¹⁷ Accordingly, a crucial starting point for restructuring security studies must lie in distinguishing between state and society. However, by making *society* synonymous with *identity*, “risks reifying both society and identity”, in that, it creates the “foundation for yet another variant of statism and the neorealist structures they want[ed] to transcend.”¹⁸

More importantly, while Buzan’s analysis seeks to *add to* the variable of state security, it does not explore the political rationale for the state and instead, presents a historical narrative of how contemporary forms of the state were constituted. His choice of the “Hobbesian state of nature” and “state,” is no historical choice at all. States are simply taken for granted as the inevitable and sole providers of security arrangements for humanity. Other forms of either historically existing social responses to threats or possible non-state forms of security provisions are excluded in this analysis. This powerful ideological move “obscures the origin of the states and also their possible future transcendence.”¹⁹ This approach needs critical attention because it seems to ignore the fact that the contemporary state system is a modern invention. For a large part of our history, humanity has existed without states in the sense of territorially defined, exclusive political identities which claim the monopoly of legitimate force.²⁰

There is another caveat to seeing the state as the central variable of any security analysis. Governments usually refer to national security as the highest stated value of the state’s existence, if not its essential *raison d’être*. The implicit assumption here is that in providing “national security,” states really do render their citizens secure, at least most of the time. Who is included or excluded from the category of “citizens”—women, for instance—is a separate issue of inquiry to which we will return later. Critics have questioned the basic assumptions of such presupposition in the conventional security discourse. Robert Jackson calls this “the paradox of the state,” in which the most important threats to security in the Third World (and often elsewhere), arise *from* states and regimes, and are directed *against* individuals and communal groups.²¹ That is why in most Third World countries, the legitimacy of states and regimes is constantly being challenged. Often characterised as “weak states,” these state do not have, or have failed to create, a domestic political and social consensus of sufficient strength to eliminate the large-scale use of force as a major and continuing element in the domestic political life of a nation.²² In other words, they lack the “security software,” defined by Azar and Moon as “legitimacy, integration and policy capacity.”²³

Ayoob seeks to explain the security predicament of states, especially in the Third World, by focussing attention on the question of the evolution of modern nation-state. The building of states in Western Europe, as Tilly observed, “cost tremendously in death, suffering, loss of rights and unwilling surrender of land, goods and labour . . . building differentiated, autonomous, centralised organisations with effective control of territories

entailed eliminating or subordinating thousands of semi-autonomous authorities.”²⁴ It took European states anywhere between four to seven centuries to emerge as full-fledged national states.

Third World countries, Ayoob argues, are expected to complete this process in just a few decades and that too, by simultaneously undertaking all the stages of nation-state building i.e. standardisation, penetration, participation and distribution with all its inherently contradictory pulls and pressures.²⁵ As a result, many Third World states with highly plural and diverse societies, are not yet politically and socially cohesive units. While the consolidation of the modern state in the West had meant that the internal dimension of its security was effectively resolved, in the Third World, it must be accorded equal, if not greater weight.²⁶

When the neo-realist scholars assume the state to be the sole referent object of security, their notion of state is that of a European nation-state with centrally organised political authority, territorially satiated, and with somewhat homogeneous populations. The ground realities in South Asian states, as indeed in most of the Third World—the lack of unconditional legitimacy for state boundaries, state institutions and regimes; inadequate societal cohesion; and the absence of societal consensus on fundamental issues of social, economic and political organisation—are radically different.²⁷ This historicising of the security problematic, as Krause points out, “is a forceful corrective to much contemporary analysis that treats states, once granted formal independence, as ‘like units’ for all purposes.”²⁸

This argument is, however, not taken to its logical conclusion. If the concept of security is intimately linked with the processes of state formation, it lends itself to another question: What kind of state? Here, Ayoob’s view of state-making “as a linear process that can be compressed or extended, but which has only one outcome, implying that the Third World states have no choice but to emulate the Westphalian model of modern nation-state is problematic.”²⁹ This means that not only is the state the *only* referent object of security but there is also only *one kind of state—the Westphalian state*.

State formation processes in the Third World have been radically different not only because of the limited time frame in which the latter has to complete the process, but also because of their intrinsically different historical experiences of colonial rule; traditional social and political formations, and a qualitatively different nature of political authority in the pre-colonial period. These could plausibly result in different *kinds* of state making outcomes. The problem lies in accepting that state making has a definable, pre-determined end point—the nation-state. It not only conceals massive differences in the historical trajectories of states and regions in the Third World but has also created havoc in the lives of their populations.

However, the ruling elites—the key local agency of the discourse on security—in the Third World perceived it differently. Enamoured by the logic of modernity, they sought to reproduce it in their respective local contexts. Modernity, in essence, is the “wisdom of the West”, conducive to the organisation and reproduction of hegemony and the power of dominant social forces.³⁰ This included a firm belief in the development and

nation-building model with the West as an ideal-type. It nurtures “a unilinear vision of progress—from tradition to modernity, from tribalism to nationhood,” and “progress, in fact, is measured by the extent to which the non-western, non-modern societies have succeeded in replicating the experience of the modern “Western” state.”³¹

In the Indian context, for instance, the Congress leadership (especially Jawaharlal Nehru) was beholden to the logic of the European model of the nation-state. This was evident from the Congress decision to create a union with a strong centre rather than a loose federation with a weak centre. The Indian State was vested with a strong central authority to organise and manage social relations among diverse communities and sub-nationalities to ensure their allegiance to the Indian nation. This was also true of other South Asian states.

However, the Western nation-state, as pointed out earlier, emerged within the largely homogeneous societies of Europe. A mechanical application of the nation-state idea with its monolithic credo and unitary state structures, on the deeply multicultural societies of the Third World was structurally flawed. The whole process negated the diversity, humaneness and freedom that were fundamental to their cultures. Trying to manage and enforce ideological and political conformity on the sub-nationalities in the interest of the nation-state, sought to “impose a monolithness and homogenisation that were alien and alienating”.³²

As a result, the character of the nation-state in South Asia is qualitatively different from that of European nation-states. The South Asian nation-state, in this context, is not necessarily the provider of security to all its citizens, rather the state itself is the site of conflict between different nation-building enterprises and power struggles between contending social groups and elites. A more appropriate question to ask, therefore, is: Whose nation needs to be secured? and, Who controls state power? both in terms of the dominant majority organised along religious, ethnic or linguistic lines or the elective versus non-elective institutions.³³ It is important to examine the assumptions, organisation, reproduction and dynamics of the modern nation-state in the South Asian region because this provides the key to understanding how the politics and mechanisms of these states produce *insecurity* for its *people*. In fact, I will argue that it is not only that the South Asian states do not have the *kind* of European nation-state that is assumed to be *given* but also that the internal vulnerabilities of the state and the insecurities of its people are rooted in the very processes of emulating a particular kind of state, a model of the Westphalian state denoting a unified, indivisible sovereign state with centralised political authority.

In an early criticism of nationalism in 1916-1917, Rabindranath Tagore wrote: We had known the hordes of Moghals and Pathans who invaded India, but we had known them as human races, with their own religions and customs, likes and dislikes, we had never known them as nation. We loved and hated them as occasions arose; we fought for them and against them, talked with them in a language which was theirs as well as our own, and guided the destiny of the Empire in which we had our active share. But this time, we had to deal, not with kings, not with human races, but with a

nation – we, who are no nation ourselves . . . I am not against one nation in particular, but against the general idea of all nations. What is a Nation? . . . It is the aspect of a whole people as an organised power. This organisation incessantly keeps up the insistence of the population on becoming strong and efficient. But this strenuous effort after strength and efficiency drains man’s energy from his higher nature where he is self-sacrificing and creative. For thereby man’s power of sacrifice is diverted from his ultimate object, which is moral, to the maintenance of this organisation, which is mechanical.³⁴

Tagore, while referring to the alienness of the nation is particularly disturbed by the impact of its mechanisation in *pluralist* South Asia. Imtiaz Ahmed, in a more recent “post-nationalist” critique of the nation-state asserts that “alienation either for reasons of birth, religion, language, ethnicity, culture, geography, complexion, occupation or simply for being ‘different’ is in-built in the conception of nation.”³⁵ He argues that

nationalism came to play its part not just in “freeing” the subcontinent from the British but also in organising South Asia’s “political,” “economic,” and “security” activities in the post-colonial era. In the process, and more importantly, under a system of political representation, nationalism in each of the South Asian states itself became communalised, with the “majority” *leading* the “minorities” in all activities of the state . . .

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I have also argued elsewhere that the root-cause of the alienation and suffering among the ethnic groups, their secessionist demands and the concomitant implications for peoples’ security, as well as that of the internal security of the state, lies in the very organisation of the modern nation-state.³⁷ The modern nation-state allows recognition of a single, presumably unified nation. This principle applied to a plural society, especially when governed through electoral democracy, is inherently problematic. The single nation tends to be identified with the dominant majority, with the state being the sole depository of political power, exercised by the “majority” while minority communities tend to feel alienated and marginalised. Those left out seek to construct their own identity and create alternative spaces within or without existing state boundaries.

Let me explain this with the example of Sri Lanka, where the Sinhala—the majority community—nationalism has been the central driving force in shaping the nature of Sri Lankan state and civil society. The Sinhala character of the state and the question of Sinhala ideology, was politicised only in the 1950s.³⁸ It was consolidated in the post-1956 years, when the two competing sections of the Sinhalese ruling classes formed social alliances with the nationalistically mobilised intermediate classes of Sinhalese society.³⁹ In fact, “it had become the business of the popularly elected government to organize the terms of reference of nationality and nation-building.”⁴⁰ What is important about these nation-building processes was that “suddenly all Sri Lankans were *made* conscious that they were no longer just ‘people’ but either ‘Buddhist-Sinhalese’ or ‘Tamil Hindus’ or ‘Muslim Hindus,’ and so on, and the fact of being one or

another determined their fate and prospects in the island.”⁴¹ This, in fact, owed its origins to the new cognitive apparatus of figures, maps and numbers—the census—introduced by the British, which imposed dualistic either-or opposition as the natural, normative order of thought and taught people in the subcontinent that one is either this, or that; that one cannot be both, or neither, or indifferent.⁴²

Nationalist construction, thus, began to be constructed in a way that enunciated a specific kind of political relationship among ethnic groups, which usually meant “establishment of an ethnic hierarchy in which the majority community is assured of its ‘legitimate’ place, and the minorities their ‘proper place.’”⁴³ The Sinhalese ideological construction of the Sri Lankan state, is driven by the powerful idea of Sri Lanka being “our land,” *ape rata*. Uyangoda points out that this “territorial possessionist idiom in the Sinhalese political discourse implies a condition of social appropriation of the state which is mediated by ideology,” and it also refers to a “collective self-understanding of a polity—a polity of “ours” and not of an “other.”⁴⁴ Sinhala nationalism in this sense, is also an exclusionary ideology, the central question of which is: How can “our” state power be shared with an ethnic “other.” Also, Sinhala nationalism has always been for a unitary state, or a “unified” Sri Lanka, where legislative and executive powers were centralised in accordance with the notion of “unified sovereignty” (which meant centralised powers not in an abstract state authority but the one controlled by Sinhalese). Any demands by the ethnic minorities, particularly the Tamils is thus, equated with the prospect of the country “being divided” and obviously, no division of sovereignty is acceptable to the nationalist search for an ideal political order.

Paradoxically, however, the very denial of nationhood to a collectivity that has come to regard itself as such, and the use of coercion to decisively establish the supremacy and indivisibility of the juridical state, seems to further spread “national” consciousness among the dissenting collectivity and heighten the resolve of the alienated to resist the state, with arms if necessary.⁴⁵ It is precisely this kind of “nationalist discourse—well disposed towards the Buddhist-Sinhala majority—organised, nurtured and backed by the state power of post-independence Sri Lanka, that has given rise to Tamil Tigers,” plunging the country into an eighteen-year-long civil war that continues unabated.⁴⁶

The story, as Imtiaz Ahmed puts it, is no different for “other nation-states of South Asia where, ‘Muslim Pakistan,’ ‘Hindu India,’ ‘Muslim Bangladesh,’ and ‘Hindu Nepal,’ all suggest the simultaneous organisation of the majority community and nation-state, albeit in each case in the manner defined by the dominant social forces.”⁴⁷ And, as a result, almost every state in South Asia has been confronted with broadly similar challenges to centralised authority, and no less important, to the hegemonic discourse revolving around the nation-state. The observation Hamza Alavi made two decades ago about Pakistan can thus be readily extended to the rest of the subcontinent.

The . . . outstanding fact about Pakistan’s political history is that the most powerful challenges to the dominant central authority . . . came primarily from political movements that draw the strength from people of

underprivileged region and voiced demands for regional autonomy and for a fuller share . . . in the distribution of resources, as well as in the state power.⁴⁸

Indeed the national question is the driving force behind most separatist and secessionist movements—Kashmiri, Assamese, Tamil, Sikh, Baluch, Chakma—which might otherwise differ in character, support base and dynamics, but share in common an uncompromising opposition to the centralised political authority, and unequivocal rejection of the legitimacy of the nation-state as presently constituted.

Ironically, so dominant is the ideology of the nation-state that even these sub-national groups or the “post-colonial nationalists” seem to be as enamoured by the state as their anti-colonial predecessors—the builders of the modern nation-state. To the Tamil Tigers, it is an article of faith that the Tamil nation must seek its ultimate fulfilment, or self-expression, in a territorially demarcated state of Tamil Eelam. Likewise, the ultimate goal of the Kashmiri militants demanding *azadi* remains an independent state of Jammu & Kashmir. But without questioning the basic logic of the modern nation-state, they merely reproduce the hierarchical social and political conditions from which they seek to escape and develop state structures with strong unitarian and monolithic overtones, “much in the style of *La Republique une et Indivisible* of French liturgy, and the “One nation, Indivisible,” of the American pledge of allegiance.”⁴⁹ For example, the appropriation of the autonomous status of the state of Jammu & Kashmir (J&K), granted by Article 370 of the Indian Constitution, by the interventionist and centralised state structures alienated the Kashmiris. But while fighting those integrative pressures, they replicated the same unitary power structures within the state J&K, thus alienating the people of Jammu and Ladakh. Similarly, Tamil nationalist construction reflects a similar ethnic hierarchy (of its own) when its own status is transposed into that of a majority in relation to the still smaller Muslim community. For example, all Tamil parties have repeatedly denied the claim that in any system of devolution of power, Muslims in the Northern and Eastern provinces should be given the status of self-rule, on the grounds of their separate identity and interests.

The case is no different with a supposedly inclusionary ideology of nationalism. Let me explain this with the example of Pakistan. Right from the inception of the “idea” and demand for Pakistan, to its post-independence history, Islam has been used as a rallying force as well as a legitimising ideology by a wide array of political and religious leaders.⁵⁰ Islam was proclaimed as the state ideology for a variety of reasons: it emphasised Pakistan’s distinctiveness in relation to India; it gave the appearance of unity to an otherwise disparate people divided along the lines of tribal, regional and linguistic identities; and it allowed the state more room in which to manoeuvre its way towards establishing dominance over a society characterised by highly localised and fragmented structures of authority. Successive Pakistani rulers have also used Islamic ideology to ward off the threat of provincialism. It was considered unpatriotic of Bengalis, Sindhis, Pathans and the Baluch, to make demands based on their regional or ethnic loyalties because all Pakistanis were “brothers in Islam.” However, as Jalal argues, the official discourse of inclusionary nationalism far from contributing to the evolution of a

collective ethos, has been the main obstacle to the accommodation of regionally defined belief systems and practices. The relative autonomy of culture at the level of local and regional social formations, has not only contested a reductionist state ideology based exclusively on religion, but has also sought to affirm the difference and distinctiveness in the politics of linguistic regionalism or sub-regionalism.⁵¹ The separation of East Pakistan on the plank of Bengali nationalism proved this point.

Our analysis shows that the state in the South Asian context, cannot be treated as a monolithic, unitary and individualised unit of analysis, but is itself a “site of contestations” among several contending social and political communities. The key issue of inquiry for the security analyst, therefore, is not how to replicate (read copy) a Westphalian-style nation-state that has everywhere rendered its populace more *insecure* (than secure), but it is how to rethink the ideology, the rationale and the form of the state, so as to create one that is better suited to South Asian ground social realities, and inspired by local knowledge systems. The concept of the nation-state with all its homogenising ramifications, cannot encompass the diversity of South Asian societies, characterised as they are by the “absence of [the] well-defined lowest common denominator of cultural identity as it exists in more massified, individuated societies in the West.”⁵² Each individual, community and “nationality” in this region has a “plural self” that simply cannot be embodied and represented by the single category and frame of the nation-state. What needs to be questioned is not the practice and the politics of the modern Indian nation-state, but its very logic. We need to go beyond modernity and evolve indigenous concepts and tools, best suited to South Asian social realities. We need to creatively experiment with new kinds of sub-state structures that accord more political space to social communities, thereby enhancing peoples’ security. We need also to explore the meaning, relevance and creation of a supra-national or post-nationalist identity, that of belonging to a South Asian community.

Modernist Development: The Road to Peoples’ Security or Insecurity

Neorealist literature not only presumes the Westphalian state as “the model,” but also prescribes how to reach that goal, the precise route to be taken and the methodology to be adopted through “modernist development.” The underlying assumption being that: “there is only *one* route evolved and mastered by the West, to becoming a modern, “developed state,” and that developing countries need only to follow the well-trodden path. This has spawned a whole genre of writings on modernisation theory with reference to the Third World.⁵³ I will not engage in a debate on this theory here. Suffice it to say that the terms of modernisation and development, were often taken to be synonymous with Westernisation. This was much like the political models, concepts and categories of economic development that had emerged in a centre of colonial power, in the specific context of industrialisation and capitalist growth, but had been raised to the level of universal assumptions and applicability in the entirely different context of the Third World.

Not surprisingly, this literature sought to answer only a particular set of questions such as: Where was a particular country placed on the continuum of tradition to modernity, at a given historical juncture? What strategies and by what ways and means,

could it employ to become “developed?” How was it to embark on the path of industrialisation and how was it to “modernise” its traditional agricultural practices and production methods? How, for instance, was it to build dams for water management? The goal of becoming a modern, developed state was not questioned. It was taken to be a sacred “given”. Whether this goal was suitable, or even desirable, was not a subject of inquiry. Significantly, it also eschewed any debate on the issue that development, as capital accumulation and commercialisation of the economy for the generation of surplus and profit, involved the reproduction not merely of a particular form of creation of wealth, but also of the associated creation of poverty and dispossession of others. In other words, the development of the colonial masters had rested upon the impoverishment of their colonies. As Nihal Perera points out in the case of Sri Lanka:

the creation of an economic space compatible with that of the larger European World economy was fundamental to enable Ceylon to participate in the imperial economy. With the introduction of plantations, a new economic system was thus developed . . . In this way, Ceylon was both “modernized” and underdeveloped. It was transformed into a “monoculture economy,” a coffee producer for the European world market, creating a subsistence, informal and unpaid labour force particularly from rural villagers, urban poor and women and children.⁵⁴

The replication of this model of economic development in post-colonial South Asia created new internal colonies—East Pakistan, now Bangladesh, in Pakistan—and caused deep divisions in its societies. Ramachandra Guha, for instance, argues that India has become effectively organised as a democracy of omnivores, for the omnivores and by the omnivores—the real beneficiaries of economic development who also have the clout of state power to ensure that the goodies come to them cheap, if not altogether free.⁵⁵ This is a system in which the interests of the huge number of ecosystem people (4/5th of India’s rural people who depend on the natural environment of their own locality to meet most of their material needs), and ecological refugees (those displaced by dams, mines and deforestation and live on the periphery), can be safely ignored. The omnivores who constitute only 1/6th of India’s population, can capture the nation’s resources by using the state apparatus, while passing on the costs of resource capture to the rest of the population.⁵⁶

The economic worldview of development-as-material-progress has, however, come under increasing criticism. The ways in which development in South Asia has led to displacement of large masses of people, to genocide, ethnic cleansing, and conflict and struggle over resources; to environmental degradation and an end to peoples’ means of livelihood, demand a re-examination and rethinking of the whole concept of “development.” The uneven effects of top-down development, because of what some people gain and what others lose, calls for its reconceptualisation and a critical examination of its structures in order to understand whose development it is, whom it benefits, what are its effects and who suffers, especially in terms of the elimination of whole eco-systems, species, and indigenous knowledge and ways of being.

Unlike the traditional discourse on military security, there is much critical questioning of conventional wisdom in discourse on development and its implications for security, especially for peoples' security. Western science and technology that did not take into account the adverse impact of development on both nature and people, is now being critically evaluated in the South Asian context. Marginalised people, science and ecology movements are now making visible the hitherto invisible costs of introducing the wrong science and technology. For example, while the big dams—the modern temples of development—totalling fifteen hundred in India alone, have brought water, irrigation facilities and power to large parts of the country, they also have a dark side. They have displaced, according to some estimates, up to fifty-six million people; submerged millions of acres of prime forest land; led to the water-logging and salinisation of vast areas; and destroyed estuarine ecosystems. Such critical evaluation and the accompanying search for alternatives that are better suited to the local milieu in South Asia, are creating epistemological and technological shifts that have enlarged the creative options for redefining development that is both sustainable and just.⁵⁷

At the same time, however, it is important to be aware of the ideological underpinnings of the concept of development in its new *avatar*. Sustainability in the Western lexicon, for example, now means sustaining Western privileges. As Anil Aggarwal cautions:

much nonsense has been written about sustainable development . . . Who is to decide what is sustainable? Who can know? All societies in order to survive, use and change environment . . . Sustainability lies in the speed with which any society can correct its mistakes . . . And those best placed to correct these are those who suffer the consequences of them . . . Therefore, if you want sustainability, or rather a higher order of sustainability, you must empower those elements in the society who have a vested interest in self-correction . . . The social and ecological costs will then be built into the model of enterprise and wealth-creation. It is not for entrepreneurs, the economists and the experts to build these costs into models, but the people who must grow the crops, harvest and cherish the earth.⁵⁸

Dipak Gyawali makes much the same point in the context of re-orienting water science in Nepal from a monositic institutional structure to one that celebrates pluralism, and accords spaces not just to the bureaucracy, but also to a dynamic and innovative market as well as a cautionary civil society. The new science would be: “*market science* which is of an innovative and risk-taking nature; *voluntary science* which is of a cautionary and risk-avoiding nature; and *government science* which is of a regulatory and risk-managing nature.” Gyawali adds, “more collaborative research, more focus of research energy on multifaceted risk research by various solidarities as per their paradigm proclivities, and a better space for “social auditors” will lead to a more healthy science in future.”⁵⁹

Likewise, a *South Asian Manifesto on the Politics and Knowledge of Water*, calls for revisioning the future relations between water, power and people, in an integrative manner and articulates the principal challenge as: “to integrate the global and the local; to

alter the structure and nature of current decision-making models, and the educational context within which they are generated, not only to accommodate a plurality of views, but also to generate options that would reflect the larger reality of water in nature and human society.”⁶⁰

It is now being argued that a top-down model of development coined by the bureaucratic state machinery, drawing on “Western wisdom,” needs to be questioned in favour of a *bottom-up* research strategy that would involve wide masses of people and look to them to pose research problems of relevance. The underlying assumption is that if local communities are permitted to reassert control over the resource base, it would create a genuine demand for environment-friendly science and technology, lead to sustainable development and enhance peoples’ security.

‘Invisible Women’: Feminist Interventions

The traditional conception of security effectively makes it synonymous with “citizenship”. Security, it can be said, comes from being a citizen—“threats” towards the state are threats to people qua citizens—the theory and practice of “security” strive to contain these threats through concerted action by citizens’ representatives. What is missing in this formulation, as indeed, in the general concept of “peoples security,” are “invisible” women. As a feminist analysis shows, “citizenship” is historically, as well as conceptually, not a gender-neutral phenomenon. Farida Shaheed points to two myths relating to the nation-state. It is worth citing her at length:

The first is a general misconception that equal citizenship and rights for all was a fundamental principle in the creation of nation-states . . . it has no basis in history. The first nation-state specifically excluded certain religions, ethnic or racial groups and *all* women from the status of citizenship and/or from the rights accorded to the male citizens of an approved group. The famous “Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen” of the French Revolution of 1789 did not promote women’s rights . . . The idea that each citizen ought . . . to receive equal treatment at the hands of the state . . . is, in fact, a relatively new and developing concept of the twentieth century . . . The second myth is that the state has a direct relationship with its citizens . . . none [of the intermediary institutions] are considered legitimate except those sanctioned by the state itself . . . The state, however, has an ambiguous attitude towards the family. Numerous twentieth century constitutions as well as the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights regard the family to be the fundamental unit of society . . . the family is [thus] accepted as a sub-state entity that is not only legitimate but one in which the state unusually delegates rights to persons not directly integrated into the state structures, that is, the males of the family and in particular, the male heads of household. This attitude is in keeping with the original concept of citizens which was restricted to male “and his family” in which women and children were essentially considered non-persons . . . The matrix of power

within the family, to a large extent, replicates the patriarchal structure within the state.⁶¹

In an insightful comparison between nation-state formation in Europe and India, Shaheed argues that the colonial intervention disrupted the evolutionary process in India where no conflict between religious and non-religious forces took place. As a result, there is no significant move among the state elites to secularise laws and society or to acknowledge women's rights as equal citizens. The relationship of women with the state is still mediated by the family and the concept of direct citizen-state relation is absent for the female population.⁶²

Feminists, in fact, argue that International Relations theory itself has overwhelmingly been “constructed by men working with mental models of human activity and society seen through a male eye and apprehended through a male sensibility.”⁶³ Moreover, when this experience is presumed to be gender-free—when the male experience is taken to be the human experience—the resulting theories, concepts, methodologies, inquiry goals and knowledge claims distort human social life and human thought.⁶⁴ The component ideas of International Relations are accordingly gendered, because women and men experience societies and their interactions differently. Unravelling the patriarchal roots of the modern state, Runyan and Peterson point out:

in terms of state and sovereignty, security and representation, International Relations theorists overlook the significance of Athenian texts in establishing the political “givens” of the Western tradition. The selective vision imposed by these andocentric, disciplinary, and modernist “filters” prevents our seeing the *mutual constitutions* of (Athenian) state formation, gender domination, (Western) political philosophy and binary metaphysics.⁶⁵

Each of these themes is important in developing a critique of security. Patriarchy ensures that men maintain power; or that when women take on roles in positions of power, they do so in ways that do not change the power relations in the system. It is important to bear in mind that the question of gender is not simply a matter of “adding certain excluded voices” but profoundly challenging the grounds of contemporary International Relations theory and its historically specific (masculinist) account of state, political identity and community.⁶⁶ It is not possible simply to include women in these theories where they had been previously excluded, for this exclusion forms a fundamental structuring principle and key presumption of the patriarchal discourse. It is, therefore, not “simply the range and scope of objects that required transformation; more profoundly, and threateningly, the very questions posed and the methods used to answer them, needed to be seriously questioned.”⁶⁷

Feminist scholarship in South Asia, especially in International Relations, is only beginning to make its presence felt. Engendering the discipline, as I have argued elsewhere, is likely to be a slow and long-drawn out process.⁶⁸ In the discipline, currently, “women are allowed the space to engage with feminist critiques at a level that seeks to

“make women visible”. While studies entitled, “Women and . . . ,” and “Women in . . .”, serve this purpose, men tend to get on with what they regard as the ‘serious work.’”⁶⁹ For example, in the feminist literature on conflict analysis, attempts are being made—as part of the engendering process—to correct the male bias in data collection and analysis. This agenda is promoted on grounds of equity but also in order to obtain a more accurately focussed picture of the world. In addition to this, the stereotypes of women as “passive victims of armed conflict” are being interrogated and there is an attempt to understand their role as actors and active participants in conflict and peace processes at the community and national levels.⁷⁰ Much work, however, remains to be done. The first, and foremost task, involves using “gender,” as distinct from “women,” as an analytical category of analysis. There is a need to examine ways in which social and political realities, especially the political discourse of the state concerning nationalism, militarism, law and the economy and social discourses regarding health, population and education, are gendered and how, as gendered realities, they produce inequalities, hierarchies and injustices.

The Environmental Debate: The North - South Divide

As the Cold War unravelled, scholars—in the West, as well as South Asia—have sought to broaden the agenda of security studies. This was partly because the conventional categories of analysis were a poor fit to new and much more complex realities. Since “the main task of the strategic community—analysis of East-West confrontation—evaporated, the function and therefore, the status and funding, of the entire edifice of strategic studies,” as Buzan and others put it, “seemed to be at risk.”⁷¹ Many suggested the necessity of extending the conventional undertakings of security to include matters of economics, migration, identity politics, resources, ecological factors and so on.

They accept the neorealist assumption that “security” is reducible to an objective referent and to a set of threats, but seek to reorient security studies (and policies) by calling attention to non-military sources of threats. These themes were not new either in the Western,⁷² or South Asian discourse on security, which, as argued earlier, have been grappling with internal threats of subversion from separatist movements. Issues of food security and economic development have also dominated their concerns but these were addressed within the parameters of normal political processes/ government policy-making and bureaucratic structures and, were broadly located within the development discourse. What became a new bone of contention in the post-Cold War era, was their inclusion under the broad rubric of security studies.

Every such attempt to broaden the agenda of security studies to include environmental, political, societal and economic concerns involves its own unique players/ referent objects, logic, reasoning, dynamics and contradictions that need to be understood on their own terms. It is not possible to undertake such a comprehensive exercise in this chapter. We will, therefore, illustrate the point with reference to the environmentalists, who claim that environmental degradation poses a threat to the eco-system and to human well-being and that this transcends particular states and conceptions of national security. The severe consequences of continued environmental degradation are viewed as more urgent than external security threats that almost invariably involved organised violence.

Environmentalists call on the authority of the natural sciences to demonstrate that, “in fact,” environmental change represents a threat to human well-being, and assert that what is *really threatened* is not an abstraction like “the state” but the material well-being of individuals.⁷³

Critics, however, argue that attempts to make the environment a security issue are driven more by a desire to heighten the political profile of environmental concerns than perceiving them as a genuine security issue.⁷⁴ Likewise, Dorff asserts that while a broader definition of security highlights significant contemporary problems, these do not constitute security issues because “problem is not a concept . . . [it] provides us with no ordering of reality that we can use to create a common understanding of what it is that we are talking about . . . [nor a] range of possible policy approaches to address those problems.”⁷⁵ From the perspective of the Third World countries, on the other hand, *excluding environment from security analysis*, is seen to be driven by a political agenda with strong ideological underpinnings. The issue is not merely whether the environmental agenda should be included within security studies, but also what the terms of reference of this debate should be. In many ways, this has become the new battleground between the “West” and the “Rest” or more popularly, between the North and South over the shape of the new World Order. Globalisation has emerged as the new dominant paradigm of the post-Cold War era for coping with which, the two sides have fundamentally different agendas and strategies for differing vital concerns and priorities. Let me explain this further.

The environmentalist argument “challenges the most basic political values of contemporary Western capitalism”⁷⁶: that natural resources are available for exploitation, and ever-increasing consumption; that affluent society is, therefore, intrinsically superior to any other form of society; that there must be faith in “the market”. A massive use of energy and resources, as well as maintaining the existing system of resource flows, are essential to the political economy of the North and, more significantly, to “the American way of life,” which the US President, George Bush, has declared to be non-negotiable.⁷⁷ However, it is precisely the expansion of unreconstructed industrialism that is responsible for the alarming rise in greenhouse gases, toxic waste, deforestation, acid rain and other such large-scale environmental threats. In so far as the security (of the West) is premised on maintaining the *status quo*, it runs counter to the changes needed to alleviate many environmental and economic problems. After all, it is the *status quo* that has caused environmental insecurities for Third World countries and especially for the poor people whose lives and livelihoods are vulnerable; and people whose lands are increasingly in danger of becoming the repository of toxic wastes from industrialised societies. Given the disproportionate use of resources by the developed world and the poverty of much of the rest of the planet, conservation of resources is clearly something that is needed in societies that are the most profligate and wasteful users of resources.

Indeed, roughly eighty per cent of the resources of the planet as well as its [carbon] sinks are consumed by twenty per cent of the world’s population that lives in Europe, North America, Oceania and Japan. As the Centre for Science and Environment pointed out in a *Statement on Global Democracy*, issued (specially) for the Earth summit:

There is no effort [at present] to create new levels of power that would allow citizens of the world to participate in global environmental management. Today, the reality is that Northern governments and institutions can, using their economic and political power, intervene in, say Bangladesh's development. But no Bangladeshi can intervene in the development processes of Northern economies even if global warming caused largely by Northern emissions may submerge half [their] country.⁷⁸

Pakistani sociologist, Tariq Banuri, in a thoughtful account of the divisions between North and South argued that these were rooted both in conflicts based on economic interests, and conflicts over meanings. With reference to the Earth Summit, Banuri observes:

Where most Northerners see UNCED [United Nations Conference on Environment and Development] as the very welcome unfolding of collective action to save humanity, many Southerners, government functionaries, as well as NGO activists (albeit for different reasons) fear in it the emergence of a new imperialism of new conditionalities, and of the new obstacles to the alleviation of poverty and oppression. Northerners have lined up to take part in a movie of Noah building an ark to defend us against the deluge. But the South does not seem to belong in this story; it is a theatre on the other side of the railroad tracks, where Jesus is being crucified to save humanity, where the poor have to suffer in their poverty, so that the rich can enjoy their lifestyles.⁷⁹

The processes of economic globalisation are only helping to perpetuating and widening the existing inequalities between the North and the South; while an entrenched underclass is being created between regions and within every society in the world.⁸⁰

The ideological heart of this model of economic globalisation is "free trade" (*trade liberalisation*, to use the politically correct phrase) which demands elimination of national regulations, laws or tariffs, that slow down corporations and their investments as they move across national borders. The goal is global integration in order to achieve greater and cheaper access to scarce resources (mostly in the Third World), new markets, and cheap labour, wherever they are. The only exception to this trend towards the elimination of economic borders applies to labour which is by and large still mostly not legally free to move at will, partly because that would seriously complicate matters for transnational corporations, and partly because people in the Third World would stand to gain. Deepak Nayyar puts it aptly:

It would seem that the institutional framework for globalisation is characterised by a striking asymmetry. National boundaries should not matter for trade flows and capital flows but should be clearly demarcated for technology flows and labour flows. It follows that the developing countries would provide access to their markets without a corresponding access to technology and would accept capital mobility without a corresponding provision for labour mobility. This asymmetry, particularly

between the free movement of labour across national boundaries, lies at the heart of the inequality in the rules of the game for globalisation in the late twentieth century.⁸¹

These new rules serve the interests of transnational corporations more than of member-countries. The former's growing power is evident from the fact that the top 200 corporations are now so big that their total sales surpass the combined economies of 182 countries and their economic clout is almost twice that of the poorest four-fifth of humanity. Of the hundred largest economies in the world, fifty-two are now transnational corporations.

Another key agenda of globalisation process is the rapid *commodification* of every remaining aspect of life. This includes such pristine elements of life—the commons—that have so far been outside the traditional market system: culture, fresh water, seeds and the genetic structures of life. Most Southern countries believe that the commons have been clearly understood to be part of the cultural, spiritual and biological inheritance of all people and these should not be turned into commodities to be sold only to those who can pay for them. Under WTO, however, virtually all life forms and resources are available for corporate ownership. Everything is for sale.

The US, and most of the developed nations, find resistance from the South to the patenting of this kind of intellectual property outrageous, violative of the principles of free trade, and an inhibitor of the rights and prerogatives of global corporations. Informing this outrage is the fact that the last reservoirs of the planet's genetic and biological reserves are in the South. According to the World Resources Institute, more than half the world's remaining plant and animal species live in the rainforests of the Third World.⁸² The argument rests on an inherent double standard:

materials created and developed from generations of innovation by farmers and indigenous people in the South were common heritage and thus Northern corporations had free access. Yet the benefits derived from this common heritage are corporate property and protected by patents . . . The common heritage of mankind, taken freely from the South, was now returned as a commodity at a price.⁸³

Vandana Shiva terms such piracy through patents as the “second coming of Columbus,” symbolising new forms of imperialism. She points out that,

at the heart of Columbus's ‘discovery’ was the treatment of piracy as the natural right of the coloniser, necessary for the deliverance of the colonised . . . At the heart of the GATT treaty and its patent laws is the treatment of biopiracy as a natural right of Western corporations, necessary for the ‘development’ of the Third World countries . . . Biopiracy is the Colombian ‘discovery’ five hundred years after Columbus. Patents are still the means to protect this piracy of the wealth of non-western peoples as a right of Western powers.⁸⁴

By controlling living resources, the biotech industry is trying to replace the natural economy from which hundreds of millions of people have long derived their food and medicine directly, with market economy. The indigenous people, in particular, have been impacted in a particularly brutal fashion by economic liberalisation and the theft of the water, food and other resources, on which they depended for their vital needs. Environmental writer Josh Karliner explains, “indeed the process of globalisation is steamrolling social and financial support for the basic rights of the poor, increasingly shunting the disenfranchised off to the side; where they must fend for themselves in the brutally competitive ‘market.’” Already poor, but largely self-sufficient communities across the earth are being cast into deeper social and ecological poverty, as well as cultural dislocation, as their resources are appropriated to satisfy the seemingly insatiable demands of the world’s ever-growing consumer societies.⁸⁵ This perpetuation of existing international arrangements coupled to international financing arrangements and the problems of the debt crisis, is likely to render many of the poorest of the planet even more insecure. This would clearly make for a highly unequal post-Cold War security order.

However, a generic criticism of the call to widen the field of security studies has been that a progressive widening endangers the intellectual coherence of the security discourse by putting in so much that “security” becomes analytically useless, and its essential meaning, void. Without a general method of distinguishing security issues from merely political ones, it is impossible to pursue the wider agenda coherently. In the following section, we will discuss the securitisation approach that seeks to bridge the position of the traditionalists (read neo-realists) and the wideners.

The Securitisation Approach of the ‘Copenhagen School’: A Panacea?

The “securitisation approach,” articulated by the Copenhagen School makes a self-confident claim of having tackled the conceptual security debate.⁸⁶ This is broadly placed under the rubric of critical security studies. Unlike traditional security studies that are generally objectivist, critical security studies adopt a constructivist approach. For them, “security” is not an objective condition; threats to it are not simply a matter of correctly perceiving a constellation of material forces, and the object of security is not stable or unchanging. They seek to understand “how” the subjects, objects and interpretative positions were socially constructed such that certain practices were made possible. In security studies, this process involves ascertaining how the nature (and source) of threats is constructed, the “object” being secured, and possibilities for reinforcing, ameliorating, or even overcoming “security dilemmas”. The social world does not exhibit any iron laws, all regularities can be broken, and it is the task of critical theory to show this as well as “to expose how some logic came to be seen as necessary when in fact they were contingent.”⁸⁷ Security is understood as a particular set of historical discourses and practices that rest upon institutionally shared understandings.

The securitisation approach, according to the Copenhagen School, is radically constructivist. “Security *is* a quality actors inject into issues by securitisation.” Securitisation refers to the process of presenting an issue in security terms, in other words, as an existential threat: the way to study securitisation is to study discourse and political constellations:

When does an argument with the particular rhetorical and semiotic structure achieve sufficient effect to make an audience tolerate violations of rules that would otherwise have to be obeyed? If by means of an argument about the priority and urgency of an existential threat the securitising actor has managed to break free of procedures or rules he or she would otherwise be bound by, we are witnessing a case of securitisation.⁸⁸

It is the discursive power of securitisation which brings together the actors and objects: *securitising actors* are defined as “actors who securitize issues by declaring something a referent object—existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival.”⁸⁹ This apparently makes for a very open conceptualisation of security. However, the criteria for “who” can become securitising actors and “what” constitutes a successful case of securitisation establishes the restrictive side of the approach of the Copenhagen School.

The act of securitisation is always related to the claimed presence of an existential threat, and this leads the Copenhagen School to make a distinction between “international security” and “social security”. Within the former, it is argued, “security is about survival. It is when an issue is presented as posing an existential threat to a designated object (traditionally, but not necessarily, the state incorporating government, territory, and society)”.⁹⁰ In contrast, “social security” concerns questions of “entitlement and social justice”, and problems within this field are not located within the same rhetoric of danger, urgency and survival.⁹¹ The distinction between international and social security rests less on whether an issue, or potential security problem, is located at the national or international level, than on the extent to which the situation is successfully presented as one of *collective* survival. It is argued that what constitutes the field of security studies is the concern with “international security”. Problems falling within the realm of “social security” might be worthy of political consideration and, therefore, important in their own right, but they should not be confused with those of “international security”. The key point is not, however, that particular problems carry a certain essential security character, but that they are located within different modes of reasoning.

A sectoral approach, i.e. military security, environmental security, economic security, societal security, and political security, is employed to understand the different qualities of security that are features of the wider agenda. Although some qualities of security are common across sector, each sector also has its own unique actors and political dynamics. These sectors serve to desegregate the whole only to reduce complexity and to facilitate analysis by selecting some of their own distinctive patterns of interaction. Otherwise, they remain inseparable parts of the complex whole and in political terms, therefore, there is an integrated field of security.⁹²

The securitisation approach clearly moves away from the traditionalist’ placement of the state as the central referent object in security analysis, to middle level “limited collectivities” (state, nation, civilisation and so on). A main criterion of this type of referent is that “it forms an interpretative community—it is the context in which principles of legitimacy and valuation circulate and within which the individual constructs an interpretation of events.”⁹³ This, applied to the South Asian context for example, accords

spaces in which social communities and group identities mobilised along religion, class, language and so on, could plausibly securitise issues concerning their political, economic, social and cultural rights. Similarly, the concerns of ecological refugees, and of indigenous/tribal peoples' rights over land, food and water could be securitised. In this framework, a state-centric position is a possible but not a pre-determined outcome.

Another important advantage of this approach is its ability to “historicise security, to study transformations in the units of security affairs.” Traditional security studies define the units (states) and the instruments (military) that by definition make any security phenomenon elsewhere invisible. Securitisation studies can analyse “how and when new referent objects attain the status of something in the name of which one can successfully undertake security? and can study the degree to which the new actors exhibit politics in the form of security.”⁹⁴ As the Copenhagen School puts it:

it becomes possible to draw a map of security in between the closed predefined world of traditionalists, the everything-is-security of the wideners, and the everything-could-be-different of critical security studies.⁹⁵

Instead of providing a pre-determined format, it allows a contextual reading of security.

On the other hand, the Copenhagen School's epistemological reliance on the speech act theory is problematic. It presupposes the existence of a situation where speech is, indeed, possible. For instance, Lane Hansen shows that by grounding the definition of security problems within speech, the securitisation approach prevents the inclusion of gender in security analysis. She characterises it as “security of silence,” and the “subsuming security” problems.⁹⁶ “Security as silence,” occurs when insecurity cannot be voiced, when raising something, as a security problem is impossible or might even aggravate the threat being faced. This is explained with example of honour killings of Pakistani women,⁹⁷ and the cases of rape in Pakistan leading to *zina*⁹⁸ convictions which show that by discursively acknowledging the rape, the woman in question runs the risk of being penalised herself. An attempt to securitise one's situation would in these cases, paradoxically, activate another threat posed to these women by their ‘own’ society. The security strategies chosen by Pakistani women have, as a consequence, often been silence, denial, or, if the incident has become known, flight.

“Subsuming security” arises because gendered security problems often involve an intimate inter-linkage between the subject's gendered identity and other aspects, for example, national and religious of the subject's identity. As a consequence, “gender” rarely produces the kind of collective, self-contained type of referent object, carefully separated from others, as required by the Copenhagen School; and to that extent gender is included, mostly as an individual—less important—security problem. The problem, in Judith Butler's words is:

If one ‘is’ a woman, that is surely not all one is; *the term fails to be exhaustive*, not because a pregendered ‘person’ transcends the specific paraphernalia of its gender, but because gender is not always constituted

coherently or consistently in different historical contexts, and because gender intersects with racial, class, ethnic, sexual and regional modalities of discursively constituted identities. As a result, it becomes impossible to separate out 'gender' from the political and cultural intersections in which it is universally produced and maintained.⁹⁹ (emphasis added).

While religion, class, race, and nationality can form the foundation for self-reproducing communities; gender as exclusivity, that is, a "women's community," cannot, to the same extent. The identity groups that come into focus in societal security theory are constituted through a *demarcation* from either the state, or other competing identity groups. But gender-based security threats are more often characterised by their *inseparability* from national or religious security than by a clearly delineated gendered referent object. Pakistani honour killings, for example, illustrate a case of gender insecurity characterised by an *inter-linkage* with national, state and religious security.¹⁰⁰

The second problem relates to the Copenhagen School definition of securitising actors who are commonly identified as "political leaders, bureaucracies, governments, lobbyists and pressure groups." Their identification depends less on "who performs the speech than of what logic shapes the action."¹⁰¹ The definition of securitising actors depends, in other words, on their ability to perform a successful securitisation to get a sufficient acceptance of the threat in question from the relevant audience. This could well reproduce the hegemonic tradition that we have been questioning so far. Simply by not asking the question, or by rendering "who" performs the securitisation irrelevant, the Copenhagen School, to put it metaphorically, seems to have missed the boat. This precisely, is the heart of the problem. It is the "West", and not the South Asians, themselves, that is producing the discourses on security. Put differently, it could also justify the principle of "might is right". Those who have the power—political, military and economic—to set the terms of the discourse and *coerce* the poor, the marginalised and the weak into accepting it, win the game. This applies to the national as well as the international level. A closer exposition will make it clear.

The Indian government's plans to build the Sardar Sarowar Dam on the Narmada river, which, when completed, would not only submerge fertile land and rich forests, but also submerge at least two hundred fifty villages. This dam, in other words, poses a threat to the "collective survival" of people living in the area. As a threat, it fulfils two criteria. Firstly, it is an "existential threat" to an identifiable referent object, i.e. the people of these villages. Secondly, they, the people, have not succeeded in making its relevant audience, in this case, the state and central governments, accept the threat in question. On the contrary, the recent Supreme Court judgement has allowed the construction of the dam. Using the concept of securitisation, how does one classify and interpret this case? First, does the state, with its power and political authority to construct the dam, have a successful case of securitisation despite the fact that it poses an existential threat to people? Or do the people, the other securitising actor—despite fulfilling the second criteria of securitisation, not have a successful case of securitisation just because they lack the power to force the state to accept their demand? Moreover, the Copenhagen School argues that if the securitising actor "manages to break free of procedures and rules, he or she would otherwise be bound by," it

is a successful case of securitisation. But in this case, the people of the Narmada Valley,, who have been waging a non-violent struggle for fifteen years (by not breaking the rules of the political system), have not succeeded. Should they “break free,” and say, resort to violence? If they succeed, will that not, in turn, cause “insecurity” to the state.

This has even more far-reaching implications at the international level because developing countries have *little or no voice* in setting the terms of the discourse, for example in the international economic arena. Let me explain this with reference to the making, and working of WTO, a body that has a legal status equivalent to that of the United Nations with extraordinary *enforcement powers*. Under the present set-up, WTO has immense powers to decide the fate of millions of people, nations and states. Its agreements and policies have far-reaching consequences on issues of land security, food security and water security and, the dice is heavily loaded against developing countries. While many industrial trade groups—500 corporations and business representatives in the US alone—had direct access to government delegations that conducted the GATT/WTO negotiations, *no access* was given to NGOs concerned with environmental issues, social issues, consumer rights, human rights, or labour. It is also important to point out the *exclusion* of the developing countries from the negotiating process. The most important negotiations were held privately behind closed doors by a few key industrial nations’ trade delegations and business interests. Agreements were drafted and only then presented to Third World participants as a *fait accompli*.¹⁰² It was a take it or leave it offer. If countries decided not to accept the provisions of these agreements (many of which were strongly biased against the poorer, smaller nations and favoured unfettered entry by transnational corporate interests from the developed world) they were told they would be abandoned by the global trading system, and were threatened with reduced access to IMF and other international loans. Fearing that exclusion would be suicidal, most developing countries went along with the ultimatum.¹⁰³ In this kind of scenario, “who” performs the securitisation is, indeed, the crux of the matter.

This is all the more important because the origin of a substantial proportion of the security discourse continues to emanate from the West, and more specifically from institutions such as the World Bank, UNDP and other international financing institutions (IFIs). They not only have the power and means to introduce the concepts and discourses on security, but also to make it a part of the popular parlance in the Third World. Let me explain this with reference to two sets of discourses: good governance and security and human security that are currently much in vogue.

First, the concept of governance, rather “good governance” is being presented as a panacea of all evils afflicting South Asian states ranging from pervasive nepotism and corruption, the absence of transparency and accountability in public administration, a lack of respect for the rule of law, drought management and caste violence to centre-state relations, management of economy and international affairs. Much research has been conducted into examining the problems of governance of South Asian states.¹⁰⁴ However, no clear and conceptually rigorous formulation of governance and its ingredients has come forth. Amit Prakash argues that a survey of a wide array of formulations of governance shows that the “concept of governance does not really offer any substantial tools of analysis to replace or to append to the existing theory of state and its relationship with the society.”¹⁰⁵

However, more than the utility of the concept, we are interested in tracing its genealogy which, it will be argued, is being adopted into the academic discourse at the behest of international financing institutions (IFIs) who have “incorporated the concept into their official rhetoric largely because it allows their representatives to refer to politik [political(sic)] reforms and conditionalities in terms that appear less imposing.”¹⁰⁶ The use of the concept also enables the IFIs to include issues in their negotiations with member-countries, which are not a part of their official mandate.

The genealogy of the term *governance* in the development discourse is generally traced to the 1989 World Bank Report entitled “Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth: A Long Term Perspective Study”. This report was prepared against the background of the difficulties encountered in implementation of the Structural Adjustment Programme in Africa in the 1980s. It defined governance as “the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources for development.”¹⁰⁷ Since then, this term has undergone a series of modifications as the World Bank publications since 1989 reflect.

A 1994 publication identified three distinct aspects of governance: “(1) the form of political regime; (2) the process by which authority is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources for development; and (3) the capacity of government to design, formulate, and implement policies and discharge its functions”. While this publication noted that “the first aspect is deemed outside the Bank’s mandate,” this would soon change. In its latest formulation, the World Development Report 1997, directly alluded to political reforms in the concept of governance. This had three elements. The first area of concern dealt with delimiting the economic role of the state,¹⁰⁸ and the second outlined a specific set of “policy reforms,” with the main components being “fiscal consolidation, reduction and redirection of public expenditure, the reform and reduction of taxes, the maintenance of competitive exchange rates, financial, trade and investment liberalisation, overall deregulation, and privatisation of state enterprises.”¹⁰⁹ The third, and the overtly political dimension of governance, included accountability, democracy, effective enforcement of contracts, electoral reforms, human rights, participation and responsiveness in government processes, reduction of military expenditures, rule of law, safety and security to the citizens, and transparency.¹¹⁰

In a critique of the World Bank’s conception of governance, Guhan points out: governance is a concept that has a significant political dimension and its economic dimensions are also related to the political dimensions. The *locus standi* of the World Bank in advising the member countries on the political dimensions of governance is highly suspect . . . [the] World Bank is not an impartial and uninterested analyst. Its perceptorial practices begin with propaganda, extend to persuasion, and end up with leverage.¹¹¹

Secondly, the World Bank follows a universalistic approach which implies that there exists a flawless model of governing human societies, which happens to be the Western model. Many intellectuals from the developing countries, as argued earlier, have vigorously contested such essentialism, and there is no reason why the same should not be the case with

World Bank-led essentialism. This essentialism makes the World Bank's formulation on governance narrowly technocratic and economic. As a result, the debate in World Bank literature degenerates from that of governance, in any holistic sense, to that of state-versus-market theology with the sole purpose of reduction of the state to the least conceivable role.¹¹² This new theory of state—which calls for the state to take a *Primus inter pares* position *vis-à-vis* other agencies of the socio-political realm, asserts that “good governance is when the state retrenches, becomes less powerful, assumes a low profile and operates in a network with private interests and groups as a partner scarcely more important than the other.” The governance theory offers no explanations about “how the miracle, in which a marginalised state is a more legitimised state, is to be achieved,”¹¹³ and yet, many in South Asia have uncritically adopted the agenda. In the context of Bangladesh, for example, Imtiaz Ahmed points out that the “current terms of reference, including aims and objectives” of Bangladesh's compulsions for good governance is very much akin to the politics and world-view of the international development community (IDC).¹¹⁴

The concept of human security has also become very popular in South Asian security debates. Kanti Bajpai traces the genealogy of the concept of human security to Mahbub-ul-Haq's work at the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and that of the Canadian government as well as academics who led a middle powers' initiative.¹¹⁵ The individual is the central variable of human security. Mahbub-ul-Haq identified five, rather radical and necessary steps, to give life to the new conception of security:

a human development conception with emphasis on equity, sustainability, and grassroots participation; a peace dividend to underwrite the broader agenda of human security; a new partnership between North and South based on “justice, not charity” which emphasizes “equitable access to global market opportunities” and economic restructuring; a new framework of global governance built on reform of international institutions such as the IMF, World Bank, and United Nations; and finally, a growing role for global civil society.¹¹⁶

In a similar vein, the 1994 UNDP Report articulated human security to be “people-centered,” and that is not concerned with weapons, but with “human life and dignity.” It is concerned with how people live and breathe in a society, how freely they exercise their many choices, how much access they have to market and social opportunities and whether they live in conflict or in peace.”¹¹⁷ More specifically, the UNDP Report lists seven “components”, or specific values of human security: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security.¹¹⁸

The Canadian-led middle powers' approach to human security overlaps with the former, in that, human security implies “an acceptable quality of life” which, minimally, connotes physical safety and well being, and “a guarantee of fundamental human rights”. Basic needs, sustainable economic development, and social equity, on the one hand, are central to the notion of physical safety and well being. Human rights, fundamental freedoms, rule of law, and good governance, on the other, are all dimensions of political

freedom.¹¹⁹ The Canadian approach concedes that “security between states remains a necessary condition for the security of people” but argues that since the Cold War it is increasingly clear that “national security is insufficient to guarantee people’s security”.¹²⁰

On the one hand, the debate on human security appears to be a serious exercise in shifting the focus from state-centric security to a people-oriented concept of security. But as Saba Khattak’s contribution to this volume shows, this continues to be “a donor-driven agenda,” tied to foreign aid or used selectively by the ruling elites to serve their narrow ends rather than to secure their populace from “freedom of want and freedom of fear,” as proclaimed. More importantly, the paradox is that while at the discursive level, the UNDP and other international agencies and developed countries set new goals of human security to be achieved by developing countries, the ground realities of forces unleashed by economic liberalisation and globalisation, also advocated by them, seek to undermine precisely that—land security, food security, water security and ultimately, human security of poor people in the Third World.

Likewise, one could come up with a list of such policy prescriptions proposed one time or another by the “International Development Community (IDC), like “modernisation,” “green revolution,” “sustainable development,” “civil society,” “democratisation,” and so on.”¹²¹ Many of these do not originate in the local and national milieu of recipient countries and are often accepted blindly. Therefore, the question who performs the securitisation is indeed very critical. Here, it is important to reiterate the point made earlier that this is as much due to an imposition of ideas by the West, as due to our own “intellectual dependency” on the West. As Imtiaz points out:

IDC is able to put forward its policy prescriptions not so much on their own merit but because of our (intellectual) dependence or, inversely, lack of imagination and creative responses. That is why, the globalisation from the top-down and/or the power of the IDC cannot be contained or replaced by developmental efforts arising from the modernists’ aspirations of the Bangladeshis because “the latter, in fact, is a mirror image of the former . . . It must be kept in mind here that concepts like civil society, or democratisation were not invented by [the] World Bank or those who man the offices of the donor community, but these were old concepts long advocated by scholars, activists and dissenters in both East and West. It is only a pity that the developing countries must now address and absorb these concepts only after they have been incorporated and repackaged by donor agencies.”¹²²

An engagement with those blind spots within the Copenhagen School requires that we shift our analytical attention from identifying instances of securitisation towards the question of how security discourses are produced. Clearly, what is at stake is not simply the question of whether the concept of security should be expanded or not, but how certain threats achieve such a political saliency that they become the subject of security policy.¹²³

Finally, the Copenhagen School argues that desecuritisation “remains the long term political goal,” since it means not to have issues phrased as “threats against which we have counter-measures,” but to move them out of this threat-defence sequence into the ordinary public sphere.¹²⁴ Interestingly, it recognises the ideological role of desecuritisation in international power politics during the Cold War period:

Whether intentionally or not, liberal desecuritisation legitimised the post-1945 U.S.-Western imperium, which operated on the demand for access rather than in the traditional European style of direct control. The desecuritisation of economic relations . . . made economic penetration by the strong legitimate and threw political obstacles in the way of the weak, who viewed their security in much wider terms than just military relations did. For many states and the peoples on the periphery of the international system, the attempted liberal desecuritisation of the political economy was itself a security issue. The self-serving qualities of liberal choices about defining the security agenda were seen as invidious, whatever their merits elsewhere. Liberal states were able to delegitimise the non-military security claims of other actors, in the process subordinating them to the “normal” politics of market economy and pluralist politics. By itself, the situation justified a wider perspective on security, but only the voices of the weak calling for a new international economic order supported it, and it was largely drowned out by the titanic military confrontation of the superpowers.¹²⁵

What, however, is not clear is how the situation is different in the post-Cold War era. As argued earlier, the composition, the “rules of the game,” and working of WTO on the one hand, and the IFIs, on the other, seek to desecuritize the international economic realm, giving the transnational corporations a free hand to control the world’s economy. The mechanisms may have changed, but the politics of desecuritisation and its ideological role, remains much the same.

Conclusion

This paper has sought to present a critical account of multiple discourses on security from diverse standpoints. This exercise may be criticised for lacking the necessary cohesion that a serious concept of security requires. But that precisely was the idea and the driving force behind this discussion, that is, to open up the concept of security for a wider debate among the South Asians. We need to re-think the very terms in which we converse about security, the very language we use to express our “realities”, our problems and our dreams. We need to question the conventional beliefs and the “given wisdom,” on issues of concern to us. Rethinking security requires challenging the use of security for ideological ends. It entails an understanding of the power relations involved and more importantly, a refusal of the metaphysics of domination and control. It calls for a drastic rethinking of political structures. Transforming states, hard though it will be in the face of resistance of powerful vested interests; must be an important part of reformulating security. The military understanding of security is one of force, imposed solutions, secrecy, power and surveillance. The question of “whose security?” therefore suggests the necessity of looking at the situation of the most vulnerable sectors of a population in

trying to formulate a positive post-Cold War formulation of security. Security needs to encompass the interests of the people rather than just states, in giving access to food, shelter, basic human rights, and the environmental conditions that allow these things to be provided into the long-term future.

Equally important is the task of de-nationalising security. We need to shake off ‘our intellectual dependency’ on the West and rethink security in light of our ground realities and inspired by local knowledge systems and practices. In the process of warding off Western pressures, however, we should not fall in the trap of defending “our national security” and “our nation-state” that is also a legacy of the colonial powers.

Finally, separating security from state security opens up spaces for constructive interactions between peoples across boundaries; eroding the possibilities of constructing security in terms of exclusionist identity. In fact, the critical inputs for new understanding of security are emerging from critical social movements, often focussed on local issues but sensitive to the wider picture. They also raise fundamentally important issues concerning the possibilities of re-imagining political community and forging new ‘solidarities,’ which act in ways that transcend the boundaries of blocs and states, working to promote international collaboration and co-operation irrespective of state policies. This is not to argue that the states are redundant or they are about to wither away. However, it does suggest that the creative energy for reformulating security come from outside the entrenched bureaucratic structure of states. It also shows security is no longer the singular preserve of security intellectuals and analysts. This paper does not claim to have answers to *all* the problems of the security problematic or even address *all* the dimensions of the multi-faceted concept of security. If only it succeeds in asking the right questions, stimulating a wider debate on the concept of security to generate a truly South Asian discourse on security, it would prove to be an immensely fruitful exercise.

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⁴ Simon Dalby, "Security, Modernity, Ecology: the Dilemmas of Post-Cold War Security Discourse," *Alternatives*, vol. 17, 1993, p. 119.

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⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

⁴¹ Nissan and Stirrat point out that even during the colonial era, the developing Tamils and Sinhalese identities were not in direct competition; they were primarily directed against, and mediated by, the British. It was only later, after independence, that the British were to be replaced by the Tamil as the “dangerous other” implied in much of the self-conscious proclamations of Sinhala identity and community. As cited by Ahmed, *ibid.*, p. 14.

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(a) ours is a Sinhalese country; (b) ours is a land of Buddhists; (c) this is the only place in the world where Sinhalese race exists; (d) foreigners have come and exploited our country, and we the Sinhalese have become poorer and poorer; (e) we will not allow anyone to divide our country; (f) why can these Tamils not go back to where they originally came from? See Jayadeva Uyangoda, “The State and the Process of Devolution in Sri Lanka,” in Sunil Bastian, (ed.), *State and Devolution in Sri Lanka*, Check, New Delhi: Konark Publishers, 1994, p. 90.

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⁶³ Rebecca Grant and Kathleen Newland, "Introduction," in Rebecca Grant and Kathleen Newland, (eds.), *Gender and International Relations*, Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1991, p. 13.

⁶⁴ Sandra Harding and Merrill Hintikka, (eds.), *Discovering Reality: Feminist Perspectives on Epistemology, Metaphysics, Methodology and the Philosophy of Science*, Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1983, p. x.

⁶⁵ Anne Sisson Runyan and V. Spike Peterson, "The Radical Future of Realist Feminist Subversion of International Relations Theory," *Alternatives*, vol. 16, no.1, 1990, p. 99. The term "binary metaphysics," in feminist terminology, refers to a gender coding in recurring litany of Western dualism's. It is argued that asymmetrical dichotomies—such as public-private, culture-nature, rational-irrational, order-anarchy, mind-body and objective-subjective—implicitly, and sometimes explicitly, map on to or are derived from a fundamental Western construction of masculine over feminine. See Peterson, *op.cit.*, p. 7.

⁶⁶ See, R. B. J. Walker, "Gender and Critique in the Theory of International Relations," in Peterson, *op.cit.* Also see, Elizabeth Gross, "Conclusion," in Elizabeth Gross and Carole Pateman, (eds.), *Feminist Challenges: Social and Political Theory*, Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1986, pp. 191-192.

⁶⁷ Gross, *ibid.*

⁶⁸ See Navnita Chadha Behera, "The Long Road Ahead: Engendering Conflict Analysis in South Asia," a paper presented at a conference on "Human Security in the New Millennium," organised by WISCOMP, New Delhi in August 2000.

⁶⁹ Donna Pankhurst and Jenny Pearce, "Engendering the Analysis of Conflict: A Southern Perspective," in Haleh Afshar, *Women and Empowerment: Illustrations from the Third World*, London: Macmillan Press, 1998, p. 155.

⁷⁰ See for example, Malathi de Alwis, "Moral Mothers and Stalwart Sons: Reading Binaries in a Time of War," in Lois Ann Lorentzen and Jennifer Turpin, (eds.), *The Women War Reader*, New York: New York University Press, 1999; Mangalika de Silva, "Women in the LTTE: Liberation or Subjugation," *Pravada*, October/November 1995, pp. 27-31; Malathi de Alwis, "Motherhood as a Space of Protest: Women's Political Participation in Contemporary Sri Lanka," in Patricia Jeffery and Amrita Basu, (eds.), *Resisting the Sacred and the Secular: Women's Activism and Political Religion in South Asia*, New Delhi: Kali for Women, 1999; *The Green of the Valley is Khaki*, Women's Testimonies from Kashmir, Women's Initiative, 1994; Richira T. Naved, "Empowerment of Women: Listening to the Voices of Women," in *The Bangladesh Development Studies*, vol. 22, June-September 1994; Nafisha Shah, *Blood, Tears and Lives to Live: Women in the Cross-Fire*, A Study for Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, March 1998; Ritu Menon and Kamla Bhasin, *Borders and Boundaries: Women in India's Partition*, New Delhi: Kali for Women, 1998; Urvashi Butalia, *The Other Side of Silence: Voices from the Partition of India*, New Delhi, Penguin Books, 1998; Roshmi Goswami and Indranee Dutta, "Facilitating the Fulfillment of Government Obligation to Women's Equality: Women in Armed Conflict Situations," *A Report by North East Network*, forthcoming; and Darini Rajasingham-Senanayake, "Post Victimization: Cultural Transformation and Women's Empowerment in War and Displacement," in Selvy Thiruchandran, (ed.), *Women, Narration and Nation: Collective Images and Multiple Identities*, New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1999.. Also see, Bennett, Olivia, Jo Buxley, and Kitty

Warnock, (eds.), *Arms to Fight, Arms to Protect: Women Speak Out About Conflict*, London: Panos, 1995. On feminist nationalism, see, Darini Rajasingham, "On Mediating Multiple Identities: the Shifting Field of Women's Sexuality in the Community, State and Nation," in *From Basic Needs to Basic Rights*, Washington D.C.: Women, Law and Development International, 1995; and Sitralega Manunaguru, "Gendering Tamil Nationalism: The Construction of 'Woman' in Projects of Protest and Control," in Pradeep Jaganathan and Qadri Ismail, (eds.), *Unmaking the Nation: The Politics of Identity and History in Sri Lanka*, Colombo: Social Scientists Association, 1995.

⁷¹ Buzan, et al. *op.cit.*, p. 3.

⁷² The rise of economic and environmental agendas in International Relations had first come about in 1970s and 1980s in the US response to the first oil crisis. Dalby argues that since then, resource issues are often linked easily to security issues in terms of the question of access to them internationally because the very survival of the US and, to a lesser extent, all industrial economies depends on the availability of both renewable and non-renewable resources. Dalby, *op.cit.*, p. 110. The rise of concerns with identity issues and transnational crime emerged much later during the 1990s.

⁷³ Norman Myers, *Ultimate Security*, New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1993.

⁷⁴ Marc A. Levy, "Is the Environment a National Security Issue?" *International Security*, vol. 35, 1995, pp. 35-62.

⁷⁵ Robert H. Dorff as cited by Krause and Williams, *op.cit.*, p. 234.

⁷⁶ Dalby, *op.cit.*, p. 114.

⁷⁷ Peter and Susan Calvert, *The South, the North and the Environment*, London: Pinter, 1999, p. 188.

⁷⁸ As cited by Ramchandra Guha, *Environmentalism: A Global History*, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 143.

⁷⁹ As cited by Guha, *ibid.*, p. 144.

⁸⁰ The 1998 UN Human Development Report says that the disparity in the level of income between the top twenty per cent and the bottom twenty per cent of the world's population is 150:1 and has doubled in the last thirty years. The world's two hundred-twenty five richest individuals have a combined wealth equal to the annual income of half of humanity. The three richest people in the world have assets that exceed the combined gross domestic product of forty-eight countries. The richest fifth of the world's people consumes eighty-six per cent of all goods and services, while the poorest fifth consumes just over one per cent.

⁸¹ As cited by Martin Khor, "How the South is Getting a Raw Deal at WTO", in *Views from the South: The Effects of Globalisation and the WTO on Third World Countries*, San Francisco: International Forum of Globalisation, n.d., p. 20.

⁸² For example, of 120 active compounds now used in modern medicines, 75 per cent were derived from the traditional knowledge of indigenous and Third World peoples. Fewer than a dozen are synthesised by simple chemical means, the rest are directly extracted from plants and then purified.

⁸³ Debi Parker and Jerry Mander, *Invisible Government: The WTO: Global Environment for the New Millennium*, A Primer prepared by the International Forum on Globalisation, San Francisco: The International Forum on Globalisation, October 1999, pp. 32-33.

⁸⁴ Vandana Shiva, *Biopiracy: The Plunder of Nature and Knowledge*, Boston: South End Press, 1997, p. 5. Also see, Vandana Shiva, *Stolen Harvest: The Hijacking of the Global Food Supply*, Cambridge: South End Press, 2000.

⁸⁵ Maude Barlow, *Blue Gold: the Global Water Crisis and the Commodification of World's Water Supply*, Special Report issued by the International Forum on Globalisation, San Francisco: The International Forum on Globalisation, 1999, p. 12. Also see, Samir Amin, *Maldevelopment: Anatomy of a Global Failure*, London: Zed Books, 1990; and Susan George, *A Fate Worse Than Debt*, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1988.

⁸⁶ Buzan, et al. *op.cit.* Jef Huysmans supports this claim and describes it as "possibly the most thorough and continuous exploration of the significance and the implications of a widening agenda for security studies." See, Jef Huysmans, "Revisiting Copenhagen: Or, On the Creative Development of a Security Studies Agenda in Europe", *European Journal of International Relations*, vol. 4, no. 4, 1998, p. 480.

⁸⁷ Buzan, et al. *ibid.*, p. 204.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 36.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*

⁹² *Ibid.*, pp. 8, 196.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 36-37.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 207.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 206-207.

⁹⁶ Lene Hansen, "The Little Mermaid's Silent Security Dilemma and the Absence of Gender in the Copenhagen School", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, vol. 29, no. 2, 2000, pp. 286-306.

⁹⁷ Recent statistics for 1998, collected by the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, identify 286 women killed in Punjab and 255 deaths (including that of 196 women) in *Karo-Kari* (black women and black man) in Sindh. As cited by Hansen, *ibid.*, p. 291.

⁹⁸ The Zina ordinance, adopted in 1979 by Zia-ul-Haq's regime bans sexual intercourse outside of a properly sanctioned marriage and allows for stoning to death in the case of transgression by a married woman and one hundred lashes in public in the case of an unmarried woman. It also functions in the prevention of prosecution of rape: when a woman accuses a man of rape, she is simultaneously admitting that she had sexual intercourse with him, thus if the man is acquitted, she can be prosecuted for *zina*. As the burden of proof is further complicated—and gendered—by the requirement that for the maximal punishment to be imposed, four Muslim men of good reputation must have witnessed the actual act of rape, rape is very difficult to prove.

⁹⁹ Judith Butler, *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity*, London: Routledge, 1990, p. 3.

¹⁰⁰ Hansen, *op.cit.*, p. 299. For an introduction of the relationship between gender and nation, see, Nira Yuval-Davis, *Gender and Nation*, London: Sage Publications, 1997.

¹⁰¹ Buzan, et al. *op.cit.*, pp. 40-41.

¹⁰² "Invisible Government", *op.cit.*, p. 4.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, p. 5. Khor points out that the officials of many developing countries were not really aware of what they had signed in the many complicated Uruguay Agreements. The governments and people in these countries are now still trying to understand, digest and come to terms with the many serious and structural changes they have to undergo. Khor, *op.cit.*, p. 8.

¹⁰⁴ Centre for Policy Research at New Delhi produced six volumes on this subject. See, K.M. de Silva, (ed.), *Sri Lanka: Problems of Governance*, New Delhi: Konark Publishers, 1993; Rehman Sobhan, *Bangladesh: Problems of Governance*, New Delhi: Konark Publishers, 1993; Lok Raj Baral, *Nepal: Problems of Governance*, New Delhi: Konark Publishers, 1993; Mushahid Hussain and Akmal Hussain, *Pakistan: Problems of Governance*, New Delhi: Konark Publishers, 1993; Bhabani Sen Gupta, *India: Problems of Governance of the World's Largest Democracy*, New Delhi: Konark Publishers, 1996; V.A. Pai Panandiker, (ed.), *Problems of Governance in South Asia*, New Delhi: Konark Publishers, 2000. Also see, Dhurba Kumar, (ed.), *Domestic Conflict and Crisis of Governability in Nepal*, Kathmandu: Centre for Nepal and Asian Studies, 2000.

¹⁰⁵ Amit Prakash, "Governance: A Debated Concept", Paper presented at a South Asian conference on "Legacy of Mahbul-ul-Haq: Human Development, organised by Institute of Social Sciences, 19-22 May 2000 and communicated to Social Scientist for publication.

¹⁰⁶ Goran Hyden, "Governance and Sustainable Development: Challenges and Opportunities", Paper presented at the Workshop on Sustainable Livelihoods and Development, jointly organised by the UNDP and the Centre for African Studies, University of Florida at Gainesville, 1-3 October 1998, <http://www.undp.org.sl/publication/goran.pdf>, p. 5.

¹⁰⁷ As cited by Prakash, *op.cit.*, p. 6.

¹⁰⁸ These are seen to be restricted to the five-fold tasks: developing and providing legal framework for the economic enterprise; maintenance of a distortion-free economic environment with macro-economic stability; investment in basic infrastructure and social sector; protection of the weaker sections; and protection of the environment.

¹⁰⁹ S. Guhan, "World Bank on Governance: A Critique", *Economic and Political Weekly*, vol. 53, no. 4, January 24, 1998, p. 185.

¹¹⁰ Prakash, *op.cit.*, p. 8.

¹¹¹ Guhan, *op.cit.*, pp. 186-187.

¹¹² Prakash, *op.cit.*, p. 9.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

¹¹⁴ Imtiaz Ahmed, "Governance and the International Development Community: Making Sense of the Bangladesh Experience", *Contemporary South Asia*, vol. 8, no. 3, 1999, p. 303. The International Development Community includes both bilateral and multilateral donors, with an understanding that the hegemonic power of the IDC lies with Western donors.

¹¹⁵ Kanti also identifies the key precursors to human security thinking. These included the multinational World Order Models Project (WOMP) in 1960s, the Independent Commission on International Development Issues chaired by Willy Brandt and Olof Palme-led Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues in 1980s, and the Stockholm Initiative on Global Security and Governance in 1991. See, Kanti Bajpai, "Human Security: The Concept and Measurement," *Kroc Institute Occasional Paper No. 19: OP:1*, Notre Dame: Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame, August 2000.

¹¹⁶ Mahbub-ul-Haq, "New Imperatives of Human Security," RGICS Paper No. 17, Rajiv Gandhi Institute for Contemporary Studies (RGICS), Rajiv Gandhi Foundation, New Delhi, 1994, pp. 2-19.

¹¹⁷ "Redefining Security: The Human Dimension," *Current History*, no. 94, May 1995, p. 229.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 229-230.

¹¹⁹ Axworthy as cited by Bajpai, *op.cit.*

¹²⁰ "Human Security: Safety for People in a Changing World," a paper prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Government of Canada (hereafter DFAIT), at website <http://www.dfaite.maeci.gc.ca/foreignp/HumanSecurity/secur-e.htm>, p. 1.

¹²¹ Ahmed, "Governance and IDC," *op.cit.*, p. 303.

¹²² *Ibid.*

¹²³ Michael C. Williams, "Modernity, Identity and Security: A Comment on the Copenhagen Controversy", *Review of International Studies*, vol. 24, no. 3, 1998, pp. 435-439.

¹²⁴ Buzan, et al. *op.cit.*, p. 29.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 210-211.