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Section 31: Reconceptualising Security in an Era of Globalisation

Panel 9: Nordic Theoretical Perspectives on Security

Paper 31:

From a European Security Community to a Secure European Community – Analysing EU 'Functional' Security

- The Case of EU Civil Protection

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Abstract

Karl Deutsch defined 'security community' as a group of people that is integrated to the point that there is a 'real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other ways'. The European security community has been explained as a result of the EU's desecuritisation of inter-state relations, defined by Buzan and Waever as the shifting of issues out of the emergency mode into the normal political processes. Today the EU is securitising issues through the establishment of emergency and crisis management mechanisms for the handling of new threats such as terrorism. This indicates that the security identity of the EU is being transformed from a European security community to a 'secure European community' – a homeland defence à la Europe. In this paper a new approach - 'functional' security – is used as a way to sketch a framework of analysis for the study of the new EU security practices. A secure community is tentatively seen as a group of people that is integrated to the point that there is a spirit of solidarity that the members of that community will safeguard the basic functions of their societies and governments in common. The framework is tested in a case study of EU civil protection assistance.

1. Aim: Analysing Change in the EU Security Identity

The new dynamics in global security in recent years have had a significant impact on the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) (Duke, 2000; Missiroli, 2002; Van Ham & Medvedev, 2002; Carlsnaes, Sjursen, White, 2004). This has been the case with regard to not only policy disagreements such as the one over the Iraq conflict, but also change in the form of new transnational threats (terrorism) and the creation of EU tools such as emergency preparedness, a solidarity clause for the protection against terrorism, military and civil crisis management, a security strategy and planned mutual defence. There is now a blurring of the border between external and internal EU security as a consequence of transnational risks and the merge of internal safety and external instruments of crisis management. This dimension of change affect the way we conceptualise and theorise CFSP/ESDP just as it has affected our analysis of national foreign and security policy (Ekengren, 2004).

Karl Deutsch defined 'security community' as a group of people that is integrated to the point that there is a 'real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other ways'[1]. Integration theory explained the creation of Europe in terms of a security community resulting from the EU's desecuritisation of relations between European states through economic integration and common institutions (Adler & Barnett, 1998, Waever, 2000). Moreover, it understood CFSP and ESDP merely as an 'external consequence', a 'spill-over' effect from this internal integration (Smith, 1996). Today, these policies must be viewed as a possible driving force due to the fact that they securitise central aims and issues of the Union and thus could be assumed to change its very security identity. They constitute an external source of change - a 'second image reversed' - for the Union (Gourevitch, 1978). Like in the case of the security community the fundamentally new identity does not imply the transformation of Europe into a state. Nor does it depend on a military defence alliance. Instead, the new EU aims and tools point to a new type of regional security identity. There is a need for theories and approaches able to explain how and why a European security community develops into a *secure European community* – a homeland defence à la Europe[2].

The aim of this paper is to use a new approach – practices of 'functional' security - as a way to sketch a framework of analysis and define a secure European community. Since the 1950s the Union has created security through transnational networking. Today the Union develops safety and defence through the same method. The framework of analysis is elaborated on the basis of a case study of a sub-field of this networking: EU civil protection assistance and its role during the floodings in central Europe in the summer of 2002.

2. Functional Security and a Secure Community

Similar to many recent studies of state security, the concept and practice of security forms the natural point of departure for this inquiry. In the former case, the question

[1] Deutsch et al. (1957), p. 6.
[2] For a comparison with American Homeland Security se for example Dalgaard-Nielsen, A. (2004).

has been raised: whose security are we referring to if not primarily the territorial security of the state? Security for or against what? The discussion of how to study new fields of security has been a lively one for many years. One of the most successful new frameworks of analysis has emerged from the Copenhagen School (Buzan, Waever, de Wilde, 1998). It has challenged traditional views of security based on an objective definition of the concept's essence by focusing on the subjective facts of fear and security evident in the discourses of the actors studied. One of the main questions has been which issues are capable of being securitised, how and by whom? According to this subjectivist perspective, the existence of a 'security issue' cannot be defined objectively from the outside by the researcher. Instead, a security issue is seen to exist the moment that an existential threat is politicized through 'speech acts' by the subjects of study in a way that justifies the use of extraordinary measures to handle the threat and gives it broad acceptance. This takes the form of a securitisation process. Consequently, desecuritisation means the 'shifting of issues out of the emergency mode into the normal bargaining processes of the political sphere' (Buzan, Waever, de Wilde, 1998: 4).

In contrast, the following is aiming at an approach that constitutes a 'middle way' between objectivism and subjectivism based on the study of new *practices* of security actors and agencies (Bourdieu, 1990; Bigo, 1996, 2001; Ekengren, 2002). Indeed, the approach implies that transformations of a 'security reality' may occur irrespective of what is officially expressed or in other ways made explicit by the subjects. On the other hand, this approach does not define security objectively by postulating its essence before empirical investigation. Instead, it relates objectivist knowledge– the researcher's interpretation and decoding—to the actors' own subjective (conscious as well as un-reflected) experience of their security practices. The advantage of such a framework is that it keeps the definition of security as open as possible in the empirical investigation of new security practices without relying on only one level of social reality, namely the actor's own view of the situation**.** The conviction behind such a framework is that there are fundamental and generative aspects of social life that are invisible to the subject and can only be grasped through the researcher's 'construction' of them (see Method below).

The 'objective' part of the analysis is a concept of security that has crystallised in the investigation of those new and broader forms of security practices that have evolved following the end of the Cold War (Sundelius, 2004a and b). The larger implications of this shift in practices can neither be understood by means of an empirical 'test' of pre-empirical assumptions (we simply do not know how to formulate these at this stage) nor by studying speech acts (the full consequences of these practices are neither understood nor expressed by the practitioners). Thus far, empirical work has shown that the goal within the broad sector of national 'non-territorial' security is to minimize societal vulnerabilities and the number and impact of emergencies by establishing comprehensive systems of crisis management. These systems feature diverse practices aimed at minimising a host of possible threats ranging from'Weapons of Mass Disruption' and dangerous materials in the former USSR to transatlantic bioterror, container security, cyberterrorism, power outages and forest fires.[3] According to Sundelius, such safeguarding of the basic functions of society and government; for critical infrastructures to be maintained etc, is aimed at something

[3] For a good overview of these practices see Dalgaard-Nielsen, A. and Søby Kristensen, K. (2003).

that could tentatively be labelled *functional security*—an objective label that may need to be abandoned should further empirical investigation prove that it fails to address today's logic of security practices.

Traditionally 'functional' security has been a strictly national concern. Many recent domestic reforms in the Nordic states are a response to 9/11, such as the establishment of new emergency and vulnerability management bodies aimed at strengthening 'functional' security.[4] Today also transnational networks are increasingly involved in practices of functional security. European cooperation is increasingly becoming a pre-requisite for 'functional' security and national defence in the European context of transnational threats and risks. Consequently, one of the main purposes of national security policies and agencies has been to safeguard and develop European institutions and to support the democratisation and civil societies of other states. Similar to the division of national security into a domestic and an external side, the study of EU security has largely been based on a strong distinction between internal desecuritisation and an external CFSP analysed in the context of international security dynamics. This division of security originates in the tradition of territorial security and defence based on spatially defined units of analysis, i.e. states. A functional approach transcends this division not only by focusing on functions rather than territory. But also by including the *temporal* dimension of security, such as the safeguarding of governmental tasks, basic 'flows' of society and transboundary exchange over time. Today's emphasis on prevention and abilities to manage different phases of a crisis is an expression of the increasingly time determined security practices. By its quality of a stronger focus on time than other new concepts such as 'societal-' (Waever et al., 1993) 'civil-'[5] and 'human security' (Paris, 2001), the approach is particularly promising for the study of new transboundary, post-national security identities. A secure community could tentatively be defined as a group of people that is integrated to the point that there is a *real assurance – or a feeling of solidarity -that the members of that community will safeguard the basic functions of their societies and governments in common*.

3. 'Functional' Security in the EU

Today's evolution of the ESDP has been interpreted as perhaps being 'the end of territorial defence' for the Union (Gärtner, 2003). Instead, the EU focus has shifted towards crisis management capacities, which are located in all three EU pillars, making the Union responsible both for internal and external non-territorial security. Within the first pillar the EU has elaborated a new 'Rapid Reaction Mechanism' for civil crisis management, a 'Community Mechanism' for civil protection (see 6 below) and adopted a whole range of security measures in a wide area of its competences[6].

[4] Myrdal, S. (2004).

[5] Price, R. (1998). See also the political launch of the concept by the Swedish government in the context of for example the Council of the Baltic Sea States (Swedish government enquiry SOU 2003:101).

[6] A whole range of 'functional' security measures have been adopted under the competences of the first pillar. These include economic security; the protection of technical infrastructure, the combatting of terrorist funding (DG Internal Market and Financial Services), a Rapid Reaction Mechanism for international civil crisis management (DG External Relations), programmes of aviation-transport security (DG Enterprise), Civil protection: a Community mechanism (DG Environment), a Rapid Reaction Network in the field of 'health security', programmes for the control of communicable

Emergency preparedness is one of five areas prioritised by the EU in the fight against terrorism[7]. Within the third pillar police and judicial cooperation (DG Justice and Home Affairs) takes place, forming the basis for the EU's combatting of terrorism. The EU has adopted a European arrest warrant, common definition of terrorism, common list of terrorist organisations and established an exchange of information between the Member States and Europol, an anti-terrorist team within Europol and a Eurojust (co-ordination of prosecutors, police officers). The Commission is investigating the possibility of creating a common EU agency for the control of EU borders. Crisis management within the second pillar includes military and civilian capacities. Under the ESDP, the EU will be able to deploy up to 5000 police men in international missions and furthermore be able strengthen civil law system and admistration and provide for civil protection. The EU's military crisis management capacities build on a close cooperation with Nato[8]. Thus in practice, the Union has in many fields moved towards a strengthened capacity for securing the EU against antagonistic threats abroad or from within, as well as for safeguarding its citizens from the deadly consequences of massive emergencies. Alongside an evolving capacity for management of crises outside EU's borders, it is generally assumed that the European public expects an EU-based capacity for emergencies within the borders of the enlarged Union. Early empirical examples clearly point to an erosion of the border between internal and external EU security policies.

> At least part of the reason why the EU Police Mission (*ESDP*) in Bosnia received good support in its call for organized crime experts is because of the interest many interior ministries and police departments have in tackling the smuggling and crime routes through the Balkans that end up in their capitals[9] (Renata Dwan, formerly at the EUPM-Section, Council Secretariat, Brussels) (parenthesis added)

The European Convention in 2003 proposed to codify the emerging transboundary practices of functional security in the form of a treaty-bound 'solidarity clause' on EU defence against terrorist attacks and natural or man-made disasters. The European Council adopted the clause as a political declaration in the aftermath of the bombings in Madrid 11 March 2004. In December 2003, the Union adopted the security strategy proposed by CFSP High Representative Solana. One of the greatest threats identified in the security strategy is the use of 'Weapons of Mass Disruption' by terrorists, a scenario that would likely result in power outages, water supply problems and a breakdown in basic infrastructure.[10] Discussions on whether or not to incorporate the capacities of the Union's third pillar, justice and home affairs (in the areas of personnel and threat identification, for example), signal another development towards a broad security approach to the ESDP. For internal as well as external security reasons, many have claimed that there is an urgent need for better coordination

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diseases, preparedness and response to biological, chemical, radiological, nuclear terrorist attacks (DG Consumer Policy and Health Protection), general vulnerability reduction, security of energy supply, diplomacy (e.g. in the UN), a Joint Research Centre (including a new security programme), policies of common risk analysis and intelligence (Jarlsvik, H. and Castenfors, K., 2004).

[7] The other four comprises Police and Judicial cooperation, global fight against terrorism, air transport security and economic and financial measures. (http://europa.eu.int/comm./110901/index.htm. 24 May 2004.

[8] Piana 2002:2.

[9] Dwan, R. (2003).

[10] Note pour le Haut Representant, Strategie de securité de l'Union europeenne. Compte rendu du séminaire sur les menaces – 'Identifying and understanding threats"', Rome 19 septembre 2003, Institute for Security Studies, 23 septembre 2003.

between civilian ESDP activities, JHA and the Commission. It has also been suggested that security thinking should be 'mainstreamed' into other areas of EU cooperation as well. The EU should in the wording of the solidarity clause, make the most of its multi-sectorial character – including military instruments[11]- in action on its territory.

4. Theories of CFSP and ESDP

A functional security perspective poses a challenge to a range of central themes in the ongoing discussion of how to theorise the foreign and security policy role and capacity of the Union. The adoption of such a perspective is therefore linked to a more central theoretical questions.

To begin with, should the *balance between (grand) theoretical ambitions and empirical work* change in the study of CFSP/ESDP? There has been growing concern among CFSP scholars that CFSP studies are either too empirical, simply content to chronicle or update (e.g. institutional development, sector and regional studies) (Jørgensen, 1997a; Tonra & Christiansen, 2004); too slow (Zielonka, 1998), failing to 'catch up' with EU developments and to address the visionary moves and policies of quicker practitioner colleagues when such moves and policies actually occur, or too frightened—unwilling to take any sort of theoretical leap that might result in new, useful analytical concepts and approaches. The latter position has been justified by the fact that scholars are simply not yet ready for more theory—or new theorising—in CFSP studies; that the current trajectory of the CFSP and ESDP and the events occurring within and outside of the Union exceed cognition to some extent, thus defying analytical reduction and analysis and making it impossible to see more general patterns at this point in time. One way forward is 'to get out of the CFSP ghetto', as Knud Erik Jørgensen has formulated it, and to link up with other areas of research (Jørgensen, 1998: 90 and 2004). This is exactly the aim of this paper: to bring new understandings of security into the study of CFSP in general and ESDP in particular.

The next major concern evoked by functional security is the *choice of theoretical point of departure*. As mentioned, new approaches to security have already been presented as a way forward to study European security and defence. A promising strand of this literature is to apply general social science concepts, such as communicative action (Sjursen, 2004). More important perhaps is that the adoption of our perspective will shift the focus from IR theory and foreign policy analysis (White, 2001) to theories on the dissolution of internal and external boundaries and the systemic dimension of EU security/safety. The dissolution has been discussed in relation to international relations (Walker, 1993, 2000; Rosenau, 1997; Albert, Jacobson, Lapid, 2000) and EU governance 'beyond the states' (Jachtenfuchs, 1995). By means of a different epistemological outlook, Bigo has come furthest in demarcating a new transboundary 'field of security' in Europe (Bigo, 2000 and 2001). Bigo leans on Pierre Bourdieu's theory of field, based on an ethnomethodological approach to the practices of security agents (military agencies, secret services, customs, police forces etc) for an understanding of why they securitise certain phenomena and not others and how they use these 'devices' as a 'technique of

[11] For the role of the military in national functional security see Stålvant, C.-E. (2004).

government' (Bigo, 2000: 176). The role of the Union is described as a 'platform' for the negotiation between security agencies of the EU countries, such as the police and military forces (Bigo, 2000: 183). The role of national security agencies are changing; both the police and the military forces are now increasingly turned towards the common task of 'internal' European security. This has led to a development where security analysis and planning are preoccupied with crisis situations and the prevention of conflicts and international crimes rather than traditional wars (Bigo, 2001). The pan-European police cooperation is described as taking place in informal networks and practices, not officially recognised. These are created by police agencies as a 'necessary' answer to the new challenges and threats of the border-free Europe (Bigo, 1996).

The challenge today is that the EU is no longer just a platform for national security agents. It now possesses security and safety instruments of its own. This creates a need for an understanding of how the external and internal instruments relate and what they are aimed at in the European field of security and beyond. What territory system or 'functions' are they aimed to secure? One way forward is to assume that we are dealing with the domesticization of European security and use theories of domestic vulnerability and security. There is, for instance, a growing body of social theory literature on the consequences of major disturbances on society, i.e. system effects. Jervis has pointed to the interconnections in the international system and how strongly these condition effective action (Jervis, 1997). Brauch et. al. have reconceptualized security in a regional system on the basis of analyses of environmental conflicts in the Mediterranean area (Brauch et. al, 2003). Beck has introduced the concept of risk society (Beck, 1993). According to Luhmann, 'the horizon of the future becomes shorter and more foreboding' as a result of a new type of world society, characterized by complexity and a short term crisis management style of politics (Luhmann, 1982: 288). The systemic dimensions of security has been brought into the context of internal EU security in the form of transnational and transgovernmetal dynamics stemming from European policing (den Boer, 2001). Thus, possible change in the international identity of the Union is not only a question of the creation of military EU capacities (Whitman, 2002; Manners, 2002). The steps towards a secure European community imply deeper transformations that are of significance for the EU's regional identity and thus its international role. As in most EU fields, European institution building is to a large extent simply a codification of existing practices and networks of European cooperation – of 'politics from below'[12]. (Della Sala & Wiener, 1997; Wiener, 1997, 1998). A functional security approach helps us to understand the constitutional 'potential' of security practices for new formal steps of the ESDP. The safeguarding of basic functions of society by national agencies is today determining, but also shaped by European policies and institutions.

By introducing functional security, we also embark upon a third problematique in the study of CFSP that is of help for finding out whether and how a secure European

[12] The earlier lack of this perspective has been explained in terms of the strong positivistic tradition in theories of European cooperation, implying a one-sided focus on 'visible' structures, which has left change in ideas, norms, discourses and practices in the dark. The consequence is that significant phenomena of European governance have been ignored (Jørgensen, 1997). These conclusions are similar to the neo-institutional strand of literature with its conception of rules, norms and practices of 'appropriateness' as taking place prior to the actors' adoption of a certain 'goal' or 'interest' (March & Olsen, 1989).

community is evolving. This concerns the question of whether the Union should be treated as an *actor* or a *structure* (often conceptualised as a 'presence') in world politics. Here, the search for frameworks of analysis able to *combine* the EU-as-actor (agent) and structuralist approaches in empirical study has been central (Hill, 1994: 107; Waever, 2000: 260; White, 2001: 32). It is in the EU's provision of 'soft' security, such as humanitarian aid that the 'translation of presence into actorness … is likely to be more efficacious than the "hard" security of military defence' (Bretherton and Vogler, 1999: 198). Hitherto, the EU has most effectively responded to wider Europe not as a traditional foreign policy actor but by extending its internal structure ('network governance') through enlargement and the integration of external actors and resources into policy-making processes (Filtenborg et al, 2002). The consequence is a very peculiar actor-structure characteristic of the EU's security role in wider Europe. The main task of the new military and civilian *actor* capabilities of the Union is to manage crisis and conflict outside the formal EU borders[13]. That is in a geographical area where Union activities in a functional security perspective might best be described as parts of an evolving European security *structure*. In the light of earlier CFSP history[14], the Balkan experience of the 1990s and the EU enlargement, the 'external'capacity will probably to a large extent be used in areas neighbouring the EU in Europe. That is, in the 'enlarged European security space' (Lenzi, 1998: 111-114) or 'internal' European security area (Waever, 2000) or 'subregional institutional security frameworks' (Jørgensen, 1997b: 211). This area is the long term result of new transboundary threats and risks, but also expanding economic and security networks - the Union's traditional method of crisis and conflict prevention. Thus, one of the tasks of the new actor capabilities of the Union is to meet the challenges of a field that to a large extent is structured by the EU's constitution of transboundary networks. Today the EU aims to be a better-equipped security policy actor in the same boundary land in which it is attempting to build a 'domestic' European security infrastructure through i.a. the solidarity clause. Forthcoming enlargements and a 'New neighbourhood policy'[15] of the Union only underline the need for methods able to produce and combine facts that could illuminate the complex double security role of the EU in a boundary land 'moving' east and south.

5. Method

The constraints of many earlier induction approaches have been basically methodological and epistemological.[16] Our method is built on the methodology of

[13] See the Amsterdam Treaty 1999 and the European Councils, Helsinki 1999, Feira 2000 and Göteborg, 2001

[14] On the basis of the growing collection of case studies of the Union's external actions (c.f. Piening, 1997; Rhodes, 1998) it is safe to conclude that the CFSP has been politically strongest within ('collective at any cost' (Lucarelli, 1997: 61)) and on its frontiers. This development has only been underlined as a consequence of the extended cooperation with candidate states during the 1990s (Friis & Murphy, 1999).

[15] Communication from the Commission. *Paving the way for a New Neighbourhood Instrument*. Brussels, 1 July 2003, COM (2003) 393 final.

[16] The limitation of for example both Sjöstedt's (Sjöstedt, 1977) and Whitman's (1998) inductive methods is that they do not transcend the dividing line between the 'internal' and 'external' European policies. The foreign policy analysis of White is based on the state-centric realist methodology which contributes little to a framework able to grasp a transboundary field of security (White, 2001). The risk of borrowing from theories of public domestic policy – potentially promising for a transboundary European field or polity - is a too far-reaching comparison with national politics, shadowing the

Bourdieu's theory of practice (1977, 1990). We take as a point of departure cases of 'everyday' practices of a selected group of people involved in EU 'functional' security. What do EU actors/agents actually do? What is their discursive practice? With whom and how do they interact in a border free Europe? The structure generating actions is supposed to *crystallise* in case studies of 'functional security' practices. The task is to reveal the generative structure that lies closest to the agent. Agency is seen as a product of a knowledge of 'how to go on' in relation to this structure - as an outcome of a structuration process over time.

Our empirical investigation will be divided into two steps. The first step would consist of the mapping out of *areas* or *sectors* of functional security practices in Europe. We might include here such areas as economic security, technical infrastructure, transports, civil protection, police, migration, nuclear and food safety, cooperation on preparedness and response to biological and chemical agents attacks, networks of epidemiological surveillance and control of communicable diseases[17], humanitarian aid[18] etc. The second step will be to delimit a field of European functional security on the basis of an aggregation and decoding of our sectorial findings. What patterned set of practices crystallise at the European level? Or perhaps it will be more fruitful to distinguish two fields, a safety field and a security field, as a first step that could help us to better understand the particular logic of the emerging functional field they give birth to?[19] At this point a European structure of generative significance might be constructed. To what extent and how are security actors and agencies drawing on this structure in their handling of emergency and security? Are we in need of different approaches for each sector should a European aggregated security structure *not* crystallise? Does the field consist of distinct area specific logics that should be interpreted in terms such as an 'EU civil protection structure' rather than an 'ESDP structure' or 'European functional security structure'?

We will construct, via interpretation, an objective world of relations, an objective structure, in the same way as is done within traditional structural theory. The so-called structural method is the same; it is the search for the social relations that generate the practice of agents. However, the structure should 'crystallise' in the process of empirical investigation, in what Bourdieu calls 'the second break'. By this he means that the researcher should try to situate himself in the position of the subject at the very moment when the act is taking place. In order to relate the agent's own 'feeling' of his practice and the objective structure constructed by the researcher, Bourdieu uses the concept of habitus. We not only avoid assessing EU actors' practices only

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unique features of the Union. Rather than being 'suboptimal' Winn and Lord (2001: 171), the Union way of conducting 'external' policies is perhaps typically European. The empirical material used by Winn and Lord is mainly official data and documentation in which we will not find many signs of transboundary policy practices and a European security field. Neither is it easy for the 'naïve induction' of Jørgensen et. al. to reach beyond official doctrines for European peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention due to the official character of its empirical data (Jørgensen, 1997b: 214).

[17] From Jarlsvik, H. …

[18] Ramberg, B. & Ekengren, M. (forthcoming) 'EU Practice and European Structure of Crisis Management: A Bourdieuian Perspective on EU Functional Security - The Cases of EU Humanitarian Aid to Turkey and Kosovo, 1999'.

[19] For this idea I am indebted to Bengt Sundelius and Ulrika Mörth who discussed the possibility of a two-field research strategy at the presentation of Ulrika's book 'Organizing European Cooperation – The Case of Armaments' (2004) at the Security policy seminar at the Swedish National Defence College, 15 April 2004.

from the outside, from the viewpoint of an 'objective' structure constructed by the researcher, but also a perspective based only on subjective or ‘visible’ (in a positivistic sense) social phenomena – a view that have tended to produce a-historical assumptions about EU foreign and security policy. The main advantage of this approach is that it is open to a possible new *European* type of functional security - a reality that would risk to be overlooked with the glasses of a fixed 'nation-state' conception of the same.[20]

In sum, we criticize both subjectivism and empiricism/positivism for not providing sufficient material for social-scientific inquiry because they investigate only one level of social reality, namely the actors’ view and ’visible’ social phenomena, respectively. Instead, in order to grasp and produce *objective* empirical evidence for assumed European structures emerging beyond the states, we need methods able to combine objectivist and subjectivist knowledge. Thus, we agree with Steve Smith that the decisive dividing line between strands of constructivism is *epistemological* (Smith, 2001). Objective social relations and structures will in the following be constructuted on the basis of our own *decoding* of views and practices of European actors.

The sole 'pre-empirical' assumption is that there seems to exist a field that can be characterised as European ‘fucntional security’. This loser type of hypothesis is based on a preliminary familiarity of the area. It is not a ’testable’ hypothesis in the positivistic sense. The aim is to provide material for the construction of systems of social relations and to contribute in the work of formulating hypotheses which can be tested by methods of ethnographic observation.[21] The method is to let structure

[20] In this way, our approach differs to realism, neo-liberal and intergovernmental perspectives because its basic unit of analysis is not the nation-state. In contrast to neo-functionalism our theory is not grounded on any assumption of the direction of the cooperation processes such as shifting loyalities and a quasi-automaticity of integration as a result of demands of additional central services and institutions of transnational actors. Nor does it assume that the field under investigation to a significant theoretical degree will resemble other area of EU cooperation with regard to their institutionalisation. The ambition with regard to the generation of generalised knowledge and predictive power of singular areas of study is lower than in neo-functionalism. Our theory of practice belongs to a reflectivist, post-structural strand of the broad array of approaches that recently has been labeled as ’constructivist’ (Christiansen, Jørgensen, Wiener, 2001). We believe that the constructivists of a strong focus on ideational aspects and the actors’ own view in their creation of meaning and new ’intersubjective’ realities put undue limits on our thinking. The subjectivism hides the profoundity of change and risks to fall into the same traps as rationalistic and positivistic theory of being too dependent on pre-fabricated, reified state structures. The security actors themselves will probably answer they act in the ’national interest’ even though the framework of their action is fundamentally being transformed. Furthermore, the actors might ’distort’ reality by answering in a way that they think they are *expected* to do. This methodological problem should come as no surprise in such a politically sensitive area as the impact of European governance on everyday national praxis, autonomy etc. Thus, it is today difficult to empirically prove fundamental European change with a subjectivistic approach. This has not least been shown in debates with intergovernmentalists, who have been able to refer to an overwhelming amount of empirical evidences (e.g. interviews) disaproving the thesis of sigificance change (cf. Moravcsik, 1998).

[21] Bourdieu has used the so called *correspondence analysis* for the mapping of fields. The method has been applied to i.a. aspects of the cultural (Bourdieu, 1979: 209, 296, 392) and academic field in France (1984: 73, 111). He has developed this method on the ground of a critical assessment of traditional statistics, which, according to him, apriori presumes that a certain correlation is of higher importance, and more decisive for the position and action of the studied objects, than others[21]. Bourdieu argues that we should not exclude ’any’ of the relations and contacts of the actor beforehand. Systems of relations should instead crystallise during the process of collection of data. In other words, systems are not supposed to be ’included’ in the premises of the study but should instead appear as a

crystallise, piece by piece, during the very collection of data. In this way structure and 'actorness' are not hypothesised in advance, and as much a priori knowledge as possible is avoided. The risk of leaving any significant *European* facts in the dark due to the use of prefabricated notions - in relation to which empirical data should be 'tested' - is minimised. Instead, the method is able to throw light on new practices and define the object of study step by step. The potential for the further institutionalisation of the EU is searched for, not postulated in terms of 'testable' hypotheses. As with all induction strategies there is no exact in before-hand given level of empirical findings when institutional conclusions should be drawn. All empirical analysis is always a mixture of continuous observation and decoding. In our case, structures of functional security exist to the extent the actors of the field attach importance to them *and* we can observe them as generator of action, when trying to put ourself in the actor's situation. In the cases, I will start off by focusing on the group of EU policymakers firstly and most closely involved in the EU intervention. The selected people function as the core group from which further 'circles' of relations are traced and mapped. The aim is to 'follow' their handling with the help of a variety of empirical material (mainly interviews, participant observation is planned for forthcoming cases).[22] How do they *go on* in the field?

6. Case study: EU Civil Protection

6.1. The EU Instruments

EU civil protection is a very appropriate sector for the search of functional security practices. The last couple of years the EU has intervened in many major emergencies and disasters in Europe in a way significant for functional security. The first EU competence in the field of civil protection was established in 1997. It took the form of an action programme aimed at the pooling of member state expertise and mutual assistance. In October 2001, in the aftermaths of the 9-11 events, the EU decided to establish a Community mechanism for civil protection to facilitate reinforced cooperation in civil protection assistance interventions.[23] However, the idea of a

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result of the investigation. The model should in Bourdieu's words follow data, and not the other way around. By the means of qualitative data, Bourdieu and his students create two dimensional 'maps' over the actors' position in the field,. For example, the relating of actors in 'the French academic field' includes: social relations and contacts of all types, social extraction and background, attributes, professional and other capacities, habits (cultural, travels etc. etc.), number of publications in well known journals etc. On the grounds of patterns in these maps, Bourdieu has discussed the distribution of *symbolic capital* among the actors that determines action and outcomes in the field.

[22] A methodological shortcoming is of course that I have no participant observations, as yet. This problem is balanced by in-depth interviews to sound out the discursive practice of some of the involved actors. The interviews have been conducted with 'open' questions, facilitating conversations focusing the personal experience of the respondents. The duration for each respondent was approximately one hour. There are some obvious shortcomings in the selection of respondents. Firstly, we have mainly talked to representatives from the Commission, which risks a certain bias in the explanation of a 'European structure'. I plan to complement the material with interviews with member state representatives. Furthermore I am far from covering the perspectives from the NGO:s. Another problem is that people tend to forget and (consciously or unconsciously) adjust their descriptions. The interviews were made seven moths after the events took place. It should however be emphasized that the oral material is only one source among others. By comparing the descriptions with official documents, such as reports, press releases, media material, policies and regulations, the interview material has been viewed with a critical eye.

[23] Council Decision of 23 October 2001/792/EC, Euroatom.

mechanism had already been discussed in relation to the problems of coordination of the civil protection intervention teams of the EU Member States to Turkey during the earthquakes in 1999.[24] The stated aim of the mechanism reads as follows:

> 'The mechanism is intended to help ensure better protection, primarily of people but also of the environment and property, including cultural heritage, in the event of major emergencies, i.e. natural, technological, radiological or environmental accidents occurring inside or outside the Community, including accidental marine pollution …' (Article 1.2. of the Council Decision 2001/792/EC, Euroatom).

The mechanism was placed in the Civil Protection Unit (CPU) of DG Environment within the Commission. The main purpose of the mechanism is to provide for an improved framework for the coordination of national rescue and intervention teams. The mechanism in this way supports the Permanent Network of National Correspondents of the National Civil Protection administrations in the EU Member States (PNNC). The network serves as a forum for the exchange of information and the discussion of different initiatives in the field of Civil Protection. One of the added values that the EU mechanism is that the Member State in need can make an appeal to one single information and co-ordination center instead of having to activate a whole range of bi-lateral contacts would its own preparedness be in-sufficient. According to the Commission no singular Member State, particular the small countries, possesses the expertise and the very specialized intervention teams that often is needed in major emergencies. The main advantage of the mechanism is that it facilitates the sharing of resources within the Union.[25] EU interventions can only be carried out on the request from the country hit by the disaster. It is up to every Member State to individually decide whether and with what means it will help this country. The help provided will stand under the authority of the receiving country[26]. As late as in 2003 the Commission adopted the detailed implementing instrument for the mechanism. The European Parliament has on several occasions suggested the creation of a European Civil Protection Force[27].

In the divison of competence between the EU and the Member States of the draft EU constitutional treaty, planned to be adopted in 2004, it is proposed that the main responsibility and legal competence for disaster relief remain with the Member States. The Union is given the right to adopt coordinating, complementary and supporting measures.[28] In the view of the civil servants of the CPU, the complementary role of the EU in relation to the Member State is of crucial weight in the EU civil protection.

> We try to integrate also the interest of other DGs here, so the complete action program is something to help, to complement and support the efforts at the national level, to bring them together, the civil protection actors, so that they can see how they can best work together. This instrument (*the mechanism*) is one of the things we are doing without touching the competence of the MS.[29]

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[24] Interview with civil servant at the Commission Civil Protection Unit, DG Environment, 2003-02-11.
[25] Interview with civil servant at the Commission Civil Protection Unit, DG Environment, 2003-02-11.
[26] Internal working document, Swedish Civil Protection Agency, 2003-02-05.
[27] See its resolution on the effects of the summer heat wave 2003 and its report on improving safety at sea in response to the Prestige accident 2002.
[28] CONV 528/03, 2003-02-06; Ekengren (2003).
[29] Interview with civil servant at the Commission Civil Protection Unit, DG Environment, 2003-02-11.

The Community mechanism consists of a series of elements and actions including the identification of intervention and assessment teams, training programmes, the establishment of a Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC) at the Commission and a Common Emergency Communication and Information System (CECIS) between the civil protection agencies of the Member States and the Commission. Provision has been made for interlinking this communication system with other existing networks for radiological[30], health[31] and biological – chemical[32] emergencies. Today many of these systems include candidate states and the EEA countries.[33] The Member States have committed themselves to make available civil protection intervention teams of up to 2000 persons at short notice by 2003.[34] The MIC is the key element of the mechanism through which the Member States at an early stage can notify each other of terrorist threats or natural disasters. Since 2002 they have also had the possibility of requesting help in the form of specialized personnel and other resources via the Community mechanism, such as search and rescue teams, fire-fighters, evacuation, emergency relief. The provisions of the Member State are voluntary and based on lists of national resources including the number of available experts, mobilisation time, medical resources, data on sustainability of resources, transports. The purpose is that the Commission should be able to put together expert teams for evaluation and coordination (logistics and communication). The EU listing of resources encourages the Member States to prepare aid packages that with short notice could be send to the place hit by the crisis. At the end of 2003 the data basis included information on 6737 persons in total within fields of expert such as search and rescue, CBRN, terrorism, clean up, logistical support.[35] Moreover, common training programmes and excercises are planned[36]. In 2004 and 2005, five big exercises on natural distasters and technological accidents will take place.[37]

> We created here a Monitoring Information Centre, so that we can coordinate from here when there is a major disaster, so we know exactly. We then send out information to the national contact points that we have identified before, and they will tell us what they have in disposal and we can coordinate centrally from here in the case of intervention. They are not really bound to follow that, they can also do individual actions, but at the end it should be so that they all take actively part in this mechanism. [38]

[30] The European Community Urgent Radiological Infromation Exchange system (ECURIE).
[31] The Early Warning and Response System (EWRS).
[32] The Rapid Alert System for Biological and Chemical Attacks and Threats (RAS-BICHAT).
[33] COM (2004) 200 final, p. 11-12.
[34] European Council in Göteborg in June 2001.
[35] Communication from the Commission to the European parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, 'Reinforcing the Civil Protection Capacity of the European Union, Brussels, 25.03.2004. COM (2004) 200 final, p. 10.
[36] The first full-scale exercise to test the EU's ability to respond to a terrorist attack was carried out in Canjuers in France October 2002 and called EUROTOX. The scenarios was an international sporting event. A warning received by the French authorities prior to the event prompted them to alert the MIC. The scale of the attacks and the number of casualities led the French authorities to request specialist assistance from other Member States via the mechanism. As a response, five national teams dispatched teams and equipment to the site of the event. Altogether, approximately 100 highly specialised personnel were involved in the actual field deployment. (Woodbridge, 2002)
[37] COM (2004) 200 final, p. 10.
[38] Interview civil servant at the Commission Civil Protection Unit, DG Environment, 2003-02-11.

Participation in the mechanism shall be open to the candidate states (Art. 7). The Mechanism would include a growing number of not only Member State but also Union experts. Article 2 of the Community mechanism reads:

> 1. In the event of a major emergency within the Community, or imminent threat thereof, which causes or is capable of causing transboundary effects or which may result in a call for assistance from one or more Member States, the Member State in which the emergency has occurred shall, without delay, notify:
> a) those Member States which may be affected by the emergency, unless this obligation of notification has already been addressed under relevant legislation of the European Community or the European Atomic Energey Community or existing international agreements, and
> b) the Commission, when a possible request for assistance through the monitoring and information centre can be anticipated, in order that the Commission may, as appropriate, inform the other Member States and activate its competent services.

In 2002, the EU created a Solidarity Fund[39] for the provision of financial assistance to help people, regions and countries hit by major disasters to return to normal living conditions. The fund was given a budget of EUR one billion annually. It is to be used for restoration to working order of infrastructure and plant in the fields of energy, water and waste water, telecommunications, transport, health and education. It can also be used for the provision of accommodation and funding rescue services, securing of preventive infrastructures and measures for immediate protection of cultural heritage, the cleaning-up of disaster-stricken areas. To qualify for funding, countries hit by a major disaster must give a precise appraisal of damage caused and fulfil specific criteria. The Commission is responsible for managing the fund. A 'major disaster' is defined to be a disaster resulting in damage estimated either at or above Euro 3 billion or more than 0,6% of the gross national income of the state concerned. Under exceptional circumstances – such as the flooding in the summer 2002 (see below) – a region could benefit from assistance from the fund.[40]

The mechanism has been put on test seven times since its establishment. After the 9-11 events the more than 1000 rescue workers from the Member States were co-ordinated through the mechanism for the shipping across the Atlantic.[41] Among the first tasks in Europe was the coordination of assistance to the Czech republic during the floodings in the summer of 2002. After this occasion, the MIC has launched requests for assistance in connection with the oil accident caused by the 'Prestige' tanker outside the Spanish coast in the autumn of 2002.[42] This resulted in ships, aircraft, equipment and experts from different participating countries put at the disposal of the Spanish, Portuguese and French authorities. It was also used for a request for high capacity pumps during the floods in France in December 2003. In February 2004 when Morocco was hit by an earthquake, the MIC sent out a request for assistance concerning search and rescue teams and power generating plants to the EU Member and Candidate States. The civil protection operation engaged more than

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[39] Council Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002 of 11 November 2002 establishing the European Union Solidarity Fund (OJ L 311, p. 3).
[40] 'The European Union Solidarity Fund', Regional Policy – Inforegio. http://europa.eu.int/comm/regional_policy/funds/solidar/
[41] De Wijk, R. (2004).
[42] Interview civil servant at the MIC, Commission Civil Protection Unit, DG Environment, 2003-02-13.

17 European countries. Moreover, the Commission, through ECHO, adopted a emergency Decision with 6 partners in order to assist the victims of the earthquake.[43] Several capacities have been tested in these first EU interventions. The added value by the mechanism over the system of bilateral requests for assistance is its provision for more consolidated and theoretically quicker and more precise response. The mechanism performed well as a clearing house for assistance. A number of technical problems have, however, been highlighted. They had mainly to do with communication problems between the various national teams.[44] Moreover, the first cases indicate that it probably will be sufficient and more efficient that only a certain number of Member States participate. This in order to avoid too many problems of logistics and coordination. The early interventions also show that there will be a strong political pressure on the Members possessing the appropriate means of assistance to provide them if they are requested. Furthermore, a more limited number of states with the most suitable tools would probably be more efficient than to 'mobilise all Union instruments', as prescribed in the EU's newly adopted solidarity clause. A voluntary EU-solidarity rather than treaty bound obligations of a certain type of support is probably sufficient for the mobilisation of the European rescources and actions needed.[45]

The Commission also suggested that the MIC *should* be informed every time a Member State calls for bilateral or multilateral assistance or when it supply assistance to another country (today it is not obligatory).[46] The fact that Member States are not required to inform the MIC could according to the Commission have detrimental consequences in cases of disasters that might have transboundary effects.[47] It has also been proposed that common equipment and insignia, such as coats and tents, should be created in order to help to identify members of the EU coordinated teams on site. According to the Commission such a team could be seen as an 'ad hoc European Union civil protection force'[48].

The relationship of the Community mechanism to other EU instruments in adjacent fields is worth mentioning. The main difference to the intervention of the EC Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) is that the aim of the EU's civil protection is to provide for assistance in the first intervention phase: 'in the first week, or in maximum the first 14 days'.[49] The mechanism foresees that the EU experts can be sent out within 12 hour after an event. While ECHO is mainly involved in the recovering phase and the rebuilding of infrastructure: 'they will provide more or less first aid after an emergency'[50]. The distinction goes between on the one side disaster relief and on the other recovering and reconstruction. The other difference is the type of assistance. The civil protection mechanism identify the public service resources of the Member States, while ECHO is mainly engaging NGOs and dependent on the partners they can find in the field. Despite the differences, it has sometimes been difficult to link the two instruments and an improved co-ordination of EU operations

[43] COM (2004) 200 final, p. 7-8.
[44] Woodbridge (2002).
[45] Ekengren, M & Larsson, S. (2003), p. 74.
[46] COM (2004) 200 final, p. 14.
[47] COM (2004) 200 final, p. 11.
[48] COM (2004) 200 final, p. 10.
[49] Interview with civil servant at the Commission Civil Protection Unit, DG Environment, 2003-02-11.
[50] Interview with civil servant at the Commission Civil Protection Unit, DG Environment, 2003-02-11.

in third countries has been seen as very urgent. Civil protection assistance is only provided in response to a request from the relevant state. Humanitarian aid through EU-ECHO provides 'apolitical', non-discriminatory humanitarian emergency assistance regardless of any request or agreement from the country hit by disaster. Co-ordination with other international organisations, such as the UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC), UNHCR, UN-OCHA and the Red Cross, is of course also of great importance in international EU operations.

The second problem of co-ordination refers to the role that the Community mechanism could play within the crisis management of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy. A Joint Council-Commission Declaration has laid down the modalities for such a future role. It has been decided that the content of the military database under the ESDP will be made available to the Community mechanism. This has been considered to be of great importance in case of CBRN or terroristattacks.[51] This task of the mechanism has been estimated to considerable enhance the role of the EU as an international, transboundary civil protection actor by some of the national civil protection agencies.[52] The future link between the solidarity clause, the Community mechanism and the external crisis management capacities under the ESDP will be problematic.[53]

In the aftermath of the bombings in Madrid 11 March 2004, the European Council deemed it necessary to adopt the solidarity clause – proposed for the new treaty - immediately as a political declaration. Civil protection takes a very central role in the clause. Article III – 184 of the draft treaty reads:

'The Union shall encourage cooperation between Member States in order to improve the effectiveness of systems for preventing and protecting against natural and man madder disasters within the Union. Union action shall aim to:

a) support and complement Member States' action at national, regional and local level in risk prevention, in preparing their civil-protection personnel and in responding to natural or man-made disasters;
b) promote swift, effective operational cooperation between national civil-protection services;
c) promote consistency in international civil-protection work.

Article I-42 reads as follows:

'1. The Union and its Member State shall act jointly in the spirit of solidarity if a Member State is a victim of a terrorist attack or natural and man-made disaster. The Union shall mobilise all instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by the Member States, to:

a) - prevent the terrorist threat in the territory of the Member States;
   - protect democratic institutions and the civilian population from any terrorist attack;
   - assist a Member State in its territory at the request of its political authorities in the event of a terrorist attack;
b) – assist a Member State in its territory at the request of its political authorities in the event of a disaster;

2. The detailed arrangements for implementing this provision are at Article III-231'

The clause raises many questions regarding the role of civil protection in the evolving functional security identity of the EU. To what extent will civil protection be

[51] Joint Declaration by the Council and the Commission on the use of the Community Mechanism in Crisis Management referred to in Title V of the Treaty on the European Union of 29 September 2003.
[52] Internal working document, Swedish Civil Protection Agency, 2003-02-05.
[53] Ekengren, M & Larsson, S. (2003).

politicized as a result of becoming a tool in a new post-national structure where non-state threats and attacks and their consequences for functional security is central?[54] Only the empirical study of practices within the framework of the clause and EU civil protection will provide an answer.

6.2. Flooding in Austria, the Czech Republic, Germany and Slovakia 2002

The Event

In the early years of the new millennium, the European heartland is hit by a disaster. It is the worst disaster of its kind in this and the past century. Four central European states are struck by the unexpected grave crisis. Hundres are killed and the property damage is counted in the billions. Large areas are evacuated. Hundreds of thousands are forced from their homes in central Europe. 200,000 - 220,000 persons are evacuated in the Czech Republic[55]. Only in Prague, 50,000 residents are evacuated. 12, 000 from Dresden.

All 16,000 residents were evacuated from Bitterfeld, a major chemical production center north of Dresden. Two power stations along the Danube in Slovakia were also knocked out. The mercury-contaminated Spolana chemical plant outside Prague released a cloud of chlorine gas into the atmosphere. The health minister of Saxony, Germany, recommended that people should not drink tap water in the worst affected areas. Thousands of inhabitants of Prague and Dresden are vaccinated against hepatitis.[56] The Czech government plan to vaccinate all in all 65.000 children against hepatitis. In the Czech Republic, the evacuation is carried out jointly by the police and the civil protection service.

What future horror event are we talking about in this case? Are we describing the consequences of a terrorist attack parallelling 9th of September and 11th of March in historical magnitude, this time targeted on central Europe? Synchronised terrorist bombings for the bursting of several dams in great European rivers, flooding huge land areas and main cities, spreading chaos, enormous material damage, food shortages and diseases? No, the disaster described concerns the flooding of 2002 of the Oder and Neisse, Elbe, Mulde and Danube rivers and their tributaries. After heavy rains, starting in the end of June, the waters of the Oder reached a record of 660 cm. The V'ltava, running through Prague, crested some 7 m above its normal levels.[57] With a focus on civil protection, this case reconstructs the EU's reaction and mangement of the flooding catastrophy of the summer 2002.

Only in Germany 8.300 soldiers are mobilised (the largest civil deployment since 1962). The Polish army, trained in disaster preparedness, is called out to help too late. Civil and military authorities are working side by side. Soldiers, firemen, police officers and volunteers are helping the rescue service and local municipalities with the rescue work and in trying to limit the damaging of property. Civilian volunteer squads

[54] Ekengren, M & Larsson, S. (2003).
[55] Andersson, B. (2002) and Coates, S. (2002)
[56] Schiermeier, Q. (2002).
[57] New Scientist, 24 August 2002.

are transported to the disaster zone from across the four countries. Volunteers and many NGO:s are struggling to protect the cities' cultural treasures. Students are battling to save valuable books from the University libraries. All rescue work is seriously hampered by the continuing lack of electricity. In the Czech Republic, the Ministry of Interior decides that 7,000 soldiers should be engaged in the rescue work. Some of these were put under the command of the Czech police authorities.[58] The Czech civil protection system was helped by civil protection personnel from Germany, Belgium and Denmark. Sweden sent pumps, sanitary-equipment and radar.[59] German police patrols a new 'border': not the one between Poland and Germany but alongside a leaking dike threatening the village of Brieskow-Finkenheerd. German and Polish Interior Ministers met several times to discuss cooperative measures. The Polish, German and Czech Prime Ministers keep close telephone contacts.[60]

The forecasting of the magnitude of the catastrophy has been very difficult due to unique character of the of the disaster and its consequences. 40% of the Czech territory was affected, 6% was inundated.[61] The four countries are trying to coordinate their efforts to the largest possible extent. There is cross-border cooperation in the sharing of information but less so in the management of the crisis. The responding to the disaster is put to serious test. Better computer modelling and better sharing of data among the countries are early conclusions in the analysis of how the crisis management capacity could be improved. It was the Czech Hydrometerological Institute[62] that first informed the coordination center at the Czech Ministry of Interior – General Directorate of the Fire and Rescue Service - of the catastrophical situation. In 2001, this Ministry had taken over the highest responsibility for the management of floodings from the Ministry of Defence.[63] The Ministry of Interior established a national crisis center that led the management. The Ministry of Environment is responsible for a large part of the practical management of the crisis. It constantly informed about the catastrophy via the radio and television and set up a 24h 'flood service'. It coordinates with other ministries in the so called 'Flood Commission' and its Center. The Commission is organised in the form of a national, central level and five 'River Basin Boards' with local and regional representation. The Ministry of Environment coordinated with the Ministry of Agriculture on the basis of the 'strategy of flood protection'. There are also 'special flood bodies' at the regional and local levels responsible for prevention, preparedness and the operative crisis management instruments. Prague had been flooded before in 1845, 1862, 1872, 1890, 1940, 1981. However, the magnitude of this current tragedy was greater than any of these earlier floods. The experiences of the floodings in Germany in 1995 and 1997 were very important due to the fact that Prague is a twin town of Köln. The Czech civil protection system is sorting under the Ministry of Interior, which facilitates centralised coordination of national resources for crisis management. 2,875 men and women of the civil protection system were involved in the efforts 2002.[64] The V'ltava

[58] Andersson, B. (2002).
[59] Andersson, B. (2002), p. 16.
[60]
[61] Press release. EIB. www.eib.org/news/press/. 20/12 2002. 'Czech Republic: EIB lends EUR 400 million for flood damage reconstruction'. Ref. 2002-128.
[62] The institute has 500 stations spread out over the country. Normally the Institute makes prognostics for two days ahead.
[63] Procházková, D. (2002), p. 1.
[64] Andersson, B. (2002).

Water Board under the Ministry of Agriculture is responsible for supervising and regulating the water flows of the central flood of V'ltava. One of the roles of the Board is to give recommendations of evacuation to the responsible authorities such as the City Council of Prague, which it did at the time of the disaster (Monday 12 August at ten o'clock in the evening)[65]. The Ministry of Public Health cooperated with the Ministry of Agriculture in setting up cisterns with fresh drinking water in the towns (the ministry is responsible for the water quality). The integrated rescue system falls under the former Ministry which evacuated three hospitals and issued recommendations to the local authorities.

Czech

Crisis organisation:	Level	Decision making body
	National	Government (Ministries)
	Regional	14 Department
	Districts	77
	Local	6200 towns (Mayor, police, fire brigad, military)

from Ullberg, S. (2002), p. 3.

43 Districts out of 77 are affected by the floodings.[66] There are huge difficulties of communication during particularly the first vawe of the flood when main instruments of water measurement were destroyed and the telephone lines were broken down. Moreover, there is a problem of 'disaster tourism', people gathering along the shores of the floods of sheer curiosity.[67] One of the biggest problems of the Prague Fire Brigad was of course the evacuation of people but also the elimination of parked cars that hindered its work. The barriers against the flood were erected in less than six hours by the Brigade. It is the Mayor who has the formal decision making authorities regarding the evacuation. The first phase of the evacuation was carried out on a voluntary basis, the second 'by force'. One of the great problems was to get the people to understand the seriousness of the situation. The civil protection system was operating under 'state of emergency' like in a 'war situation'.[68]

3810 members of the Czech Fire Rescue System, 12,530 voluntary and company fire-fighters, 7854 soldiers and 214 foreign fire fighters from eight countries participated in the emergency work. Foreign technical humanitarian aid were provided by 9 foreign units of eight countries (208 men). 20 persons died during the disaster. The governmental estimate of losses varies between 60 and 90 billions Czech kronas.[69] Up until 21 August, the Czech Republic had received assistance in the form of dryers, pumps, blankets, stoves, disinfectants, hygienic materials, generators, emergency grants, personnel and other humanitarian items from 20 countries.[70] The Czech

[65] Andersson, B. (2002), p. 15.
[66] Andersson, B. (2002), p. 5.
[67] Ullberg, S. (2002), p. 3-4.
[68] Ullberg, S. (2002), p. 7.
[69] Procházková, D. (2002).
[70] OCHA Situation Report No 5. 21 August 2002. www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf

Interior Minister Stanislav Gross said on 14 August that the Czech republic was thankful for the many offers of aid from abroad but does not need all of the help on offer. The Minister welcomed first and foremost aid for the reconstruction.[71] The International Federation of the Red Cross played the leading international role for humanitarian aid during the disaster. Its coordination was carried out by the Federation's Central Europe Regional Delegation in Budapest with the support of the Federation's Disaster Management and Coordination Division in Geneva.[72]

In the wake of the catastrophy, there is in all countries political disputes over how to best manage the financial side of the support to victims and reconstruction. Both in Austria and in the Czech Republic the government was nearly forced to resign as a result of quarrels between the coalition partners concerning the financing of the disaster relief. In Germany, Chancellor Schröder is according to many observers winning votes in the election campaign on his resolute leadership and shown solidarity with the victims of the crisis.

EU Institutions and Agencies Involved

On 14 August, President Havel phones the Commission President Romano Prodi – at that time on holidays in his home town Bologna – an explains that he is literally standing in water in his home town Prague. Prodi travels immediately to Prague and, on the spot, promises Havel that the Union will assist the Czech Republic in this grave situation. He contacts Brussels and many of the high civil servants of the Commission are called back from their holidays in order to lead the work of coordinating the assistance of the EU Member States and putting together an EU aid package for the affected areas. One of the first to be contacted is the Head of Unit for the Czech Republic Team at DG Enlargement at the European Commission.[73]

At 18:10 (14 August 2002), the MIC under Environment Commissioner Wallström receives a request for support from the Czech Republic authorities which is immediately transmitted to the Member States. The request concerns portable dryers, floating pumps, electric submersible pumps. Before this request (at h 14:00), the French authorities informed the MIC that they were ready, if requested, to leave with specialised teams to the area. The French offered as a first aid two teams specialised in water purification and water pumping. Belgian authorities informed the MIC (15:45 and 17:22) that they had received an official request from the Czech Republic via the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[74] Later the same day (departing 21:00) Belgium sends 19 vehicles and 54 personnel with generators and pumps, and an aircraft of the armed forces. Italian and Greek authorities also sent aircraft and help. The Belgian military unit specialized in fighting floods arrived in Prague in the evening of 14 August.[75] On hehalf of the Union, Prodi expressed his sympathy for the populations in the crisis hit areas. Together with Prodi, EU Commissioners Wallström, Veurheugen, Barnier visit

[71] Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, at the Relief Web 15 August 2002. www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf
[72] Central Europe: Appeal No.5/2002 Floods Operations Update No 3, Source: IFRC, 11 Oct 2002. www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf
[73] Interview with Rutger Wissels, Head of Unit, Czech Republic Team, DG Enlargement, European Commission, 13 February 2003.
[74] Communiqué de Presse. 'Commission expresses solidarity with victims of floods - ANNEX', IP/02/1220. 15/08/2002. http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.
[75] Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, at the Relief Web 15 August 2002. www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf

Prague and the flooded areas of Germany on 16 August. This was the biggest Commission delegation at this level ever to carry out visits of this kind. The extraordinary representation showed the deep concern of the Commission for natural disasters 'wherever they happen'.[76]

At the time of the disaster, there is no specific budgetary line for this type of disaster relief within the EU. Instead, the EU is able to channel financial solidarity, through the EU structural funds (for Germany and Austria) and pre-accession funds for the candidate countries. In practice, the Commission allowed Germany and Austria to reallocate part of the structural funds earmarked for them for the period 2000-2006. The official task of Barnier, Commissioner in charge of regional policy, and his service is to provide the regions concerned with information and the technical support required.[77] Commissioner Fischler, the Directorate General for agriculture is taking a range of the emergency measures in order to secure the food supply in the disaster areas.[78] Enlargement Commissioner Verheugen is using means from the pre-accession programmes PHARE and ISPA[79] for the support of reconstruction in mainly the Czech Republic and Slovakia.[80] An amount of EUR 9,75 million under PHARE and EUR 48 million ISPA funds is immediately made available for reconstruction in the Czech Republic on the basis of project proposals of the Czechs. The Czech Republic was also supported by the EU structural funds, and later – after November 2002 - also got means from the new EU solidarity fund. It was the first time ever the structural funds was used for a non-member country. The Commision also confirmed other measures concerning agriculture, civil protection and applicant countries affected by the floods, such as funds for Trans-European networks, the approval of state aid to repair up to 100% of the flood damage, the speeding up of procedures generally, and the possibility to derogate from the requirement to publish a contract notice. Moreover, the Commission announced the adoption of a European risk-prevention strategy.[81]

The flooding was the immediate reason for creating the EU solidarity fund in October 2002 (see above). The fund is available for both the Member States and the applicant states with which accession negotiations 'are under way'.[82] On November 15, the EU granted euro 728 million to the German, Austrian, Czech and French regions hit by the floods.[83] The sums allocated to Germany were to serve for helping central

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[76] Interview Ernest Schulte at the Commission Civil Protection Unit, DG Environment, 2003-02-11.
[77] Communiqué de Presse. 'Commission expresses solidarity with victims of floods', IP/02/1220. 15/08/2002. http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.
[78] Communiqué de Presse. 'EU Cereals Management Committee responds to flood crisis', IP/02/1228. 23/08/2002. http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.
[79] ISPA is a pre-accession programme which supports the development of transport and environment infrastructures in the candidate states.
[80] Communiqué de Presse. 'Commission responds to the floods in Germany, Austria and certain applicant countries', IP/02/1246. 28/08/2002. http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.
[81] Communiqué de Presse. 'Commission expresses solidarity with victims of floods', IP/02/1220. 15/08/2002. http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.
[82] 'The European Union Solidarity Fund', Regional Policy – Inforegio. http://europa.eu.int/comm/regional_policy/funds/solidar/
[83] Communiqué de Presse. 'Solidarity Fund: Council and Parliament back Commission plans to grant EUR 728 million to German, Austrian, Czech and French regions hit by floods', IP/02/1686. 15/11/2002. http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.

government and the *Länder*[84] reimbursing expenditure on aid operations, immediately securing flood-protection facilities, repairing waste water treatment plants and restoring energy supplies, welfare infrastructure, such as kindergartens and hospitals, and drinking-water supplies.[85] In December 2002, the European Investment Bank (EIB) provided the Czech authorities with a loan for the financing of repairs of damages caused by the floods. EIB will lend a total of EUR 400 million to cover part of the state budget needs for rebuilding infrastructure.The flood damages in the Czech Republic are estimated at some EUR 2.3 billion, or 3% of current Czech GDP.[86]

At the time of the disaster, the Civil Protection Unit (CPU) of the DG Environment had one person on duty. This official took the first direct contacts with the Czech government, Ministry of Interior and was constantly updated with new information of the floodings over the telephone. The information coming from the Czechs was continuously also consolidated and confirmed in written form. The Commission also established contacts with the Czech Ministry of Environment and tried to get additional information from other sources, such as press agencies. In practice it was the CPU who first established the contacts by asking the Czech authorities if there had been any damages and what had been damaged, and by informally urging them to request assistance via the Community mechanism. Eventually the Czech authorities activated the Community mechanism, asking the MIC to formally request assistance from Member States while they assessed their needs. One of the reasons for the informal contacts taken by the CPU was that it expected the EU Member States would eventually ask for information about the accident and in what way they could help the Czechs.[87] The MIC was informed of a need for high capacity pumps and driers by the Czechs because there were a lot of damages in their cultural heritages. The CPU sent out to all contact points in the EU Member States – normally at the national civil protection agencies - the information sheets that the Czech Republic needed driers. Offers came from many of the Member States and the driers were quickly at the location. In addition, expert and civil protection teams were as mentioned sent from the EU States who were also approached bilaterally by the Czechs.

The main role of CPU and the mechanism during the floods seemed to have been to function as a 'focal point' and link for the Czech request for help and the messages of the EU states concerning their readiness to provide assistance. The transmission of information between the Czechs and neighbouring countries was a central task. The responsible officers put it in the following way:

> Yes, because you can't expect that they (the Czech authorities) know exactly the address to the Belgians, or to the Swedish Rescue Services.[88]

The advantage was that the Czechs in a stressful emergency situation only had to inform one institution that could collect, compile, redistribute information and continously summarise the situation. The CPU itself characterised its role as 'a

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[84] Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, Bavaria, Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Lower Saxony, Schleswig-Holstein and Thuringia.
[85] Communiqué de Presse. 'Solidarity Fund: EURO 444 million for the regions in Germany hit by the disastrous floods earlier this year', IP/02/1872.
[86] Press release. EIB. www.eib.org/news/press/. 20/12 2002. 'Czech Republic: EIB lends EUR 400 million for flood damage reconstruction'. Ref. 2002-128.
[87] Interview Ernest Schulte at the Commission Civil Protection Unit, DG Environment, 2003-02-11.
[88] Interview Ernest Schulte at the Commission Civil Protection Unit, DG Environment, 2003-02-11.

kind of service support in a very common sense'[89]. This role of giving a European 'overview' of the situation was of course not only important for the Czech national and regional 'flood' authorities. Due to the transnational character of the disaster it was in some parts crucial for countries like Germany. The river flow was down flow, so the problems that hit the Czech Republic would come to Germany at a later stage. All the countries and regions down stream could be kept aware of that the situation was not solved in these countries. The role of the EU coordination was to improve Europe's 'functional' security against threats engendered by the flows of the European floods – a transnational system since millions of year. Another advantage of the creation of one European focal point was that other international organisations such as the UN-OCHA only had to ask the EU and not every Member State about the situation. In the case of the floodings, the Commission and the OCHA at an early stage agreed that the situation was managed by and within the EU mechanism. Consequently, the UN was not involved in the management of the disaster.[90]

There were also critical evaluations of how the Community mechanism was used during the disaster. Retaining the habit of bilaterally requesting assistance, whilst choosing to use the mechanism in a piecemeal fashion in some phases lead to increased confusion, not better coordination.[91] According to the Commission the main problems and challenges was that the CPU got the information and the request from the Czechs relatively late. The explanation given by the officials is that this was perhaps only to be expected given the fact that the mechanism had existed only for six months at the time of the floodings. Not many states, particularly non-EU members, were aware of its establishment. Another reason given for the need of the CPU to take the first contact and inform the Czechs of the possibility to ask for help was that contacting Brussels or any international actor is probably not first priority for a government faced with such a such a major disaster.[92] The Commission did not send any of its own experts to the areas of disaster. The assistance resources were provided by the EU Member States and sent on to the regional and local actors. It was up to each Member State to decide in what way they could assist. Thus, there was no automatic reply function regarding what should be provided. Germany for example was not in the position to provide any kind of assistance to the Czechs, because it was directly concerned itself.[93]

The role of the military forces in the crisis management related to the floodings was subsidiary. In all Member States and accession countries, the responsibility to solve this kind of situation lies in the civilian sector. The highest command structures were civilian. The civilian national and regional administrations used the military resources. Even though for example the German forces involved gave the public an impression of that it was the military that solved the situation at the Elba or along the Oder it was the German civil authorities that was in charge.[94] The Czech government also requested help from the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre

[89] Interview France Joseph at the Commission Civil Protection Unit, DG Environment, 2003-02-11.
[90] Interview France Joseph at the Commission Civil Protection Unit, DG Environment, 2003-02-11.
[91] Woodbridge, 2002.
[92] This was however different with regard to the case of Prestige, when the CPU was more or less involved since the first moment.
[93] Interview Joseph France, the Commission Civil Protection Unit, DG Environment, 2003-02-11.
[94] Interview Joseph France, the Commission Civil Protection Unit, DG Environment, 2003-02-11.

(EADRCC). Portable dryers for drying damp houses, floating pumps, electric pumps, vaccines against Hepatites A, chlorine based diseinfectants and cleaning products and insect repellents for disinfecting larger areas were requested.[95] Nato Secretary General Lord Robertson expressed his sympathy for the victims and the EADRCC contacted all the EAPC countries for assistance. 13 Nato and partner countries provided or offered assistance.[96]

7. Evolving Structures of European Functional Security

The aim of this paper was to use a 'functional' security approach to the transformation of the Union's security identity. The long term purpose is to define whether and how Europe takes the step from a security community into also a secure community. It is of course too early to draw any conclusions about to what extent EU measures such as civil protection assistance really assure the Union members that the safeguarding of the functions of their societies and governments is carried out in common. What we can do however is to map out the cooperation structures that form one of the conditions for a homeland defence à la Europe and within which trust is built. There is of course no doubt that the EU civil protection contributed to the protection and re-establishment of society – 'functional' security - in the case of the floodings. The question is whether it is possible at this early empirical stage to discern any patterned set of practices – a structure - that in turn could be interpreted as generating EU and European actions. The following combines subjective and objective facts in the search for structure.

7.1. EU Civil Protection as 'Functional' Security

At the formal, official level, the Community mechanism for civil protection is aimed at 'facilitating reinforced cooperation between the Community and the EU Member States in civil protection assistance intervention in the event of major emergencies, or the imminent threat thereof, which may require urgent response action' (Art. 1.1). The intention of the EU measure is 'to help ensure better protection, primarily of people but also of the environment and property...'. The mechanism is geared towards the protection of people and environment rather than functions within society and government. However, 'functional' security can be said as being of *in*direct concern for the reinforced cooperation on the protection established by the mechanism. The threat is stated to be 'major emergencies' and thus largely in accordance with Sundelius' assumptions of societal emergencies and vulnerabilities as being a main objective of the new security. The mechanism purports to reinforce cooperation 'between the Community and the Member States' (Art 1.1). The underlying idea of this wording is that there exist already a two-level responsibility for something that both the 'Community' and the Member States have in common: an already existing community of interest with regard to the protection of 'people and environment'. The Community obligations are stricter when it comes to major emergency 'which causes or is capable of causing transboundary effects'. The mechanism envisages two phases of 'major emergencies': cases where they have already taken place, and when there is

[95] EADRCC Homepage, August 2002. Latest Up-date 15-Jan-2003. www.nato.int/eadrcc/floods_czech_republic

[96] NATO Homepage, Press Release 16 August 2002. Press Release (2002) 099. Latest Up-date 21-Aug-2002. www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-099e.html

'imminent threat thereof'. There is an obligation ('shall') of the Member States to notify each other in both cases. Civil protection is – at least on the formal level - of common concern. In addition, of great importance for the creation of a Union security identity is of course the fact that the 'people' to be protected is put in singular form, evoking the image of a European people. A secure European community wider than the EU is envisaged by Article 1: the mechanism is to be used for 'accidents occurring inside or outside the Community'.

The security aimed at by the solidarity clause is more clearly of a functional character. Civil protection is still central in a system where the Union shall mobilise all instruments at its disposal, including military resources, 'to protect democratic institutions and the civilian population from any terrorist attack'. It is the functions of the democratic institutions that are to be safeguarded. The functional specification has here gained ground in relation to the territorial delimitation. The territorial dimension is weakened due to the vagueness with regard to where the assistance should be deployed in order to prevent terrorist threats and protect democratic institutions. The formulation *in* the territory of the Member States points to a security beyond clear territorial connotations. The main question is here no longer the security and defence *of* the territory at the borders of a geographically delimited area. It is the defence of an unspecified 'people' (of the states or the Union?) and undefined institutional capacities in a territory stretching beyond the Member States in the perspective of the need to prevent terrorist threats internationally that is envisaged by the EU security strategy. The clause is more clear regarding *when* the assistance should be carried out. The EU members should prevent *before* an attack, *constantly* protect each other and assist *after* a member state has been attacked. The emphasis on institutions (EU or member state?) points to the importance to secure the capacity to lead society. It is the function of democratic government and political organs that are in focus. Union assistance to a Member State shall come at the request of its political authorities in the event of a terrorist attack. It is still an open question whether and in what form the Union would assist in emergency cases when Member State authorities will not be able to articulate such a demand. It is perhaps not too far-fetched to assume Union assistance also in these hypothetical cases considering that the Union and its Member States, according to the clause, 'shall act jointly in the spirit of solidarity if a Member State is a victim', evoking the image of an emerging European system to protect and society to feel responsibility for. Should 'solidarity' only be seen as a first step towards real assurance of the Union members that the safeguarding of the functions of their societies and governments is carried out in common? Or will a practical sense of solidarity – a weaker form of conviction that a member will not stand alone - rather than assurance be a more enduring characteristic of a secure European community?

Is there a difference between this subjective side of EU civil protection and the logic of practice within the field? In the following an interpretation of the subjects' facts – official data and interviews - is made.

7.2. *European* rather than EU Civil Protection Structure

European Structure

An analysis focusing the formal sides of the civil protection mechanism or the view of EU representatives would risk pointing out an un-problematised 'EU civil protection

structure'. 'Subjective' facts will never be enough for an understanding of the structures that generate today's European 'functional' security actions. In order to construct an 'objective' structure we need also to base our knowledge on what actors did in practice in the very heat of the moment.

The flooding case has pointed to two sets of practices that seem to be of particular importance in the further mapping out of the structure and logic of action in the field. *Firstly*, it looks like the European vocation and commitment to assist the countries concerned is stronger than what can possibly be understood from the studying of formal obligations to help or the statutes of EU civil protection. *Secondly*, the close intertwining of the practices of EU and other actors in the field is so strong that the structure crystallizing might be *European* rather than the 'EU' one that an investigation of only official material might lead us to construct. In practice thus, the civil protection case points to the possible evolution of a European 'functional' security structure.

There was a strong sense of 'European' responsibility and solidarity generating action. The symbolic top level visit to the Czech Republic of the EU demonstrated that it took a strong responsibility for the crisis management. The well recognized comparative advantages of the Union - superior own financial resources (including long term engagement), indirect coordination of many field actors such as NGO's and local authorities through financial means – considerably strenghtened the EU's legitimate right to express and define the crisis and the means of assistance. The European dimension of the disaster was from the outset recognised by all organisations which prompted them to act swiftly and forcefully in order not to jeopardise any thrustworthiness with regard to taking a 'European responsibility'. The common concern of this European symbolic capital was a strong driving force. The habitus of the actors unconsciously generated action for the protection of this capital. The capital was so important that the financial and other resources allocated was not rationally calculated in relation to the size of the disaster and stood not in proportion to the possibility of practical implementation.

Formally, the European field of civil protection - as it can be detected from the limited empirical material - is made up of distinct organisations and a non-hierarchical order with regard to the legitimacy of the various actors. The possession of civil protection instruments is of course the condition for the participation in the field. However, the specific competences, resources and instruments by means of which the symbolic values are achieved are distributed unevenly among the actors. The uneven distribution of resources among the main aid organs leads to a tension that can explain the often peculiar mix of international coordination and competition and implicit division of labour. Every international actor contributes with a piece to the puzzle; one coordinates and another finances emergency assistance, a third finances reconstruction. A fourth helps to coordinate national assistance on regional level and a fifth covers the need of wider global coordination. However, the result is often not optimal. In the emergency situation, the Czech Republic was offered much more international and European assistance than it could make use of. A great number of civil protection actors wanted to intervene and have their actions legitimized by their provision of resources on the European scene. At stake is basically the long term elaboration of the principles of the geographical and resource limits to European civil protection.

Through the early engagement of President Prodi and the civil protection mechanism, the EU was one of the first international actor to hold information about the disaster. This considerably helped to establish a legitimate right to supply information to other actors involved throughout the crisis as a whole. The limited operative role of the EU in the emergency phase was due to the traditional dominance of the bi-lateral contacts in the field and the 'regional' and 'local' character of the disaster effects. Through its 'Situation Reports' and 'ReliefWeb', issued from the first day of the floodings, and a strong recognition of the international community, UN-OCHA initially got an implicit role of informal first coordinator. Its symbolic capital is strong, which gives the UN a special position in the field. Only after direct contacts with the Union, the EU civil protection mechanism took the international responsibility of coordination.

The intertwinning with agents of states, other international organisations and NGO:s, horisontally as well as vertically in nearly all phases of action, is so tight that to conceive of a distinct EU structure would only distort the facts of reality. This makes it not very meaningful to trace and isolate moments of 'EU' activities that are independent from the other main actors in the field. EU actions were part of a European network and could by its coordination of national resources improve collective European activities. Owing to the fact that the EU actors' practices are so intertwined with other organisations' activities they are part of a larger European structuration process. Consequently, the structure we are searching for might not be an 'EU structure'. Instead our investigation points to a generative structure of *European* civil protection.

A practice of high generative significance is the European coordination of and channeling of resources to national emergency and humanitarian aid organs for implementation in close cooperation with local authorities and NGOs. The European structure is characterised by information and decision networks 'on this side' of (not beyond) the nation-state. Thus the case indicates how a new trans-European security structure crystallise in the 'preparedness' and emergency practices of EU organs and state agencies, IGO's, NGO's, regional and local authorities. It is in large parts a structure of non-state coordination of decisions and resources of non-political state actors, possibly generating a *European* logic of security practices different from the one of individual states.

European Actorness

Explaining EU actions only as a function of the European structure would leave out the choices of action in which the particular logic of European civil protection might reside. It risks to see the actors as structural dopes. Neither would a one-sided focus on the freedom of choice, constructed on the basis of 'subjective' views of alternatives of action account for the structural constraints. It would overlook the more complex agency-structure relationship in the many times un-reflected strategic EU behaviours depending on i.a. the tension of the field. This include the not officially recognised competition between the involved organisations and states and the strategic playing with time (timing) in the choices of action. The case shows that it was not self-evident that and how the European Commission should be involved in the crisis management. There was for example no budget line for this type of disaster relief. There were strategic choices for the Union. A static structural approach would

also have difficulties in explaining the policy choices of EU Commissioners on behalf of the Union in the case of EU aid to the countries hit. The tools and budgetary means for EU assistance were improvised. The outcome was the establishment of a new solidarity found. The initial actions were instrumental for the eventual engagement of the Union. There was a room of subjective manouvre in the early strategic actions. Mr Prodi was forestalling subsequent EU decisions of funding, based on his 'sense' of a widespread feeling of European responsibility that eventually would result in formal decisions for the fulfilling of his promises to the Czechs. The European structure disposed habitus to an action adapted to the situation.[97]

The close interlinkages and synchronisation of the actors over and in time show that their practices are not as distinct from each other as their formal identity indicates. Rather they should be seen as taking place in a temporal whole, in a *sequence* of civil protection intervention[98]. This common time is a further reason why the disposition of the organisations to act should be understood in relation to a European structure of civil protection rather than an EU or NATO one. In a time perspective, the actions of EU, NATO, UN or NGO are less independent from each other. These were sequenced into each other over time and synchronised in time with the help of strategic calculations, predictions, anticipations, timing considerations - 'when'-questions, and, a sensitivity of each other's moves. This is also the reason why it seems to be of little importance to strictly distinguish what each of the various crisis managers did in explanations of 'actorness' and instead look for common (in time) 'European action'. This action seems to be a function of the degree to which the members of the field sense they act in common, that is, synchronised. What the case shows is that actors were disposed by a common European time through the sharing of simultaneous information, the same expectations for immediate action and the need for coordination. This temporal structural component was, of course, sparked off by the crisis itself and underlined by the ad hoc 'reactive' character of the responses. An unconscious knowledge of 'how to go on' temporally in the field - a particular temporal logic - of European civil protection might eventually grow. Like in European governance generally, it is perhaps in the time dimension that the unique character of European 'functional' security will be most clearly expressed (Ekengren, 2002).

European actions over time point to a new type of collective 'actorness' for the involved agents. The agency-structure analysis reveals an actorness that could be defined as the capacity of the structural parts to act synchronised – 'in the same time'. The tacit synchronisation for simultaneous action is based on informal leadership in horizontal networks hold together by a strong feeling of European responsibility. Perhaps we are seeing the contours of *European* actorness? The existence of this actorness might be analysed in terms of to what extent the agents drawing on the European structure sense that their actions take place in a common framework, that is simultaneously. European actorness is a question of to what extent the parts of the European structure, including the EU, are felt to handle in a common sequence of actions. This in contrast to a actorness definition based on formal organisational affiliations or actor capabilities. A practice oriented approach helps us to define a new meaning of 'actorness' better suited for the difficult examination of the EU's role in

[97] In 'the heat of the moment' the agent adjusts his action not only to what he sees in the present but what he foresees in an upcoming future, i. e. the 'objective probabilities' (Bordieu, 1990: 81).
[98] 'Science has a time which is not that of practice' (Bourdieu, 1990: 81).

an emerging secure European community. EU impact is perhaps more a question of being part of a European 'present' rather than to show 'presence' in world affairs (Hill, 1994: 107). The early findings provide evidence of a distinct logic of European civil protection, unique in structure as well as 'actorness'. The case indicates that the policy-making for European 'functional' security rather than being 'sub-optimal' in a state perspective (Winn and Lord, 2001), might have a temporal logic of its own.

8. Conclusion: Towards a secure 'Eurocal' community?

Some writers have argued that we are entering into a stage of 'glocalization' (e.g. Robertson, 1995: 25-44) or 'glocal society' and advised us to think global but act local. In European civil protection the central initatives and light coordination take place (and increasingly will) on the European level while the operative decisions and handlings are carried out by the local one in large parts with resources and personnel of Member State agencies. The multi-layered character of the system resembles the structure of US homeland defence[99]. The EU civil protection mechanism functions as an 'intermediate' agency in the field of European 'functional' security by operating both 'inside' and 'outside' the Union. The European structure is not only transcending the external – internal EU frontier but also the division between supranational and intergovernmental relations in the EU. In the heat of the moment, President Prodi trusted that the European Commission and the EU Member States would follow when he promises aid and resources to president Havel. Thereby, he is together with the EU civil protection mechanism in practice acting 'on this side' of the states by relying on strong expectations of a Union solidarity in the disaster rather than referring to treaty obligations. Where are the future limits of this expectation of solidarity in European 'functional' security: a real assurance of that the Union and its members will assist? In the system crystallising, the political level of states is in emergency situations withdrawing 'beyond' the European transboundary activities. There is a de-politicization of 'functional' security on the European level due to the reliance on instruments, such as civil protection, aimed at also 'non-political' natural disasters and on lower levels of national governments, e.g. civil protection agencies. The governments play the financing and 'lightly' steering role of relatively independent national agencies and multilateral aid organs with broadly written mandates. A *Eurocal* dimension of security is taking shape, where Eurocal action is constituted by synchronised European and local practices for the safeguarding of the functions of communities.

The question is of course how situation specific the European intervention in the case of the floodings in 2002 is? Will possible future terrorist attacks and large scale transboundary emergencies be handled by the Union in the same fashion? Will Europe ever be integrated to the point that there will be real assurance that its members will safeguard the functions of their societies and governments in common? Only further empirical investigation can give us an answer. This study has indicated in what form the new European security identity might be moulded. The European security community was characterised by transnational economic exchange and transgovernmental structures. A patchwork of Eurocal structures within which solidarity and assurance of 'functional' assistance could grow might be a core element in a future secure European community.

[99] Dalgaard-Nielsen, A. (2004).

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