

The Multilateral System and the Development-Security Nexus

A comparative study of two policy-fields' response to state failure

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Introduction

During the last decade a debate has emerged about the interrelationship between poverty and war, development and security. It is a response to the new political reality that emerged after the cold war in which violent conflict and warfare were chiefly a matter that took place within the borders of sovereign states, not between them. Experiences in Somalia, Sierra Leone, Bosnia and Kosovo all contributed to the identification of 'state failure' as a key characteristic and major cause of the outbreak of internal wars. With specific reference to the problems of underdevelopment and lack of effective and legitimate statehood, President Bush recently signaled a \$ 5 billion increase in US development assistance in the context of the 'war on terror': "Persistent poverty and oppression can lead to hopelessness and despair. And when governments fail to meet the most basic needs of their people, these failed states can become havens for terrorism"¹ The phenomenon of 'failed states' is a cross-cutting issue that brings out in much clarity the inherent relationship between development and security. It underwrites the ongoing debate within the UN and elsewhere of the need to address 'the root causes of conflict' through investment in long-term development assistance. A key issue in this debate is the organizational relationship and policy-coordination between the field of development and the field of security.

Focus and Objectives

The project 'The Multilateral System and the Development-Security Nexus' will study how 'failed states' have been defined and sought addressed within the field of development, on the one hand, and the field of security, on the other. This will be done by way of identifying key characteristics of 'the logic of governance' of both fields and their relationship with each other. In this way, the project will seek to contribute to a better understanding of the organizational dynamics of international organizations in general, and of the organizational, political and conceptual relations between development and security within the UN in particular. Two key UN organizations have been identified for each 'policy field': UNDP, for the field of development, and the Department of Peace Keeping Operations, for the field of security.

The project is aimed at exploring the following general research questions: What is the 'logic of governance' characteristic of the field of development and the field of security with respect to failed states? Are there any changes over time in how 'failed states' are conceptualized within these two organizations, and what accounts for these changes (organizational learning, changed interests and objectives of key member states such as the permanent members of the Security Council?)² Through these general research

¹ See World Bank (2002) "Headlines for Friday, March 15, 2002. p. 2

² Currently, the DPA and the UNDP have cross-referenced their web-sites on the issue of conflict prevention and governance. See <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/docs/peacemak.htm>

questions, insights will be produced about the relationship between development and security within the UN by way of discussing the factors that can account for the dynamic of organizational reform with respect to the coordination and integration between the field of development and the field of security. Also, the project will seek to formulate a model of policy change within IOs by linking factors emanating from the ‘high’ politics of strategic interaction of member states, with the factors emanating from the ‘low’ politics of inter-agency rivalry within the UN. The project will build on the insights produced by the current project funded by the Multi-program on the role of knowledge in the multilateral system,³ and will form part of the SIP on “The State in the South” which deals with the characteristics of statehood in developing countries.⁴

Background

Secretary General Kofi Annan has made it a key objective to reform the UN from a ‘culture of reaction’ to a ‘culture of prevention’.⁵ Annan’s reform-initiative is based on a conception of the need to address the ‘root causes of conflict’ and is predicated upon the notion of an inherent relationship between poverty and war, development and security. Despite a high level of general political support, however, the progress of reforming the UN towards a more sustained focus on preventing conflict through investment in long-term development policies, or what is called ‘structural prevention’, has been slow.⁶ These developments form the immediate context of the project, as it is directed towards the identification of the dynamics of policy-integration and coordination between development policies and security policies within the UN.

There are obvious systemic explanations for the apparent lack of coordination and policy-integration between development and security. The principle of non-intervention is predicated upon the external sovereignty granted to a state by the United Nations. The ‘reactive’ logic of UN security policies – in the form of peace support operations of various forms – is partly explained by the fact that the potential for violent conflict within a sovereign state does *not* constitute grounds for intervention by the UN, nor does it mobilize international political support for investment in conflict-reducing development assistance. However, there are also important institutional and organizational dimensions to the way in which development and security is structured in the multilateral system.

During the Cold War, the fields of security and development were thoroughly institutionalized as separate ‘policy fields’ with distinct objectives and means of intervention. Schematically, one may say that the Cold War effectuated a geographical ordering of security and development in which development concerned north-south relations, while security concerned east-west relations.⁷ Following this geographical ordering of world politics was an institutionalization of two distinct fields of operations

³ Project no. 130480/730

⁴ Application from the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs to the Norwegian Research Council for ‘SIP – Staten i Sør’ sent to the committee on SIPs on June 15. 2002.

⁵ For a brief summary of key resolutions from the Millennium Summit, see UN Press Release GA/9758 September 8. 2000.

⁶ See UN (2001) *Prevention of Armed Conflict*. Report of the Secretary General. A/55/985—S/2001/574

⁷ See Lundestad, Geir (1999) *East, West, North, South. Major Developments in International Politics since 1945*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

whose areas of concerns and modes of intervention diverged so as to create a conceptual and political division of labor, thus resulting in an absence of a common organizational, political and conceptual framework for the formulation of policies based on the recognition of the intimate inter-linkages between development and security. The two policy fields were furthermore backed by concomitant social scientific disciplines that contributed to a cognitive division of labor as ‘development studies’,⁸ on the one hand, and ‘security studies’,⁹ on the other, were linked up with and partly funded by the respective agencies in both policy fields.

It thus appears that there are not only purely political or structural features of the international system that produce obstacles to a tighter integration between development and security, or a more sustained focus on how to tailor development policies towards the prevention of violent conflict through institution-building, education and economic reform. Equally relevant are the institutionalized rules, norms and procedures that defines the ‘logic of governance’ and organizational outlook of the different organizations that operate in the field of development, on the one hand, and the field of security, on the other. This brings attention to the organizational or institutional aspect of the development-security nexus within the UN. In order to account for the dynamic of change in international organizations, it appears necessary to link the ‘high’ politics of state interaction to these institutional or organizational dimensions of international organizations.

Theoretical focus: Two logics of governance

Most theories in International Relations (IR) that focus on international organizations (IOs) operate with the characteristics of the state system as the dependent variable. In these analyses, IOs normally figure as independent or intervening variables that – by virtue of defining an arena for negotiations, of setting the agenda, or socializing states through norms and knowledge – in some way structure the interests and actions of states and may thus be said to have an effect on the character of the state system.¹⁰

⁸ See Cooper, Frederick and Randall Packard (eds.) (1998) *International Development and the Social Sciences: Essays on the History and Politics of Knowledge*. Berkeley, California: University of California Press.

⁹ See Bilgin, Pinar and Adam. D. Morton (2002) “Historicising the representations of ‘failed states’: beyond the cold war annexation of the social sciences?”, *Third World Quarterly* 23 (1): 55—80.

¹⁰ There is an abundance of literature on how international institutions and international organizations may, in some way, influence state behavior and structure the functioning of the international order. See, for example, Cortell, Andrew P. and James W. Davis, Jr. (1996) ‘How Do International Institutions Matter? The Domestic Impact of International Rules and Norms’, *International Studies Quarterly* 40: 451—78. Finnemore, Martha (1996) *National Interests in International Society*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press: Finnemore, Martha and Kathryn Sikkink (1998) ‘International Norms Dynamics and Political Change’, *International Organization* 52 (4): 887—917: Katzenstein, Peter J. (ed.) (1996) *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*. New York: Columbia University Press: Keohane, Robert (1988) ‘International Institutions: Two Approaches’, *International Studies Quarterly* 32 (4): 379—96.: Klotz, Audie (1995) *Norms in International Relations*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press: Kratochwil, Friedrich and John G. Ruggie (1986) ‘International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the State’, *International Organization* 40 (4) 753—75: March, James G. and Johan P. Olsen (1998) ‘The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders’, *International Organization* 52 (4): 943—69.

Currently, the debate between rationalist and constructivist theory in the discipline of IR is located within such a mode of analysis: These two theoretical positions study IOs and ideational factors largely as a *means* to identify different mechanisms or ‘logics’ of integration and order in the state system. At the core of this debate are two competing models of the rationality of *individual action*. For rationalists, international politics is best understood by reference to the strategic rationality of individual, corporate actors in the form of a ‘logic of consequences’. For constructivists, by contrast, it has been a central objective to show that a different rationality of individual action – in the form of the ‘logic of appropriateness’ or the ‘logic of arguing’ – accounts for international political processes. For constructivists, it has been important to show that norms, ideas, rules and knowledge are – through processes of learning, socialization and persuasion – internalized by actors and thus defining for actors’ identities. In this way, they can, so the argument goes, account for the role of ideational factors and also point to a less ‘anarchic’ feature of international politics.¹¹

As a consequence, the internal functioning and politics *within* IOs has received relatively little attention. When staged at the level of competing logics or rationalities of *individual action* as expressions of different mechanisms of integration in the state system, certain cognitive costs occur in terms of grasping the logic or rationality of governance and policy change within IOs. In order to move beyond the focus on the rationality or ‘logic’ of individual, corporate actors, the project will identify the ‘*logic of governance*’ characteristic of the UNDP (field of development), on the one hand, and the DPA (field of security), on the other. In this way, we place the analysis at the level of the organizational unit, and draw attention to the functioning of IOs as such by way of exploring the *rationality of problem-definition and policy-response of different organizational units*.

In drawing attention to different ‘logics of governance’, the insights from institutional and organizational theory are brought to the fore on how bureaucratic entities serve as powerful socializing units and structure action-orientations. By virtue of their rule-based character, bureaucratic entities tend to structure behavior to the point where they establish institutionally and professionally defined identities and conceptions of how to define and seek to resolve different problems.¹² As separate and institutionalized fields of governance with distinct goals and modes of intervention, organizations in the field of

¹¹ For a critique of the current research agenda of the moderate constructivist research agenda and of the general focus on competing rationalities of individual action, see Sending (2002) “Some Problems With the ‘Logic of Appropriateness’ and Its Use in Constructivist Theory” *European Journal of International Relations* 8 (3) forthcoming. For an overview of the debate between rationalist and constructivist theory, see Katzenstein, Peter, Robert Keohane and Stephen Krasner (eds.) (1998) *International Organization at Fifty: Explorations and Contestations in the Study of World Politics*. Special Issue, *International Organization* 52 (4).

¹² For an exposition of these theoretical insights on international organizations, see Haas, Ernst (1990) *When Knowledge is Power: Three models of Change in International Organizations*. Berkeley, California: University of California Press. For an overview of organizational literature, see Meyer, John W. and S. R. Scott (1983) *Organizational Environments: Ritual and Rationality*. Beverly Hills, California: Sage; Campbell, C. and B. G. Peters (eds.) (1988) *Organizing Governance. Governing Organizations*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press; March, J. and J. P. Olsen (1989) *Rediscovering Institutions: The organizational basis of politics*. New York: Free Press/Macmillan.

development and in the field of security are characterized by a tendency to express a distinct ‘logic of governance’ in terms of using already established solutions to new problems, and applying organizational rules to define and respond to new problems.¹³ These mechanisms, as well as the ‘turf-battles’ for mandates, competence-area and resources are eminently captured in Allison’s notion of ‘bureaucratic politics’.¹⁴ These theoretical perspectives offer the opportunity to produce new insights about IOs *as organizations* in general, and about the dynamic of reform of the development-security nexus within the UN in particular.

The insights from organizational and institutional theory must, however, be supplemented by a clear notion of the implications of the lack of sovereign authority in the international realm. The focus on ‘logics of governance’ must thus be explicitly coupled with, and sought theorized within the context of, the strategic interaction and relations of power between key member states of the UN: A theoretical formulation of the functioning and dynamics of policy change within IOs must be sought by *bridging* key insights from IR theory and organizational and institutional theory.

Failed States

A pervasive feature of the violent conflicts that the UN in some way engaged in was not between sovereign states, but between groups within an externally sovereign state. A defining feature of these wars was that they took place in societies where there was considerable failure or indeed a collapse of internal sovereignty. Michael Barnett has neatly summarized this development by noting that the UN’s role in peacekeeping underwent a shift from focusing on the collective security between juridical sovereign states, to be increasingly focused on the security implications of lack of substantial or ‘empirical’ sovereignty.¹⁵

Once directed at the internal characteristics of an externally sovereign state, issues of security become intimately related to the problems associated with the fostering of socio-economic development in terms of establishing effective and legitimate state institutions. Most of those states that were formed during the process of de-colonization were, in fact, established by the external recognition granted by the UN. However, these states often lacked the second component of statehood, namely internal sovereignty in the ideal-typical sense of monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, thus providing internal security. This has led Robert Jackson to coin the term ‘quasi-states’.¹⁶

State failure denote an institutional deficiency of particular states in that they lack the central capacity of providing internal security for its population and are thus likely to be prone to the outbreak of violent conflict between different groups and for human rights

¹³ See March and Olsen (1989) ch.2. For an attempt to identify these mechanisms at the level of IOs, see Haas, Ernst (1990).

¹⁴ Allison, Graham T. (1971) *The Essence of Decision. Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*. Harvard: Boston: Little, Brown Company.

¹⁵ Barnett, Michael (1995) “The New United Nations Politics of Peace: From Juridical to Empirical Sovereignty”, *Global Governance* vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 79—97.

¹⁶ Jackson, Robert (1993) *Quasi-states: sovereignty, international relations and the third world*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

violations, and form sites for international terrorism and organized crime.¹⁷ After the experiences with Somalia in particular, the breakdown of the internal or substantive sovereignty of states in Africa assumed a more prominent position in policy-debates in the UN. Partly the focus on internal statehood and its deficiencies emerged because human rights norms and humanitarian conditions acted, increasingly during the 1990s, to condition or relativize the principle of external sovereignty and non-intervention. Partly, state failure emerged as a challenge of governance because it was recognized that lack of, or outright collapse in, internal or ‘empirical sovereignty’, posed a fundamental challenge of governance *both* for the effort of both preventing and managing violent conflict and for post-war reconstruction by means of institution-building etc.¹⁸

It has moreover been increasingly recognized that the challenges of UN in peace support operations (PSOs) cannot only focus on the military and police-functions of a transitional period in post-conflict situations: The provision of internal security rests not solely on effective policing, but on a triad of the police, judiciary, and penal system.¹⁹ Hence, institutional reform, education and technical assistance in reforming all three ‘legs’ of the security triad are necessary for internal security. The notion of ‘security sector reform’ constitutes a telling example of the widening horizon of security-thinking in this regard and it opens up room for a more direct consideration of how to link development policies towards assisting states in the provision of effective and legitimate control over its territory and population. Such integration requires modes of intervention that extends beyond the traditional policy-tools of the security sector and well into the competencies of the field of development with its focus on institutional reform of key state institutions.²⁰

It is for this reason that this project will focus on how the two different ‘fields’ of development and security have defined and sought to respond to the phenomenon of ‘failed states’ since it constitute a cross-cutting issue that not only bears directly on the fundamental problems that both the field of development and that of security seeks to solve but also constitute a relatively new and paradoxical challenge of governance:

¹⁷ See, for example, Camilleri, Joseph and Jim Falk (1992) *The End of Sovereignty?, The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting World*. Hants: Edward Elgar: Clapham, Christopher (1996) *Africa and the International System. The Politics of State Survival*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: Dornboos, Martin (1995) “State Formation Processes under External Supervision: Reflections on Good Governance” in Stokke, Olav (ed.) *Aid and Political Conditionality*. London: Frank Cass. Herbst, Jeffrey (1997) “Responding to State Failure in Africa”, *International Security* 21 (3): pp.120—144. Kaplan, Robert (1994) “The Coming Anarchy”, *Atlantic Monthly* Feb. pp.44—76: Spruyt, Henrik (1994) *The Sovereign State and Its Competitors*. Princeton: Princeton University Press: Zartman, William (ed.) 1995) *Collapsed States. The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

¹⁸ For an overview, see Ignatieff, Michael (2002) “Intervention and State Failure” p. 115 in *Dissent*, Winter, pp. 115—123.

¹⁹ See Barth Eide, E. (1999) “The Internal Security Challenge in Kosovo” Paper prepared for the UNA-USA/IAI Conference on “Kosovo’s Final Status”, Rome 12-14 December 1999.

²⁰ See the works of the 1997 Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict (1997), and the research program on ‘conflict prevention’ of the International Peace Academy (www.ipacademy.org), in particular Adebajo, Adekeye (2002) *Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publ. For a discussion of the role of the UN in ‘peace enforcement’ operations see Boulden, Jane (2001) *Peace Enforcement. The United Nations Experience in Congo, Somalia, and Bosnia*. London: Praeger.

‘Failed states’ pose *new problems of governance* that appear to require the simultaneous emphasis on establishing internal security – military, penal and judiciary – *and* general institution-building and investment in education, health, economic reform etc. Hence the policy-tools of both the security sector and the development sector appear necessary for an effective policy-response. Moreover, as evidenced by the case of Kosovo, the establishment of an internationally grounded internal sovereign entity (resolution 1244) produces a different logic of governance and entails considerable challenges of inter-agency coordination on the part of the multilateral system since it is the UN that have sovereign authority in the area, not a sovereign state.

Research Questions and Methodology

There is a tendency in the literature that focuses on the role of IOs as political agents of change, notably constructivist and neo-institutional theory, to focus on those success-cases in which there is a demonstrably effect of the international diffusion and institutionalization of new practices, such as in the field of human rights and environmental protection. Recently, Thomas Risse, himself a leading exponent of a moderate constructivist research agenda, noted that this methodological deficiency must be rectified as there is often a case-selection on the dependent variable.²¹ This leads to a bias in terms of empirical analyses of many ‘success-cases’ of normative change, but few comparative studies that include both successes and failures of ideationally or institutionally grounded change.²²

There is, further, a general absence in the literature on IOs and on the role of rules, ideas and norms of identifying and discussing *alternative* explanations for political change than those that pertain to the agency of international organizations: Is international policy-change explained by organizationally driven changes in ideational factors, or is it explained by changes in the structure of interests among key member states? This raises the issue of whether international organizations are epiphenomenal – reflecting the material interests of key member states – and whether policy change within IOs are best accounted for by reference to changes in the interests of major powers.²³

In order to move the research on the role of ideational factors and of the functioning of IOs further, then, one must also study the ‘hard’ cases in which policy change is not easily detected and in which it is explicitly recognized that the ‘high’ politics of strategic interaction in, say, the Security Council, have an impact on efforts of reform and policy change. Against this background, the project will be structured by a set of *general* and theoretically grounded questions that seeks to address some of the particular characteristics of IOs, namely the complex relation between the ‘low’ politics between different organizational units and ‘logics of governance’, on the one hand, and the ‘high politics’ of the interaction between member states, on the other:

²¹ Risse, T. (2002) “Transnational Actors in World Politics” in Carlsnaes, W., Risse, T. of Simmons, B. (eds) (2002) *Handbook of International Relations*. London: Sage

²² The current project on the role of knowledge funded by the Multi-program is arguably subject to this kind of critique.

²³ Simmons, L. and B. Martin (2002: 200) “International Organizations and Institutions” pp. 192–211. in Carlsnaes, W., Risse, T. of Simmons, B. (eds) (2002) *Handbook of International Relations*. London: Sage

- 1) What are the key factors that accounts for policy change and organizational reform within IOs?
- 2) What is the relationship between the factors emanating from ‘high’ politics of strategic interaction of member states, and the factors emanating from the ‘low’ politics of inter-agency rivalry in the UN?
- 3) What accounts for the slow and uneven process towards tighter coordination and integration between the field of development and the field of security?

These general research questions are addressed towards an identification of dynamics of reform and policy change within IOs and are focused towards the development-security nexus. The methodological challenge, of course, is to identify empirically rich cases that can provide a clue to these overarching research questions. The UNDP and the DPA are singled out because they represent, respectively, the field of development and the field of security. By way of focusing the analysis on how these two organizational units, the study is comparative in its research-design. In focusing on how these two organizations have sought to define and respond to one and the same phenomenon – the cross-cutting issue of ‘failed states’ – the project will seek to identify and account for the ‘logic of governance’ characteristic of these two organizations and link these to the general issue of reform and dynamics of change within IOs.

The following specific research questions will structure the analysis of how the UNDP and the DPKO/DPA have defined and developed policy-responses to ‘failed states’:

- 1) What is the conceptualization of and policy-response to ‘failed states’ within the UNDP, and the DPA/DPKO, and what are the differences between these?
- 2) Are there any changes over time in how ‘failed states’ are defined and sought resolved within these two organizations, and what accounts for these changes (organizational learning, changed interests and objectives of key member states such as the permanent five etc?)²⁴
- 3) How have these two organizations responded to and sought to coordinate their efforts of building a ‘culture of prevention’?

We can now see how these more specific research questions are linked up to the general, theoretically based research questions formulated above: These specific research questions will structure the search for an explanation and understanding of whether the axiomatic principles that underwrite and stabilize these organizations’ ‘logic of governance’ are changed in response to pressure from key member states such as the United States (high politics) or whether changes in problem-definitions and policy-responses are primarily endogenously driven by the organizational units within IOs. The project thus aims to produce knowledge that concerns, with descending levels of generality:

²⁴ Currently, the DPA and the UNDP have cross-referenced their web-sites on the issue of conflict prevention and governance. See <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/docs/peacemak.htm>

- 1) The character and logic of reform of IOs.
- 2) The development-security nexus within the UN
- 3) The UNDP and DPA's conceptualization of and responses to 'failed states'

Outcome

The outcome of the project will be:

i) A theoretically focused article to be published in a high-level international academic journal, i.e. *International Organization, European Journal of International Relations, Third World Quarterly, International Security, or Global Governance*

ii) A policy-oriented article to be published in relevant journal, i.e. *Foreign Affairs, International Peacekeeping*

iii) A policy-oriented report in Norwegian distributed to relevant institutions (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, NORAD etc).

iv) In collaboration with Professor Michael Barnett, I will in addition organize a one-day seminar at NUPI on the United Nations and the development-security nexus in the fall of 2004. Professor Barnett is professor at University of Wisconsin, Madison and has published widely on theoretical issues of international organizations, on the United Nations' role in peace support operations and, most recently, on the UN's role in Rwanda.²⁵ The seminar will be focused on the conceptual, organizational and political tensions between the field of development and the field of security within the United Nations.

Organization

The current project funded by the MULTI-program will be finalized in January 2003. The proposed project on "The multilateral system and the development-security nexus" will commence in May, 2003 as a shorter research-project financed by the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs will be undertaken between January and April 2003. Most of the research for the project will be performed at NUPI.

Timetable

August--December 2003: Start-up. Reading general literature on 'failed states', peace-support operations and development policy etc.

January – March 2004: Analysis of data. Supplemental data collection and writing. Data collection at UN headquarters, New York: Archive research and interviews.

April 2004 – December 2004: Writing two articles and policy-report. Supplemental data collection, New York

²⁵ Barnett, Michael (2002) *Eyewitness To A Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

National Network

The research will be performed at the Norwegian Institution of International Affairs, Oslo and, while in New York, with an affiliation to the International Peace Academy, New York. The project will be undertaken in close collaboration with the project, funded by the Research Council, performed by Ståle Ulriksen and Stein Sundstøl Eriksen at NUPI on 'Warfare and State Formation in Africa' which focuses on the D.R of Congo. The project will constitute one element in the proposed SIP on 'The State in the South' in the Department for Development Studies at NUPI, and work closely with both the academic part of the Training for Peace Program, and theme groups on 'Crisis Management, Peace Support Operations and the UN', and on the 'State and the State System' in the Department for International Politics, NUPI.

International Network

Professor Michael Barnett, University of Wisconsin, Madison

David Malone, Director, International Peace Academy

Professor Peter Evans, University of California, Berkeley. (SIP: 'State in the South')

Professor Mark Duffield, Leeds University. (SIP: 'State in the South')